DEVELOPMENT UPDATE #3: Phoenix Rising!

[MBot]

The North Pacific would have been a sideshow had a conventional land war in Europe started. The strategic goal of the Navy would have been the disruption of Soviet forces operating in the northern Atlantic to ensure the safe arrival of troops and supplies from North America for operation Reforger. Nothing happening in the Pacific would have had the strategic significance of the battle of the Atlantic had the Soviets attacked Europe.

 

 

While I share your view that the strategic priority of the USN lied with the Alantic Fleet (and therefore the Norwegian Sea Battle), I think you are underestimating the importance of the Pacific Fleet. Let me quote some excerpts from the Maritime Strategy:

 

CINCPAC stresses the importance of defense of the Aleutians. Soviet seizure of one of the Aleutian airfields could bring Hawaii and the US West Coast within easy Soviet air attack range.

...

In CINCPAC’s recent presentation of his strategic concepts to the JCS, he concluded that “swing”, by redeploying over half his carriers, cruisers, destroyers and all but six of his amphibious ships [to the Atlantic Fleet], would jeopardize even the capability to defend the US.

 

The USN also considered the defense of it's East Asian allies (Japan, South Korea) to be of higher priority than access to Middle East oil, further emphazising the strategic importance of the Northwest Pacific area:

 

• SWING “. . . IGNORES THE INCREASED SOVIET THREAT IN THE PACIFIC AND EXACERBATES THE INADEQUACY OF FORCES CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO PACOM.”

• “DEFENSE OF NE ASIA ALLIES AND THE PACOM LOCS SHOULD BE GIVEN HIGHER PRIORITY THAN ENSURING ACCESS TO SWA OIL IN A GLOBAL WAR SCENARIO.”

• DIFFERENT APPROACH PREFERRED.

•• NO “SWING” ASSUMED

•• PRIORITY TO NE ASIA ALLIES

 

In fact, CINCPAC prefers a different strategy approach, and has developed an alternative strategy which would carry out the four strategic priorities shown here. Basically, the SWA SLOC protection mission would be deferred in favor of engaging Soviet Far East forces well forward. The objective would be to keep Japan and Korea as active allies, maximize our own use of Korean and Japanese forces and bases and, at a minimum, deny the use of these bases to the Soviets. Early offensive strikes on the Soviets would support these key allies, strike at areas of exposed Soviet weakness and keep the Soviets preoccupied with homeland defense. CINCPAC’s sequence of operations, shown here, highlights the initial importance of the Aleutians, additional USAF TACAIR to northern Japan followed at some point by offensive mining, and strikes on Soviet client bases. In the initial operations phase, the IO CVBG would attack the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron as it redeployed out of the IO. A force of 3 CVBGs would generate in the vicinity of Guam and begin to sweep key SLOCs and position for subsequent strike operations. Korean and Japanese forces make major contributions in self-defense in this phase, while our own offensive naval operations confine and attrite Soviet Far East forces. In the subsequent offensive operations phase, the forces would help stabilize the situation in Korea. Then they would move forward to further increase the pressure on the Soviets, adding to their perception of our resolve to bring the consequences of aggression home to them until the war is terminated. This strategy assumes that the PRC as a minimum will serve as a force-in-being and will therefore tie down significant Soviet forces.

 

The above suggested approach by CINPAC was put into formal doctrin with the Maritime Stategy.

 

I think it becomes clear that the USN expected to fight simultaneous campaigns of significant strategic importance with both the Atlantic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet, making an expected conventional war with the Soviets a global one.

[chev255]

Thanks Mbot - "must spread rep"...

[NeilWillis]

But of course, Leatherneck aren't based in the Aleutians, they're based in Scandinavia, so my money will be on the North Atlantic being featured, for more fundamental reasons than the USN doctrine.

 

Very good argument though, and the significance of the Pacific cannot be ignored.

[CheckGear]

They are also large maps but seem much more plausible for a mid to late 80's Tomcat.

 

Plausibility for a mid-to-late-'80s Tomcat would be the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, not the GIUK Gap/North Atlantic. The F-14 gained it's reputation fighting Third World air forces, not superpower air forces.

 

Iceland is also a real possibility.

 

It's amazing how a work of fiction influenced thinking on a hypothetical war. There are a number of problems with an "invasion of Iceland" scenario, not least of which is logistics. In order to conduct and sustain an invasion/occupation of Iceland, the Soviets would've needed to ensure their own SLOCs stayed open. This was next to impossible, as the superior air and naval capabilities of NATO would've rendered any attempt to attack Iceland futile. Some people may say the Soviets would've been crazy enough to attempt it, but it's folly to assume your enemy is crazy. They're always smarter than you think.

 

Several people have posted on the conventional war plans for fighting the Soviets... I have read through them as well and I can say with complete confidence that nothing ever goes according to plan. The North Pacific would have been a sideshow had a conventional land war in Europe started. The strategic goal of the Navy would have been the disruption of Soviet forces operating in the northern Atlantic to ensure the safe arrival of troops and supplies from North America for operation Reforger. Nothing happening in the Pacific would have had the strategic significance of the battle of the Atlantic had the Soviets attacked Europe.

 

The problem inherent in this thinking is that war with the Soviets was never quite as likely as people believed. It was a "high-risk, low-probability" scenario and many of the characteristics of this hypothetical war were precisely the reason why it was unlikely to occur. Central Europe has long been considered the primary theater of this hypothetical war, but take a step back and look at the big picture - unless you desire heavy losses and a low gain-to-loss ratio, why would you fight your adversary at their strongest point? Furthermore, Soviet priorities weren't exactly what many of us think they were. According to primary sources, the mission of the Soviet Navy were, in order of importance:

 

1. Strategic nuclear strike;

2. Destruction of enemy naval forces;

3. Support for ground force operations;

4. Interdiction of enemy sea lanes of communication (SLOC)

5. Protection of Soviet SLOCs

 

See how far down the list the SLOC mission is? Yet people like Tom Clancy would have us believe the USSR would engage in a "Second Battle of the Atlantic" the way the Nazi Kriegsmarine did in World War II and even that campaign wasn't nearly as effective as people believe. The list of priorities reflect the defensive posture of the Soviet Navy and how the Soviet Armed Forces as a whole was a land-oriented force. More importantly, not all priorities were equal - preservation of Soviet strategic nuclear forces, particularly the ballistic missile submarines, would've consumed the lion's share of forces.

 

Now, what is for certain is that the Soviets would've also devoted much time and resources to the destruction of NATO carrier groups. This is where the "Badgers," "Backfires," and "Bears" (Oh my!) would come into play. But as I've stated in an earlier post, these were essentially kamikaze missions. The same was true for the Soviet submarines and surface vessels stalking NATO vessels. They would have pretty one or two opportunities to do maximum damage to the NATO carrier groups before they were put down for the count.

 

As stated before, the importance of the SLOC battle has been overstated. In fact, according to analysis conduct as long ago as the '80s, there is very little to suggest that interdiction of the SLOCs was ever a major part of their war planning. As disappointing as it may be for some, protecting those convoys wasn't ever going to be as exciting as some would've hoped. If anything, Soviet exercises and writings emphasized attacking port facilities as opposed to interdiction on the high seas, a mission that would've required their submarines to travel long distances through waters heavily patrolled by NATO anti-submarine forces. They could've damaged port facilities, but it would've come at a substantial cost for relatively low gains.

 

Even if the Soviets chose to wage a full-blown interdiction campaign against North Atlantic shipping, the impact would've been limited. NATO would've had 215 million tons of shipping to utilize at the start of a war in the mid-to-late-'80s. That's a pretty tall order to overcome on the part of forces that aren't anywhere near as capable as we believed.

 

I could go on forever here, as this is all fascinating stuff, but I'll end it with this - the Soviets may not have known the facts I've recited to you, but they knew enough to be afraid. That's in large part why they never challenged us on the high seas and why their military as a whole had a strategically defensive, if a tactically offensive, mindset. While NATO prepared to take the fight to the enemy, they would always be hindered by the fear of nuclear exchange, as well as the realization they lacked the ability to wage a long-term struggle for the Soviet bastions and attacks on places like the Kola Peninsula. And none of that would matter - the North Atlantic convoys would make it to Europe because the Soviets devoted their resources to protecting their SSBNs. The Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe would eventually lose steam and the East would either lose the war or sue for peace.

 

That's how it would've went down. And that's why it would've never happened. Nobody wages war against someone while seeking to encounter stiff resistance. More relevant to this F-14 module, this is also the reason why I want to see the World War III scenario put to rest. Permanently. It didn't happen and it was never going to happen. Time to devote efforts towards something more plausible.

Edited August 26, 2016 by CheckGear

[Vampyre]

Iceland is in the ball park for a Tomcat map. The "nothing ever goes according to plan" part is the critical piece of my post plus and the popular work of fiction you refer to leads me to think of Iceland as a possibility regardless of the actual real world planning. My true hope is that the map will be either Norway or Murmansk.

[CheckGear]

The "nothing ever goes according to plan" part is the critical piece of my post plus and the popular work of fiction you refer to leads me to think of Iceland as a possibility regardless of the actual real world planning.

 

"Nothing ever goes according to plan" means as much as "absence of evidence is evidence of absence." I've already shown how conventional wisdom on a hypothetical NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict is detached from reality. This is not to say some form of military conflict wouldn't be possible, but to say it would take a shape and form we would've never expected. That's where "nothing ever goes according to plan" has some relevance.

 

But this idea that the Soviet would actually shoot themselves in the foot and invade Iceland? That's a stretch among stretches. And yes, a work of fiction, is, ultimately, a work of fiction. There is no evidence invading Iceland was ever on the Soviet radar, as much as it may have made theoretical sense. It need not be said, but Red Storm Rising doesn't count as evidence. Again, it never ceases to amaze me how a work of fiction has made believers out of so many people, all the while completely disregarding primary sources and the real evidence. Nothing ever goes according to plan, but humans are creatures of habit as well and they tend to follow certain patterns.

[Vampyre]

"Nothing ever goes according to plan" means as much as "absence of evidence is evidence of absence." I've already shown how conventional wisdom on a hypothetical NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict is detached from reality. This is not to say some form of military conflict wouldn't be possible, but to say it would take a shape and form we would've never expected. That's where "nothing ever goes according to plan" has some relevance.

 

But this idea that the Soviet would actually shoot themselves in the foot and invade Iceland? That's a stretch among stretches. And yes, a work of fiction, is, ultimately, a work of fiction. There is no evidence invading Iceland was ever on the Soviet radar, as much as it may have made theoretical sense. It need not be said, but Red Storm Rising doesn't count as evidence. Again, it never ceases to amaze me how a work of fiction has made believers out of so many people, all the while completely disregarding primary sources and the real evidence. Nothing ever goes according to plan, but humans are creatures of habit as well and they tend to follow certain patterns.

 

You do realize we are talking about a map for a computer game about a fictional war that never happened right? The "absence of evidence is evidence of absence" quote is not really valid in this case because none of this came to pass. The fact that an enemy will not behave as one expects and Iceland being of strategic importance during the Cold War is a good enough reason to make a DCS map of it... possibly better because of its small relative size and the fact that all DCS maps made so far are small. Iceland is just as valid a possibility as any of the other guesses for the Tomcat map.

[CheckGear]

You say:

 

You do realize we are talking about a map for a computer game about a fictional war that never happened right? The "absence of evidence is evidence of absence" quote is not really valid in this case because none of this came to pass.

 

Then you say:

 

The fact that an enemy will not behave as one expects and Iceland being of strategic importance during the Cold War is a good enough reason to make a DCS map of it... possibly better because of its small relative size and the fact that all DCS maps made so far are small. Iceland is just as valid a possibility as any of the other guesses for the Tomcat map.

 

If the fact that an enemy will not behave as one expects and Iceland being of strategic importance is a good enough reason to make a DCS map of it, then no, the fact it was a "war that never was" isn't all that relevant. Part of the fascination behind the NATO-Warsaw Pact scenario is the sheer amount of firepower involved, the relative parity of participants, the high-intensity nature of the scenario, and the fact it was a daily risk for almost half a century. Yes, the war never actually happened, but it doesn't make the facts irrelevant.

 

As for the enemy not behaving as one expects, again, one can get carried away with this belief. It's more accurate to say one doesn't know thy enemy as well as one thinks. But that hardly makes the enemy some unpredictable force of nature. The enemy is comprised of living, breathing, human beings and they operate with the same basic level of functionality as we do. They stick to norms and patterns, just like we do. This is why primary sources, such as written Soviet doctrine, as well as their military exercises, are so important to refer to in any discussion on the matter - this is what they're thinking and doing. This idea that you do one thing when training, then suddenly find an extra gear and become this unbelievable foe capable of incredible feats makes for good fiction, but that's not how things actually work in the real world. None of this is to say the enemy would stick strictly to the script, but improvisation is the most they'll do. For the most part, they stick to what's on hand.

 

Same thing with Iceland being of strategic importance. Again, what is the enemy thinking? What is the view from their perspective? From our vantage point, Iceland is very important. Nothing says the Soviets saw it that way. Even if they did, there's even less to suggest they intended to do anything about it. Just because a war breaks out doesn't mean they suddenly start thinking on a higher level. If anything, war breaks people down to their more base levels and instincts and they tend to stick to what they know. When you get down to it, there isn't anything all that unpredictable about the enemy.

 

Case in point - as we prepared to liberate Kuwait from Iraq, a lot of people thought it would be a bloodbath and that the Coalition and the Iraqis would exchange heavy losses. As it turned out, the Iraqis were nowhere near as competent as we thought. We had based our expectations on the Iran-Iraq War, when we should've actually based our expectations on the Arab-Israeli wars. Professional western-style armed forces versus conscript-laden, Eastern-style forces, not armed forces of authoritarian country versus armed forces of another authoritarian country. But I digress.

 

Plausibility, especially in a military simulation, matters as much as functionality. It's been a selling point of these games ever since the first simulation was released. The World War III scenario, along with an attack on Iceland, just doesn't work all that great in light of the facts.

Edited August 26, 2016 by CheckGear

[Vampyre]

You say:

 

 

 

Then you say:

 

 

 

If the fact that an enemy will not behave as one expects and Iceland being of strategic importance is a good enough reason to make a DCS map of it, then no, the fact it was a "war that never was" isn't all that relevant. Part of the fascination behind the NATO-Warsaw Pact scenario is the sheer amount of firepower involved, the relative parity of participants, the high-intensity nature of the scenario, and the fact it was a daily risk for almost half a century. Yes, the war never actually happened, but it doesn't make the facts irrelevant.

 

As for the enemy not behaving as one expects, again, one can get carried away with this belief. It's more accurate to say one doesn't know thy enemy as well as one thinks. But that hardly makes the enemy some unpredictable force of nature. The enemy is comprised of living, breathing, human beings and they operate with the same basic level of functionality as we do. They stick to norms and patterns, just like we do. This is why primary sources, such as written Soviet doctrine, as well as their military exercises, are so important to refer to in any discussion on the matter - this is what they're thinking and doing. This idea that you do one thing when training, then suddenly find an extra gear and become this unbelievably capable foe makes for good fiction, but that's not how things actually work in the real world. None of this is to say the enemy would stick strictly to the script, but improvisation is the most they'll do. For the most part, they stick to what's on hand.

 

Same thing with Iceland being of strategic importance. Again, what is the enemy thinking? What is the view from their perspective? From our vantage point, Iceland is very important. Nothing says the Soviets saw it that way. Even if they did, there's even less to suggest they intended to do anything about it. Just because a war breaks out doesn't mean they suddenly start thinking on a higher level. If anything, war breaks people down to their more base levels and instincts and they tend to stick to what they know. When you get down to it, there isn't anything all that unpredictable about the enemy.

 

Case in point - as we prepared to liberate Kuwait from Iraq, a lot of people thought it would be a bloodbath and that the Coalition and the Iraqis would exchange heavy losses. As it turned out, the Iraqis were nowhere near as competent as we thought. We had based our expectations on the Iran-Iraq War, when we should've actually based our expectations on the Arab-Israeli wars. Professional western-style armed forces versus conscript-laden, Eastern-style forces, not armed forces of authoritarian country versus armed forces of another authoritarian country. But I digress.

 

Plausibility, especially in a military simulation, matters as much as functionality. It's been a selling point of these games ever since the first simulation was released. The World War III scenario, along with an attack on Iceland, just doesn't work all that great in light of the facts.

 

The US fighting in the Caucuses is not plausible either... yet it is the main map included in DCS and a lot of people are happy with it being that way. You don't believe Iceland is a possibility for a DCS map due to the belief that the USSR was predictable and it would be a dumb move. Got it. But an Iceland map does have a lot of things going for it with size, strategic importance, and a culturally significant work of fiction. Don't be confused, I am not advocating for this map, I merely mentioned that it is a real possibility as a Tomcat map and I would rather see the Norwegian Sea or Murmansk Peninsula in DCS as I believe they would be a better value gameplay wise.

[CheckGear]

The US fighting in the Caucuses is not plausible either... yet it is the main map included in DCS and a lot of people are happy with it being that way.

 

DCS using the Caucasus probably has more to do with the recent conflicts in the region, along with the legacy of using the Black Sea as a theater of war going back to the Su-27 Flanker days, which led to the development of DCS. So yeah, the U.S. fighting in the Caucasus isn't plausible, but the ongoing wars in the region make it somewhat more plausible than the GIUK Gap/North Atlantic theater, which hasn't seen a war in over 70 years.

 

You don't believe Iceland is a possibility for a DCS map due to the belief that the USSR was predictable and it would be a dumb move. Got it. But an Iceland map does have a lot of things going for it with size, strategic importance, and a culturally significant work of fiction. Don't be confused, I am not advocating for this map, I merely mentioned that it is a real possibility as a Tomcat map and I would rather see the Norwegian Sea or Murmansk Peninsula in DCS as I believe they would be a better value gameplay wise.

 

Just to be clear, I enjoy these sorts of discussion. My persistence is indicative of my passion in these topics as opposed to an intent to argue.

 

I disagree regarding Iceland and the Norwegian Sea; I agree regarding the Kola Peninsula. The Murmansk/Severomorsk area certainly provides a wide range of targets to attack and numerous enemies to engage. The problem is, and I've made this argument already, we've seen all this before in other simulations. Yes, DCS continues to trot out the Black Sea/Caucasus region and I've called them out on it before, and this is also why I want them to break the cycle and explore other theaters. Gameplay certainly matters and the Kola Peninsula isn't the only place that would work for the F-14. We have a Strait of Hormuz map coming up; that's the best combination of gameplay/plausibility as any. I'd like to also see a North Persian Gulf map, and, as grand an undertaking as this may be, a Sea of Japan map as well. Different places other than the same old Kola Peninsula that offer both gameplay value and plausibility.

[MBot]

Let me add my 2 cents on Iceland. I agree that a Soviet invasion of Iceland in the opening stage of a war would have been highly improbable. Taking and supplying it against an opposing US Navy would have been next to impossible and I am not aware that this was ever in Soviet planing, nor that the US expected this to be a Soviet intention. The frequent public misconception on the strategic importance of Iceland probably comes from misunderstanding that the GIUK-gap is primary an ASW barrier. The Soviets do would have wanted to attack Iceland with cruise missiles, airstrikes and special forces in order to neutralize the SOSUS net.

 

The Soviet Navy did follow a largely defensive strategic posture with the priorities described above (1. Strategic nuclear forces, 2. Defend homeland, 3. Interdict enemy SLOC). 1. and 2. are actually the reason why the Soviets would have wanted to attack Norway. To remove NATO airbases in North Norway within striking distance of the strategic submarine bases and to seize the same airbases from which to exercise control over the Norwegian Sea in order to expand the security perimeter around the homeland and the submarine bastions. Strategic defense through offensive action, a very Soviet line of thought. NATO on the other hand wanted to defend its member Norway, keep the enemy away from interfering with the GIUK ASW-barrier and the US in particular wanted to strike the flanks of the Soviet homeland. Therefore in case of a US-USSR war, the Norwegian Sea would most likely have indeed become the mother of all naval battles.

 

To come back to the significance of Iceland as a playable theater. There are plausible scenarios to explain it. Let's assume that the Soviets would succeed in sinking several CVBG and SSN, win the Norwegian Sea battle and seize Norway (while improbable, still possible). With the enemy naval force crippled and available Norwegian bases to secure the supply lines through the Norwegian Sea, an invasion of Iceland would now be a possible exploitation of previous succes. Some time later US CVBG swung from other theaters, or made available after overhaul in CONUS could approach from the North Atlantic to retake Iceland (and provide the the opportunity for the player to fly missions with his F-14). While this scenario is not completely unrealistic in my opinion, it pales in comparison to the significance and plausibility of the Norwegian theater.

[CheckGear]

Let me add my 2 cents on Iceland. I agree that a Soviet invasion of Iceland in the opening stage of a war would have been highly improbable. Taking and supplying it against an opposing US Navy would have been next to impossible and I am not aware that this was ever in Soviet planing, nor that the US expected this to be a Soviet intention. The frequent public misconception on the strategic importance of Iceland probably comes from misunderstanding that the GIUK-gap is primary an ASW barrier. The Soviets do would have wanted to attack Iceland with cruise missiles, airstrikes and special forces in order to neutralize the SOSUS net.

 

No problems there.

 

The Soviet Navy did follow a largely defensive strategic posture with the priorities described above (1. Strategic nuclear forces, 2. Defend homeland, 3. Interdict enemy SLOC). 1. and 2. are actually the reason why the Soviets would have wanted to attack Norway. To remove NATO airbases in North Norway within striking distance of the strategic submarine bases and to seize the same airbases from which to exercise control over the Norwegian Sea in order to expand the security perimeter around the homeland and the submarine bastions. Strategic defense through offensive action, a very Soviet line of thought. NATO on the other hand wanted to defend its member Norway, keep the enemy away from interfering with the GIUK ASW-barrier and the US in particular wanted to strike the flanks of the Soviet homeland. Therefore in case of a US-USSR war, the Norwegian Sea would most likely have indeed become the mother of all naval battles.

 

Again, I love these sorts of discussions, which is why I'm choosing to engage here.

 

I'm not sure if your referencing any primary sources here, but attacking Norway actually seems counter-productive. For one, any attack, as you imply, would need to be an amphibious one, as the terrain of Norway makes a land invasion difficult. The same applies to NATO if they were ever contemplating a land attack on the Soviet Union. Much of the USSR's ground forces in the north were amphibious units anyway. Second,while land bases in Norway certainly seem like a threat, remember that much of NATO's resources would be committed to fighting the war in Central Europe. There isn't much of an offensive threat posed by either the Norwegian military nor the forces that would be deployed there to reinforce NATO positions. Third, while defeating NATO naval forces was priority #2, not all priorities held equal value. Defense of USSR's strategic nuclear forces were of utmost importance, even at the risk of other priorities. Aside from it's attack submarines and bomber forces, the likelihood of the Soviets devoting that many resources to fighting a naval battle in the Norwegian Sea is very low.

 

You can see this in both the way Soviet warships were designed and the way crews were trained. Simply put, like much of Soviet equipment, they weren't built to last. They were intended for short, intense, individual operations; one big punch only. Soviet ships also trained to operate alone, instead of in groups like NATO vessels. Again, this is the kamikaze mindset on display yet again. Place this within the context of preserving the strategic nuclear deterrent as priority #1. Do you think the Soviets would have sacrificed sacrificed a large their Sunday punchers to defeat NATO's naval forces?

 

The more one uncovers, the more unlikely this "mother of all naval battles" becomes. It's just too far out of character with how the Soviets thought and operated. Even if this "mother of all naval battles" occurred, it would ultimately be a very one-sided affair in NATO's favor. Then the Soviets would have nothing to defend their bastion with, possibly increasing the likelihood of nuclear exchange.

 

To come back to the significance of Iceland as a playable theater. There are plausible scenarios to explain it. Let's assume that the Soviets would succeed in sinking several CVBG and SSN, win the Norwegian Sea battle and seize Norway (while improbable, still possible). With the enemy naval force crippled and available Norwegian bases to secure the supply lines through the Norwegian Sea, an invasion of Iceland would now be a possible exploitation of previous succes. Some time later US CVBG swung from other theaters, or made available after overhaul in CONUS could approach from the North Atlantic to retake Iceland (and provide the the opportunity for the player to fly missions with his F-14). While this scenario is not completely unrealistic in my opinion, it pales in comparison to the significance and plausibility of the Norwegian theater.

 

Even if one were to suspend disbelief, you run into the issue of logistics, again. The Soviets would've probably taken heavy losses and their resource expenditures would probably be considerable enough to keep them from going any further than Norway. The Soviets didn't have a very logistically sound military; the idea was to have enough resources to sustain one massive effort in hopes of winning the war in the first round. But, as Vampyre so astutely points out, nothing ever goes as planned. Even with their 90-day supply of material, they'd probably run low within a week to a few weeks. Even Tom Clancy, whom I hardly consider a credible source, depicts as much in Red Storm Rising.

[MBot]

I'm not sure if your referencing any primary sources here, but attacking Norway actually seems counter-productive. For one, any attack, as you imply, would need to be an amphibious one, as the terrain of Norway makes a land invasion difficult. The same applies to NATO if they were ever contemplating a land attack on the Soviet Union. Much of the USSR's ground forces in the north were amphibious units anyway. Second,while land bases in Norway certainly seem like a threat, remember that much of NATO's resources would be committed to fighting the war in Central Europe. There isn't much of an offensive threat posed by either the Norwegian military nor the forces that would be deployed there to reinforce NATO positions. Third, while defeating NATO naval forces was priority #2, not all priorities held equal value. Defense of USSR's strategic nuclear forces were of utmost importance, even at the risk of other priorities. Aside from it's attack submarines and bomber forces, the likelihood of the Soviets devoting that many resources to fighting a naval battle in the Norwegian Sea is very low.

 

North Norwegian air bases such as Bodö or Bardufoss were actually of high strategic importance. During the Cold War, Norway instituted a delicate policy of balancing the needs of the NATO alliance and especially the USA, to base forces in country, versus the perceived threat these forces posed for the neighboring Soviet Union. In the case of these airbases, Norway did not allow its allies to bring certain aircraft (or nuclear weapons) to Norway. For example, during actual exercises the Marines were not allowed to bring their Intruders to Norway because of the offensive threat they posed for the USSR. I think it was pretty clear for all parties that in case of war, any such limits were off the table (and it was publicity stated doctrine by the US to attack the Soviet homeland). The readily available NATO plans for the reinforcement of North Norway call for a massive build up of air power. Therefore strike aircraft such as the Intruder (and with them their nuclear weapons) based in North Norway were posing an existential threat to the ports of a significant part of the Soviet strategic submarine force. Considering the importance the Soviets placed on their strategic forces, it is not far stretched to assume that they would go great lengths to remove such threats.

 

Unfortunately I do not have primary sources for the Soviets, but their force structure gives a lot of insight into war plans. Significant forces in the Northwestern TVD such as amphibious shipping, assault troops, airborne forces, the Red Army, the VVS etc. were of no value to the defense of the homeland and the strategic forces other than through offensive action. Considering prevalence of offensive action in Soviet operational and tactical military thinking, I think it would be highly surprising that the Northwestern TVD would just sit around doing nothing in case of war.

Edited August 26, 2016 by MBot

[JunMcKill]

The idea came from Tom Clancy's RED STORM RISING that took one of the best scenarios of the superb game HARPOON in the 80s.

 

Let me add my 2 cents on Iceland. I agree that a Soviet invasion of Iceland in the opening stage of a war would have been highly improbable. Taking and supplying it against an opposing US Navy would have been next to impossible and I am not aware that this was ever in Soviet planing, nor that the US expected this to be a Soviet intention. The frequent public misconception on the strategic importance of Iceland probably comes from misunderstanding that the GIUK-gap is primary an ASW barrier. The Soviets do would have wanted to attack Iceland with cruise missiles, airstrikes and special forces in order to neutralize the SOSUS net.

 

The Soviet Navy did follow a largely defensive strategic posture with the priorities described above (1. Strategic nuclear forces, 2. Defend homeland, 3. Interdict enemy SLOC). 1. and 2. are actually the reason why the Soviets would have wanted to attack Norway. To remove NATO airbases in North Norway within striking distance of the strategic submarine bases and to seize the same airbases from which to exercise control over the Norwegian Sea in order to expand the security perimeter around the homeland and the submarine bastions. Strategic defense through offensive action, a very Soviet line of thought. NATO on the other hand wanted to defend its member Norway, keep the enemy away from interfering with the GIUK ASW-barrier and the US in particular wanted to strike the flanks of the Soviet homeland. Therefore in case of a US-USSR war, the Norwegian Sea would most likely have indeed become the mother of all naval battles.

 

To come back to the significance of Iceland as a playable theater. There are plausible scenarios to explain it. Let's assume that the Soviets would succeed in sinking several CVBG and SSN, win the Norwegian Sea battle and seize Norway (while improbable, still possible). With the enemy naval force crippled and available Norwegian bases to secure the supply lines through the Norwegian Sea, an invasion of Iceland would now be a possible exploitation of previous succes. Some time later US CVBG swung from other theaters, or made available after overhaul in CONUS could approach from the North Atlantic to retake Iceland (and provide the the opportunity for the player to fly missions with his F-14). While this scenario is not completely unrealistic in my opinion, it pales in comparison to the significance and plausibility of the Norwegian theater.

[Rangi]

I wonder if an AIM-54 can rise from the ashes of this thread?

[MBot]

We are talking about the scenarios the AIM-54 was buit for, so I think it has at least some peripheral relevance :)

[CheckGear]

North Norwegian air bases such as Bodö or Bardufoss were actually of high strategic importance. During the Cold War, Norway instituted a delicate policy of balancing the needs of the NATO alliance and especially the USA, to base forces in country, versus the perceived threat these forces posed for the neighboring Soviet Union. In the case of these airbases, Norway did not allow its allies to bring certain aircraft (or nuclear weapons) to Norway. For example, during actual exercises the Marines were not allowed to bring their Intruders to Norway because of the offensive threat they posed for the USSR. I think it was pretty clear for all parties that in case of war, any such limits were off the table (and it was publicity stated doctrine by the US to attack the Soviet homeland). The readily available NATO plans for the reinforcement of North Norway call for a massive build up of air power. Therefore strike aircraft such as the Intruder (and with them their nuclear weapons) based in North Norway were posing an existential threat to the ports of a significant part of the Soviet strategic submarine force.

 

This is where one has to get inside the minds of both NATO and Warsaw Pact commanders and think strategically - is the threat posed by NATO forces in Norway in a reinforced state effective in terms of deterrence or in terms of actually degrading the enemy's ability to wage war?

 

For instance, you mentioned nuclear weapons. Nukes are clearly weapons of deterrence, although the Soviets didn't necessarily see it the same way, but that's a whole different issue. At least, from NATO's perspective, nukes are more effective when not used. Once used, they may destroy a lot of targets, but it makes termination of the conflict that much more difficult. This is obviously problematic, because the goal of war is essentially to resolve conflict.

 

But take nukes out of the equation. Without them, what threat do reinforced NATO forces in Norway pose to the Kola Peninsula? You say it's a "significant existential" threat - Murmansk is 80 miles from the Norway-Soviet Union border. Never mind that precision-targeting was still undergoing growing pains in the mid-to-late-'80s. NATO would still have to contend with substantial air defenses and the availability (or lack thereof) of airborne refueling tankers and other resources that could either alleviate or compound operational difficulties. The war in Central Europe, along with the possibility of wars going on in other parts of the world, would severely restrict the amount of reinforcements available to the Arctic front. In other words, NATO forces in Norway actually don't present as substantial of a threat to the USSR as they may seem. Put carrier-based air power into the mix, the calculus changes. But these carriers would first have to contend with the bulk of the Soviet Red Banner Northern Fleet protecting the bastion in the upper reaches of the Norwegian Sea. And that possibility raises plenty of questions of it's own, a) regarding the physical ability of NATO naval forces to destroy the Soviet fleet in their own waters and b) Whether it's best to do so or to use the threat of such an action as leverage towards war termination negotiations.

 

Considering the importance the Soviets placed on their strategic forces, it is not far stretched to assume that they would go great lengths to remove such threats.

 

It's difficult to know whether the Soviets saw NATO forces in Norway the same way I just explained. But it's also unreasonable to assume the Soviets were completely ignorant of NATO's capabilities and of their own strengths and weaknesses. In my view, there was little for the Soviets to gain by going on the offensive in Norway. Given much of NATO would be bogged down in Central Europe, there was actually more incentive for them to rely on their air defenses to blunt any NATO offensive from Scandinavia into Soviet territory. Going on the offense as a defensive strategy is certainly a central part of their military thinking, but that doesn't mean they engaged only in offensive activities. Things like terrain and the difficulty in reaching the west coast of Norway would've made any Soviet commander think twice about engaging in such a vast undertaking. War certainly removes many limits, but that doesn't mean people suddenly put all their cards on the table.

 

Unfortunately I do not have primary sources for the Soviets, but their force structure gives a lot of insight into war plans. Significant forces in the Northwestern TVD such as amphibious shipping, assault troops, airborne forces, the Red Army, the VVS etc. were of no value to the defense of the homeland and the strategic forces other than through offensive action. Considering prevalence of offensive action in Soviet operational and tactical military thinking, I think it would be highly surprising that the Northwestern TVD would just sit around doing nothing in case of war.

 

That sounds true in theory. However, their ability to be successful in such offensive operations is highly contingent on factors such as surprise. As I said above, war removes many limits, but it doesn't necessarily make people do suicidal things. Unless NATO was thoroughly unprepared, NATO defenses in Norway were essentially non-existent, and the Soviets were aware of it, I find it even more difficult to believe the Soviets would commit such a large number of some of their best forces (airborne, naval infantry, etc.) to a battle that would've been extremely difficult to win.

[MBot]

This is where one has to get inside the minds of both NATO and Warsaw Pact commanders and think strategically - is the threat posed by NATO forces in Norway in a reinforced state effective in terms of deterrence or in terms of actually degrading the enemy's ability to wage war?

 

Ask yourselves the following question. Assuming that the Soviets would have several air bases 600 km off the coast of Norfolk, do you belief the US would tolerate this? I am 100% certain the US would invade the place at the first possible minute (considering the Cuba Crisis, the USA would probably even go to war over this). NATO air power in North Norway posed a direct threat, both conventional and nuclear, to the Kola peninsula. It was the USA's publicity stated policy to do exactly this!

 

Anyway, until I see a primary Soviet source that say otherwise, I am willing to belief the assessment of the US intelligence services, who expected an attack on Norway to be a part of war between the USA and the Soviets:

 

The current National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet naval wartime strategy is the agreed upon, best estimate by the U.S. intelligence community.

...

The war at sea cannot be discussed without consideration of the land/air/battle. This chart shows the likely Soviet initial land/air attack posture once the situation transitioned to global war. The primary Soviet thrust would be in Central Europe. Smaller attacks would also occur to attempt to seize Northern Norway and the Turkish Straits. In the Far East, the Soviets would attack U.S. forces in the Pacific. They would also pressure the Japanese to deny to the U.S. the use of naval and air facilities. If they fail because of the U.S.-Japanese alliance (as the Maritime Strategy assumes), they would attack Japan, initially by air. North Korea might take the opportunity to attack South Korea. The Soviets would seek not to provoke the Chinese into entering the war against them but would not let their guard down in Asia. Even if the Chinese attacked the Soviets, however, the Soviet focus would nevertheless remain on Europe.

 

Source: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s

https://fas.org/irp/doddir/navy/strategy1980s.pdf

 

 

Here is another interesting document from 1989 on the situation on North Norway:

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a231546.pdf

(read from page 33 if nothing else)

 

Note that this is a RAND document and not an official US position, nevertheless it gives a good initial overview on the NATO northern flank.

Edited August 27, 2016 by MBot

[scaflight]

Ask yourselves the following question. Assuming that the Soviets would have several air bases 600 km off the coast of Norfolk, do you belief the US would tolerate this? I am 100% certain the US would invade the place at the first possible minute (considering the Cuba Crisis, the USA would probably even go to war over this). NATO air power in North Norway posed a direct threat, both conventional and nuclear, to the Kola peninsula. It was the USA's publicity stated policy to do exactly this!

 

Anyway, until I see a primary Soviet source that say otherwise, I am willing to belief the assessment of the US intelligence services, who expected an attack on Norway to be a part of war between the USA and the Soviets:

 

 

 

Source: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s

https://fas.org/irp/doddir/navy/strategy1980s.pdf

 

 

Here is another interesting document from 1989 on the situation on North Norway:

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a231546.pdf

(read from page 33 if nothing else)

 

Note that this is a RAND document and not an official US position, nevertheless it gives a good initial overview on the NATO northern flank.

 

Thanks for being a sourcy kinda guy, MBot.

 

The RAND document indeed provides some very good arguments for how the Soviets might have acted in the event of war. What I pictured earlier was an AO which relies on a few key premises that I think are realistic enough that LN might have opted for it. These are,

 

* Soviet forces attack through Finnmark quickly, winning the land battle until the defensive lines in the Lyngen Alps (close to Tromsø).

* NATO presence is sufficient to stall amphibious assaults further than Tromsø/Andøya.

 

Additionally, smaller units of airborne or amphibious desantes may fail to hold Bodø AFB, though certainly cripple it for a while.

 

This would give LN a scenario full of potential where they could focus their efforts wherever they wanted: ground battle in the mountains, or air/sea battles north of Lofoten. Every asset in the Soviet inventory could be present.

 

This all leads to the single thing I'd like to see more than anything else: a CV operating in the radar shadow of the Lofoten mountains. Right next to my home.

 

 

 

Enthusiastic though I am, certainly the Iceland AO represents a much more economical terrain in terms of effort and detail. I therefore find that to be a more likely venue for LN's efforts. :cry:

[CheckGear]

Ask yourselves the following question. Assuming that the Soviets would have several air bases 600 km off the coast of Norfolk, do you belief the US would tolerate this? I am 100% certain the US would invade the place at the first possible minute (considering the Cuba Crisis, the USA would probably even go to war over this). NATO air power in North Norway posed a direct threat, both conventional and nuclear, to the Kola peninsula. It was the USA's publicity stated policy to do exactly this!

 

It depends. Does a full state of war exist between the U.S. and USSR? What sorts of capabilities do the Soviets have at those bases? Is there a more effective way to deal with those threats? How isolated are the Soviets? These situations are far more complex than you'd imagine.

 

Anyway, until I see a primary Soviet source that say otherwise, I am willing to belief the assessment of the US intelligence services, who expected an attack on Norway to be a part of war between the USA and the Soviets:

 

While I find primary sources to be valuable resources that shed light on how a party to a conflict is thinking, this also has to be viewed in context of the big picture and the means available to each side. Just because the U.S. intelligence services expected an attack doesn't mean it would've occurred. Remember that U.S. intelligence services were found to have exaggerated and over-estimated the threat posed by the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact. I can't say whether they did so intentionally, but it gives you every reason to take U.S. intelligence agency assessments with a grain of salt. To see how easily they embellished the Soviet threat, read their annual "Soviet Military Power" publications. It's actually pretty humorous to read, knowing what we know now.

 

Not to overdo the subject, but remember it was the same U.S. intelligence services that feared a Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf to seize the oil fields. I'm pretty sure they had their reasons for thinking so, but do just a little bit of research and you'll find they never had the capability to pull off such an attack.

 

Here is another interesting document from 1989 on the situation on North Norway:

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a231546.pdf

(read from page 33 if nothing else)

 

Note that this is a RAND document and not an official US position, nevertheless it gives a good initial overview on the NATO northern flank.

 

Note this segment from p. 34:

 

A Soviet overland advance through the Nordland regions of Norway, Finland, or Sweden would be extremely difficult. Lying above the Arctic Circle, the region offers an inhospitable climate. The terrain in Finland and Sweden is swampy, that of Norway mountainous and intersected by fjords. The road network is extremely limited, and during most months of the year off-road travel is impossible for all but the most specialized vehicles. Thus, a successful Soviet advance would necessarily rely on desant forces: the Soviet term for combat forces-airborne, airmobile, and amphibious troops-designed to conduct combat operations in the enemy's rear areas. Desant units can be used to outflank enemy defenses at the tactical, operational, or even strategic level. Significantly, we find desant units disproportionately represented in this region, including one airborne division, an air assault brigade, naval special purpose (Spetsnaz) forces, and a naval infantry brigade (which includes a parachute regiment).

 

This is where one has to read between the lines. Unless NATO is taken completely by surprise, these Desant units would be outgunned and outnumbered. If you're a Soviet commander, you have to decide whether it's worth sending these units to their certain deaths in an attempt to secure these targets. As elite as Soviet airborne, air assault, naval infantry, and Spetznaz forces are, unless reinforced, they're pretty much sitting ducks against NATO forces.

 

Then there's this bit on p. 37:

 

At the other extreme, one cannot rule out the possibility that the Soviets would do nothing at all, content to take a purely defensive posture in the northern region. Soviet planners may find that operations in the far north would be too great a drain on their limited resources. The experience of the Second World War could not be considered encouraging for a Soviet planner. During the 1939-1944 war between the Finns and the Soviets, in what the Finns call the Continuation War, the Soviets suffered one million casualties against a nation of only 3 million people. Yet, despite the enormous Soviet effort, the Soviets never occupied Helsinki, the only enemy capital they failed to take.

 

Even RAND entertains the possibility that the Soviets may be content to take a defensive posture with respect to Norway. Although their ultimate conclusion is that the Soviets would take military action against Norway, they also outline other actions they could take short of invading Norway. These alternate courses of action are actually more consistent with the generally conservative mindset of the Soviet military.

 

I could go on for hours covering all the bases, but there're too many problems associated with a Soviet attack on Norway. There're also issues with NATO launching attacks on the Kola Peninsula, but the only thing I'll say about this is what I've said already - the threat of attack on Kola can be strategically more useful than actually taking the risk of going on the offensive.

 

But, in addition to lacking the means of doing anything we believed the Soviets to be remotely capable of doing, the greatest obstacle may be the war even happening at all. Timing is everything and the ability of the Soviets to attack Norway or even West Germany is contingent upon everything going right for them and everything going wrong for NATO. As we are all aware, such a prospect is so absurd that it's not even worth contemplating. And without questioning how and why a war would even start, we can't even begin to assess the likelihood of anything.

 

Thanks for being a sourcy kinda guy, MBot.

 

Now it's my turn to be a sourcy kind of guy. If you wish to learn more about the Soviet military (which is the all-important missing piece of the puzzle), I suggest the following:

 

- A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact 1955-1991

- The Collapse of the Soviet Military

- Inside the Soviet Army

- The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine

 

I have plenty more sources that I consult, but these are some of the better ones and provide a good starting point for understanding the Soviet Armed Forces. To put it mildly, the Soviet military nor the Warsaw Pact was what you think it was. In fact, I'd hardly be going out on a limb if I said the Soviet military was pretty useless as a warfighting entity.

Edited August 27, 2016 by CheckGear

[Andy1966]

any new map is a good map IMHO

[scaflight]

CheckGear, in response to your #112 and later posts:

 

 

Even RAND entertains the possibility that the Soviets may be content to take a defensive posture with respect to Norway. Although their ultimate conclusion is that the Soviets would take military action against Norway, they also outline other actions they could take short of invading Norway. These alternate courses of action are actually more consistent with the generally conservative mindset of the Soviet military.

You're running a risk of cherrypicking at this point, in the word's most sincere meaning in academia. When an argument is forwarded, such as RAND does, it's necessary to show that some evaluation has been given to the other hypothesis -- that we've made a token effort to falsify our arguments. What you quoted is a drop in an ocean, a paragraph in the whole text, but I think you're using it for more than it is worth.

 

"Even RAND entertains the ..." is not an argument, because RAND to be taken seriously has to. What you would prefer to do is say that RAND lists x y and z as factors that would make a Soviet defensive posture more likely.

 

 

 

When I tanked MBot for being 'the sourcy kinda guy', that meant attributing individual statements to sources. You're not really a sourcy kinda guy by just listing books. Much as I'm sure these are good reads, I can't attribute any of your information to them, because you haven't. Therefore, when you cite a 'generally conservative mindset' we're not really any the wiser as to what that means. Instead, I'd argue that it'd take a comatose mindset for them not to attack.

 

My response in this thread is to delve into the discussion to clarify something. At some point the effort to refute the "mother of all naval battles" became "the Soviets won't attack" (I paraphrase). As for the former, I don't want to analyze what posture NATO and Soviet naval forces would assume relative to one another in the event of a war, but I do think the latter notion has to be done away with. It is based on and perpetuates a loss-averse, un-creative or conservative Soviet military to state that Northern Norway would not be attacked.

 

NATO planning for Northern Norway shows a stark contrast. The entire county of Finnmark was virtually without defense (approx. 5,000 soldiers). Its status was as a buffer, with no intent on holding (Gjeseth, 2011). Thousands of NATO troops did exercises in the counties of Nordland and Troms, to the south; just about zero did anything in Finnmark. Therefore, on every level of evaluation, from the geopolitical (having a bargaining chip), strategic (buffering strategic forces, destroying ELINT facilities Vårberget), to the tactical (low losses), an attack on Finnmark makes sense for Russian commanders.

 

To refute your argument about desantes being outgunned -- they would face no other opposition than local defenses and whatever naval assets happened to be in the region; as the RAND argument goes, the disproportionate number of these forces near Murmansk contribute to a compelling case that the Soviets wanted to seize and hold Finnmark, whatever their strategic interest (SLOC, GIUK, nuclear defense etc) was. We can also argue that the threshold for tactical nukes is radically increased in a liberal democracy's territory, compared to a border skirmish. Additionally, that the great expanse of Finnmark allowed Soviet forces to disperse more than they could hope to in Russia, and to extend a SAM umbrella 400 km westwards, not to mention to better secure lines of communication with (entirely undefended) Svalbard, where Soviet SAMs would serve a strategic role. These are defensive considerations.

 

 

 

We're in essence down to a 'how could they not?' about very basic opportunism. The budget for what is and isn't worth an effort is difficult to draw up, but I don't see any reason the Soviet forces in the north would want to stay within their borders at all.

 

If anything, their best bet would be to expedite a rapid assault through Finnmark, launch cruise missiles at (poorly defended!) AFBs in Bardufoss, Andøya, Bodø and Evenes, and hope to dislodge the initial Norwegian defense in the Lyngen Alps before the defense even had the time to be set up. Assuming a highly conservative or outright timid Soviet commander, he could assume a defensive posture as soon as there was any opposition in the Lyngen area. Dealing with counterfactuals isn't easy, but this one's not among the hardest.

 

I don't pretend to go from this to surmise what efforts NATO naval assets would make. I do think, however, that naval superiority would be the defining factor in breaking any standoff. Whether either side has any interest in breaking that standoff is another matter altogether.

 

 

 

And clearly, none of this criticism is meant in any derogatory or offensive way! Simply intended to be positive and constructive. I just have to clarify, since text is such a poor medium for conveying emotion. :)

 

Gjeseth, Gullow (2011). Landforsvarets krigsplaner under den kalde krigen. Oslo: Fagbokforlaget.

Edited August 28, 2016 by scaflight

[Coxy_99]

I bet LNS love this pre guessing haha

[CheckGear]

You're running a risk of cherrypicking at this point, in the word's most sincere meaning in academia. When an argument is forwarded, such as RAND does, it's necessary to show that some evaluation has been given to the other hypothesis -- that we've made a token effort to falsify our arguments. What you quoted is a drop in an ocean, a paragraph in the whole text, but I think you're using it for more than it is worth.

 

I pick my moments to be absolutely blunt and this is going to be one of them and I say this with no ad hominem intent - you don't know what cherry-picking is. It is using individual pieces of data to support an argument while ignoring or hiding the existence of other data that could refute said argument. I've not done that. I didn't pretend that the rest of the RAND report didn't exist. In fact, I even acknowledge, in the statement of mine you quoted, that RAND's position was that the Soviets would take military action against Norway. I was merely pointing out other areas of the report that provided alternative possibilities on the matter. These are worth taking seriously because they are part of the report, even if they don't form the core of their ultimate position (if they even have one).

 

If anything, I was resisting cherry-picking. Mbot's position seems to be that because the U.S. government or a think-tank thought so, it was guaranteed to happen and here are the reasons why. I was pointing out that in the very sources he consulted, there was still plenty of room for dissension on the matter.

 

"Even RAND entertains the ..." is not an argument, because RAND to be taken seriously has to. What you would prefer to do is say that RAND lists x y and z as factors that would make a Soviet defensive posture more likely.

 

I'm not trying to sell anything here. These discussions are a research tool. By bouncing ideas and thoughts off others, I learn new things and adjust my views accordingly, as well as return the favor by sharing my knowledge with others. Getting others to agree with me or "winning" a debate isn't the goal here. It's to share knowledge and learn something in the process. I have no problems with disagreement; what's important is that we get agree on the facts as much as possible. I have my position, others will have theirs and I have no difficulty wrapping my head around the reality people can look at the same thing and come to a different conclusion. So excuse me if I don't exactly present things in a way that conforms to your definition of "academic," because I'm not trying to earn a degree here.

 

What I'm seeing in this discussion is an attempt to justify archaic ways of thinking and a resistance to acknowledge information that challenges the popular narrative. It's incredible that a quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War, people still put so much stock into information that was either wrong, inaccurate, or has been superseded by new information. It's even more mind-boggling how people are allowing works of fiction to define reality. If you think that's something only the uninformed do, think again - much of what we think we know about World War II, the most publicized war in history, is wrong. I'll elaborate more on this if you wish.

 

When I tanked MBot for being 'the sourcy kinda guy', that meant attributing individual statements to sources. You're not really a sourcy kinda guy by just listing books. Much as I'm sure these are good reads, I can't attribute any of your information to them, because you haven't. Therefore, when you cite a 'generally conservative mindset' we're not really any the wiser as to what that means. Instead, I'd argue that it'd take a comatose mindset for them not to attack.

 

This is a variant of the "Pics or It Didn't Happen" mentality. Anybody can quote a piece of information. It's what you do with it that counts. What I've seen thus far (MBot, jump in here any time) is to adhere to some official word, take it at face value, and essentially discount all other relevant factors in play. One cannot view these things in isolation. It's not enough for someone to say they'd do something; the means, opportunity and context have to present. And as much as I'd love to list out every last one of my sources down to the page number, I don't, because I consult a number of sources at a time to support even a single point. I'd probably end up writing a whole post listing every specific quotation I utilize to make my arguments. Again, I'm not trying to earn a degree here.

 

But don't take my word for it - check out this passage written by Frank Chadwick, the wargame extraordinaire, in Desert Shield Fact Book

 

...how many tons of fuel will each US division consume a day? What is the fuel lift capacity of the trucks actually in place in Saudi Arabia? What volume of traffic can each of the roads crossing from Saudi Arabia to Iraq and Kuwait actually sustain? Without an answer to fundamental questions like that, it is impossible know which of the general outline plans argued back and forth are even possible

 

This is what's missing with all this "sourcing" - placing the information into context and addressing whether the nuts and bolts are on hand to implement the written intent. "Sourcing" means nothing if you choose to view the data in isolation. It may not be accurate to describe as"cherry-picking," but it's pretty darn close to it.

 

I also need to re-emphasize such "official" assessments and statements were, at best, based on incomplete information or, at worst, exaggerations and overestimations. Take them with a grain of salt, especially in light of the information we have available today.

 

My response in this thread is to delve into the discussion to clarify something. At some point the effort to refute the "mother of all naval battles" became "the Soviets won't attack" (I paraphrase). As for the former, I don't want to analyze what posture NATO and Soviet naval forces would assume relative to one another in the event of a war, but I do think the latter notion has to be done away with. It is based on and perpetuates a loss-averse, un-creative or conservative Soviet military to state that Northern Norway would not be attacked.

 

I never said the Soviets wouldn't attack. I just said the Soviets don't have the means to launch a successful invasion of Norway as envisioned by the folks of yesteryear. The low probability of success, among other factors, is why I believe the Soviets wouldn't risk such an undertaking, especially when there are other means of threatening Norway short of invasion. As for my implication the Soviet military is loss-averse, un-creative, or conservative, what sort of picture does a military filled with corrupt officers, persistent brutality, low morale, poorly-trained soldiers, equipment of questionable quality, and tactical inflexibility paint for you?

 

NATO planning for Northern Norway shows a stark contrast. The entire county of Finnmark was virtually without defense (approx. 5,000 soldiers). Its status was as a buffer, with no intent on holding (Gjeseth, 2011). Thousands of NATO troops did exercises in the counties of Nordland and Troms, to the south; just about zero did anything in Finnmark. Therefore, on every level of evaluation, from the geopolitical (having a bargaining chip), strategic (buffering strategic forces, destroying ELINT facilities Vårberget), to the tactical (low losses), an attack on Finnmark makes sense for Russian commanders.

 

To refute your argument about desantes being outgunned -- they would face no other opposition than local defenses and whatever naval assets happened to be in the region; as the RAND argument goes, the disproportionate number of these forces near Murmansk contribute to a compelling case that the Soviets wanted to seize and hold Finnmark, whatever their strategic interest (SLOC, GIUK, nuclear defense etc) was. We can also argue that the threshold for tactical nukes is radically increased in a liberal democracy's territory, compared to a border skirmish. Additionally, that the great expanse of Finnmark allowed Soviet forces to disperse more than they could hope to in Russia, and to extend a SAM umbrella 400 km westwards, not to mention to better secure lines of communication with (entirely undefended) Svalbard, where Soviet SAMs would serve a strategic role. These are defensive considerations.

 

 

 

We're in essence down to a 'how could they not?' about very basic opportunism. The budget for what is and isn't worth an effort is difficult to draw up, but I don't see any reason the Soviet forces in the north would want to stay within their borders at all.

 

If anything, their best bet would be to expedite a rapid assault through Finnmark, launch cruise missiles at (poorly defended!) AFBs in Bardufoss, Andøya, Bodø and Evenes, and hope to dislodge the initial Norwegian defense in the Lyngen Alps before the defense even had the time to be set up. Assuming a highly conservative or outright timid Soviet commander, he could assume a defensive posture as soon as there was any opposition in the Lyngen area. Dealing with counterfactuals isn't easy, but this one's not among the hardest.

 

I don't pretend to go from this to surmise what efforts NATO naval assets would make. I do think, however, that naval superiority would be the defining factor in breaking any standoff. Whether either side has any interest in breaking that standoff is another matter altogether.

 

 

 

And clearly, none of this criticism is meant in any derogatory or offensive way! Simply intended to be positive and constructive. I just have to clarify, since text is such a poor medium for conveying emotion. :)

 

Gjeseth, Gullow (2011). Landforsvarets krigsplaner under den kalde krigen. Oslo: Fagbokforlaget.

 

There's too much in the above passage for me to pick apart bit-by-bit, so I'll just broadly address it by saying you're not acknowledging the incredible difficulty any invasion force would have with regards to environment and terrain. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan speaks volumes in this regard. You don't have to run into resistance; the environment often times offers the greatest resistance of all. An effective invasion of Finnmark would be anything but "rapid." They may get there quickly, but they'll have a very difficult time once on the ground.

 

More importantly, your scenario relies almost entirely on the Soviets achieving total surprise, something that would've been next to impossible to occur, unless NATO deliberately slept at the wheel. The lack of surprise would kill any Soviet military effort.

 

If you want to understand why I'm so down on the Soviet military read this essay at http://www.alternatewars.com/WW3/the_war_that_never_was.htm. It's a great starting point and has a list of sources at the end you can consult to learn more. I'm not one to say the Soviet military couldn't exact punishment on it's enemy, but, as a warfighting organization, there wasn't a whole lot to write home about. Their bark was definitely worse than their bite.

Edited August 28, 2016 by CheckGear

[boopidoo]

The idea came from Tom Clancy's RED STORM RISING that took one of the best scenarios of the superb game HARPOON in the 80s.

Yes, a map of the northeast Atlantic including Iceland, Kola Peninsula as well as northern part of Norway, Sweden and Finland would be very good for many scenarios. Mostly water, high mountains and not too many populated areas makes for an interesting map. Also it would fit the upcoming AJS-37 Viggen. ;)

 

Making that map should be a relatively low workload vs usability factor, especially compared to a western Europe map.

Edited August 29, 2016 by boopidoo