A-10C Discussion

[mvsgas]

20 Casualties of all types. Don't know how many were total write offs. The precise data thing was in reference to total sortie counts. It may be buried in the GAO document.

 

There was a quote from Gen Horner that the Hogs were pulled from hitting RG units due to the hits they were taking.

 

Here is a copy of Gulf War Air Power Survey Volume V (this is a direct PDF link)

In it, you can see FMC rates, average hours per missions, etc, etc.

on page 651, table 205

A-10/ OA-10 had 6 losses and 14 damaged. All during combat.

 

But if you look at table 204 page 641 to 649, you can see many other aircraft had comparable losses, but their losses are divided on both combat and non combat sorties. For Example 21 F-16 where damage or loss. 14 on non combat missions, of those, 5 where loss 9 damaged.

Edited April 25, 2015 by mvsgas

[mvsgas]

Some of the things we should look at also are the aircraft available, mission flown, type of missions, etc.

[OutOnTheOP]

That is why I don't really comment much on this topic. So many people are "experts" but have no first hand knowledge or experience.

 

The F-35 will eventually be a great replacement for the F-16, the A-10 well IMO won't ever be but I've decided to wait and see what the guys on the ground who will need the air support say about it.

 

I know right now, every time I run into someone in the army or marines and they find out I work A-10s the overwhelming majority talk about how it's their support aircraft of choice.

 

Ah, so... what, *you're* an expert, then?

 

Please, tell me, what roles can A-10 adequately fill, aside from CAS?

 

I suppose it can do *extremely* shallow BAI. It will never do OCA, never do DCA, never do SEAD/DEAD (no, one or two cases where it was useful against a '50s-'60s system don't prove it can), it'll never do deep strike... (this all assumes a halfway competent IADS, of course... in a situation where there ISN'T a credible IADS, who cares? Any aircraft you can hang ordnance off can do the job then. You could deep strike with a B-17 :doh:)

 

So, yes, CAS and Sandy. Or AFAC (which can be done by almost anything, though loiter time helps). That's pretty much it.

Edited April 25, 2015 by OutOnTheOP

[OutOnTheOP]

They flew at lower altitudes (at the very least when deploying ordnance) since they were using clusters, dumb bombs and Mavericks rather than LGBs from up high so they were more exposed to enemy fire and SAM's.

 

Yes, they, by inherent flaw in their operational tactics, as dictated by the capabilities of the A-10, allowed themselves to enter the lethal envelop of ADA systems. This is not a good thing. Again, the F-111 performed the same role against the same targets, with a high PGM delivery profile, and did not take losses. Mission done, less risk. Better all around.

 

 

Also, in the relevant context of anti-armor missions, the F-111's flew mostly only night sorties against static tanks (their effect was overestimated also due to Iraqis using decoys) which ended up being pretty harmless even for the two A-10 squadrons which flew night missions exclusively using Mavericks to basically get around and find targets. The same LGB totting F-111's would have been useless against e.g. attacking Iraqi armor like at Al-Khafji

 

Explain why you come to that conclusion. Asserting "they would be useuless" is not proof of anything, it is an opinion. Why? Do LGBs suddenly no longer kill tanks if there are friendly troops in the same time zone? Can Maverick only be launched from NOE?

 

I mean, it's not like the most devastating single anti-armor CAS strike in history was delivered by a B-52 or anything. ....oh, wait.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oSxQXs9m9Wk

 

 

An interesting thing to note here is that on doing BDA, F-111 reports counted as 0.5 of a kill while reports from the A-10s counted as 0.33.

 

Think that might have something to do with the fact that the F-111s brought back Pave Tack footage of bombs slamming into tanks, while the A-10s brought back pilots' assurances that "yep, I shot three tanks. I promise! I totally saw the hits, while I was dodging SA16s and AAA on egress!"? Which do you think a professional staff will weigh more on their BDA analysis?

 

 

And let's not go into how much those F-111F strikes cost compared to A-10's.

 

By all means, why not? I would bet good money that the expenditures were primarily in ordnance anyhow; of course an F-111 dropping twice the warload will cost more per sortie.

 

 

The problem for the A-10 in the Desert Storm was that it was a CAS plane, but the Army didn't really need CAS support since the Iraqi tanks were not considered that much of a threat (even less so after a 40-day pounding) so they got sent to various deep strike/interdiction missions especially targeting artillery positions (since the Army was fearing those), SCUD hunting, even attacks on SAM emplacements, so anything but direct CAS most of the time

 

Disingenuous. The SCUD hunt missions and SAM (more EW radar than SAM, by the by) missions were vanishingly small portions of the A-10 role in DS. Oh, and artillery positions are not "deep strike" by any stretch of the imagination; they were 10-20 km behind the FLOT, tops. Technically, still CAS, if the artillery was firing on friendly forces (read up on your 8 forms of contact. ADRP 3-90, indirect fire is contact.)

 

So, considering all that, their losses were not really high and they did an outstanding job.

 

I disagree that A-10 losses weren't high. They may have done a good job, but that's an opinion statement, not fact.

 

the USAF was just about to retire them all and then after the DS had to keep half of them and further upgrade them (which can't be said for those F-111F's).

 

The F-111s were retired, not because they were ineffective, but because there was no reason to keep them: the F-15E could fly the same mission profile, do it better, and provide air-to-air service in addition. The A-10, I believe, was kept largely for the same politically-motivated (look at senator me, I'm championing the A-10, I care about the troops!) reasons as are being argued in the chambers of congress now.

 

So, bottom line is, DS is not really a good example since there was little to no need for direct CAS missions

 

Despite being the closest thing in history to the Fulda gap scenario for which the A-10 was explicitly designed?

 

 

even though there were missions where A-10 loitering abilities came in very handy (like e.g. SCUD hunting).

 

Yeah... how'd they do with that SCUD hunting, by the way?

 

OEF and OIF analysis would be much more relevant to determine if there's a niche role for which the F-35 (or e.g. some drones or other light CAS aircraft) can't replace the A-10.

 

Ok, fine, let's consider OEF/ OIF then. Almost all the situations there could (and in fact have been) dealt with through JDAM or hellfire. Even A-10 flies a high profile in OEF/ OIF, so the "low and slow is needed for CAS" argument just doesn't jive there, either. A-10 in OEF/OIF don't even take off with more than 4-5 pieces of ordnance, so their supposedly massive warload hasn't been needed there. There is a need for a COIN aircraft with long loiter time, low operating cost, the ability to carry 2-4 JDAM/SDB and 2-4 hellfire or other light guided missile. Cannon in the 25-30mm range preferable, but extreme rate of fire unneccesary (the GAU-8 is a profligate waste of ammo against infantry targets). What the USAF needs is a good turboprop COIN plane, not the A-10.

 

Incidentally, if you're curious about my bona fides, I was a fire support officer/ e-jtac in Baqubah, Iraq, 2006-2007. I know a thing or two about the application of CAS. For what it's worth, in COIN, I would much, MUCH rather have an Apache than a Warthog. I'd rather have an artillery battery with some Excalibur on hand than either airborne asset (seriously, the Paladin has loiter time like you would not BELIEVE :D).

 

I hate to say it, but a lot of the situations where troops got their bacon saved by A-10s (or whatever other CAS asset) in Iraq and Afghanistan (especially Afghanistan), they only needed to have their bacon saved in the first place because they planned their operations poorly: if you're conducting operations outside the range fan of your artillery, and you're stupid enough not to bring a high-volume area effect weapon with you (both the Mk19 and the 60mm mortar are incredibly effective against both point and area targets), you're asking for trouble. Never count on rifles alone to win the day for you. Sadly, many units left their 60s at home, because, well, they're heavy, and no one wants to make all the soldiers on the patrol carry the two or three rounds of 60 they're supposed to carry.

Edited April 25, 2015 by OutOnTheOP

[Snoopy]

Ah, so... what, *you're* an expert, then?

 

Please, tell me, what roles can A-10 adequately fill, aside from CAS?

 

I suppose it can do *extremely* shallow BAI. It will never do OCA, never do DCA, never do SEAD/DEAD (no, one or two cases where it was useful against a '50s-'60s system don't prove it can), it'll never do deep strike... (this all assumes a halfway competent IADS, of course... in a situation where there ISN'T a credible IADS, who cares? Any aircraft you can hang ordnance off can do the job then. You could deep strike with a B-17 :doh:)

 

So, yes, CAS and Sandy. Or AFAC (which can be done by almost anything, though loiter time helps). That's pretty much it.

 

I'm no expert but I also have been working for the USAF for over 20 years, 10 of those specifically on A-10s. So suffice it to say I have access to data you don't, I have first hand knowledge from talking to pilots when they return from a mission and I have seen HUD footage the public never will.

 

Thank you for proving my point.

[Dudikoff]

Despite being the closest thing in history to the Fulda gap scenario for which the A-10 was explicitly designed? Yeah... how'd they do with that SCUD hunting, by the way?

 

Look, this discussion is pointless. You're just posting the same thing over and over while ignoring the basic points I'm trying to make.

 

For the I don't know which time, one of the F-111's roles was BAI; it was not the A-10's role as they were not intended to operate behind enemy lines because they were somewhat slow which makes them an easier target for IR missiles and they were definitely not equipped to tangle with the medium range SAM's which would be present in depth. Again, the F-111's flew those anti-armor missions AT NIGHT and FROM HIGH ALTITUDE; again, the two A-10 squadrons which operated AT NIGHT didn't suffer any losses IIRC. A-10's don't have any TGP's so couldn't fly high while doing the same role during daytime. So, just because the F-111's were destroying armor, it doesn't mean they were doing the A-10's job which is strictly CAS and those missions were pretty much non-existing in DS (AGAIN, the ground war lasted only 4 DAYS and bombing tanks and artillery before that was certainly not CAS). Still, the sources state that they killed most of the tanks, probably with those 4800 Mavericks they fired (but the BDA estimates are somewhat questionable IIRC, but I don't have my book on analysis of Iraqi losses based on the documents captured in OIF at hand).

 

AFAIK, A-10's were by design intended to approach the battle lines, take out short range SAM's and AAA with Mavericks and then harass advancing enemy units with guns, clusters and bombs (probably mainly with guns because they couldn't carry much ordnance if they would want to have any maneuvering capability left). So, yes, they have a rather limited main capability which was not needed because the Army was not facing a comparable opponent and they can be vulnerable outside that role depending on the situation. They are in dire need of some IR jammers and MAWS sensors, but then again they often felt like the USAF unwanted children since one can get the impression that they were most of the time one step to retirement and thus extremely lagging with much needed upgrades (e.g. they had no real upgrades till after DS so had no TGP's, had primitive navigation, RWR and ECM, no native night capability, etc.).

Edited April 25, 2015 by Dudikoff

[OutOnTheOP]

I'm no expert but I also have been working for the USAF for over 20 years, 10 of those specifically on A-10s. So suffice it to say I have access to data you don't, I have first hand knowledge from talking to pilots when they return from a mission and I have seen HUD footage the public never will.

 

Thank you for proving my point.

 

And I've been in the Army for 12; been actively engaged in combat for the better part of 9 months of that (I mean "in firefights", not "occupying a base in Iraq"), deployed three times. I think I know what we need in support of our operations. 9 times of 10, it ain't A-10. I would trade every A-10 in the world for a better stock of Excalibur, and a modern CLGP replacement for Copperhead.

 

Two can play that game.

 

*edit* oh, and seriously, if you're going to play the "but I have access to secret squirrel info that I'm not gonna share, because classified, but trust me, it proves my point" bit, that doesn't prove a damned thing. I have access to plenty of interesting stuff I can't share, either, but I'm not going to try to predicate my argument around assertions that I don't back with... well, *anything*. So far you've asserted that the A-10 does "way more than CAS", but failed to even delineate which other missions it does, and you've claimed that you've talked to pilots, but not even cited a sample of what they've said. I'm going to assume that the pilots thought they had the greatest airplane in the world, and that it was nigh perfect... but historically, every pilot has said that about pretty much every plane, even those that were clearly outclasses against their contemporary opponents. As a contrast, consider that the scouts in the Cavalry troop I went on my most combat-heavy deployment with were very firmly of the opinion that they could take on anything in the world with their M4s; to the point that it was like pulling teeth to get them to dedicate time training how to direct mortar and artillery fire (in fact, the CO at one point suggested that we pull the mortar turrets from my M1129s; luckily I won that fight, because those mortars did more damage to the enemy than any other weapon system we worked with, with the possible exception of Apache). Just because they strongly believed something about the capabilities of their weapon system, doesn't make it instantly true.

 

I think your pride in your airframe is clouding your view of the topic

Edited April 25, 2015 by OutOnTheOP

[OutOnTheOP]

Look, this discussion is pointless. You're just posting the same thing over and over.

 

I could say the same of you.

 

For the I don't know which time, one of the F-111's roles was BAI; it was not the A-10's role as they were not intended to operate behind enemy lines because they were somewhat slow which makes them an easier target for IR missiles and they were definitely not equipped to tangle with the medium range SAM's which would be present in depth. Again, the F-111's flew those anti-armor missions AT NIGHT and FROM HIGH ALTITUDE; again, the two A-10 squadrons which operated AT NIGHT didn't suffer any losses IIRC. A-10's don't have any TGP's so couldn't fly high while doing the same role during daytime. So, just because the F-111's were destroying armor, it doesn't mean they were doing the A-10's job which is strictly CAS and those missions were pretty much non-existing in DS (AGAIN, the ground war lasted only 4 DAYS and bombing tanks and artillery before that was certainly not CAS).

 

I think it's the... second? I dunno, who can count that high? And I'm not ignoring your point, nor do I fail to understand it. Rather, I just think the point is, frankly, a bit dumb: you argue that since the A-10 didn't do CAS in DS, that we shouldn't judge it's usefulness from performance there, since it operated out of role. My counter is that since the A-10 has NEVER really done it's role (as you seem to define it), that is proof that the basic design philosophy of the A-10 is flawed. It has never, and likely will never, do CAS in a conventional environment against heavy tank and mechanized forces in the attack. Against any possible enemy that it MIGHT do that role (Russia or China), it would be slaughtered by the ADA. The role it had in Iraq and Afghanistan did not require most of it's capabilities, and certainly didn't require it to operate with the tactics and operating envelope for which it was primarily designed (NOE flight).

 

The A-10 didn't do any better than F-111/F-15E/ F-35 style high-and-high PGM platforms in ODS. Or in OAF. Or, really, ever.

 

You're basically saying you want to throw out all operational data because it doesn't agree with your preconceptions. That, frankly, is retarded. If it has never performed the mission it was designed for, the answer isn't "but it's great at it's designed mission!", it's "what use is a platform designed for a mission we never do?"

 

 

Still, the sources state that they killed most of the tanks

 

That's beyond disingenous, that's a downright lie. The F-111 is credited with more tank kills in ODS, and you know it. Full stop. Now, you can argue the methods of counting (which you already did, and with which I disagree strongly), but the official counts put the F-111 ahead of the A-10 in tank kills.

 

AFAIK, A-10's were by design intended to approach the battle lines, take out short range SAM's and AAA with Mavericks and then harass advancing enemy units with guns, clusters and bombs (probably mainly with guns because they couldn't carry much ordnance if they would want to have any maneuvering capability left).

 

Yes, they were designed to do this in the assumption that the most capable short range SAM was the SA-9/ SA-13, and the most capable AAA was the ZSU-23/4. That is not a valid assumption anymore. And even if it were, the assumed loss rates among the A-10 were something like 30% per day in a high-intensity conflict.

 

So, yes, they have a rather limited main capability which was not needed because the Army was not facing a comparable opponent and they can be vulnerable outside that role depending on the situation.

 

I would say they're vulnerable in pretty much ANY role they fill.

 

They are in dire need of some IR jammers and MAWS sensors, but then again they often felt like the USAF unwanted children since one can get the impression that they were most of the time one step to retirement and thus extremely lagging with much needed upgrades (e.g. they had no real upgrades till after DS so had no TGP's, had primitive navigation, RWR and ECM, no native night capability, etc.).

 

Jammers and MAWS help, but they can only go so far. When it comes down to it, it's a late 1960s design, with early '50s aerodynamic performance. It does not have the kinematic performance to reduce the Pk of ADA systems to acceptable levels.

[Dudikoff]

I think it's the... second? I dunno, who can count that high? And I'm not ignoring your point, nor do I fail to understand it. Rather, I just think the point is, frankly, a bit dumb: you argue that since the A-10 didn't do CAS in DS, that we shouldn't judge it's usefulness from performance there, since it operated out of role.

You're basically saying you want to throw out all operational data because it doesn't agree with your preconceptions. That, frankly, is retarded. If it has never performed the mission it was designed for, the answer isn't "but it's great at it's designed mission!", it's "what use is a platform designed for a mission we never do?"

 

OK, let me spell it out for you since you obviously failed to read my posts with comprehension from the start: I am not arguing for the necessity of the A-10's type in the DS in any way, but I am disproving your repeated claims that the other planes did ITS role better (namely, F-111 and F-16 that you mentioned). So, basically, what I was saying the whole time is that A-10 in DS performed roles which it was not really designed for and did them well enough because there was rarely a need for its basic role (like at Al-Khafji) rather than the other way around which is something you kept repeating over and over again and initially claiming that the plane didn't even perform combat strikes since well after the Iraqi IADS was destroyed based on the dates of the losses. Also, you keep posting about F-111 suffering no losses while striking tanks which is pointless as the A-10's suffered no losses when flying in same conditions (at night), etc. So, please, let's not go any further with this.

Edited April 25, 2015 by Dudikoff

[OutOnTheOP]

OK, let me spell it out for you since you obviously failed to read my posts with comprehension from the start: I am not defending the usefulness of the A-10 in any way, but I am disproving your claim that the other planes did ITS role better (namely, F-111 and F-16 that you mentioned). So, basically, what I am saying is that A-10 in DS performed roles which it was not designed for rather than the other way around because there was rarely a need for its basic role (like at Al-Khafji) which is something you kept repeating over and over again and initially claiming that the plane didn't even perform combat strikes since well after the Iraqi IADS was destroyed based on the dates of the losses.

 

Where did I ever say "The F-111 did low-altitude CAS better than the A-10"? I said, *explicitly*, that the F-111 killed more tanks, that it was capable of dropping ordnance on targets in proximity of friendlies, and *implicitly* that it provided more valuable service to the overall success of the air campaign.

 

I never said ANYTHING about the F-16 doing CAS better, or even about F-16 killing tanks in the BAI role. The ONLY time I mentioned F-16 was in saying that it took less losses per sortie than A-10, despite operating more deeply behind lines, confronted by higher-capability ADA systems. That was in direct reply to an outright wrong assertion made earlier that the "A-10 is more survivable against SAMS and AAA than the plastic F-35"

 

Yes, sortie rate for the A-10 was only high after the IADS was disrupted. Considering that was the very first thing the coalition did, this should be no surprise. And the area in which the A-10 primarily operated (the border areas, in the middle of the desert and along the infamous "highway of death"), did not have significant high-performance ADA to start with. No SA-2, no SA-3, no SA-6. Just MANPADS and the occasional SA-9/13.

 

The fact that A-10 was used for strikes on some EW/ GCI radar sites means the A-10 is capable of SEAD about as much as the fact that Apache conducted the first "SEAD" strike against EW radar sites. Think we should be using Apache for SEAD, too? I mean, it did it once in ODS, so that proves it's the right tool for the job, right?

 

Perhaps YOU need to work on your reading comprehension.

Edited April 25, 2015 by OutOnTheOP

[Snoopy]

I think your pride in your airframe is clouding your view of the topic

 

I've worked multiple airframes in my career. As to the topic of the thread, well I guess we'll just agree to disagree.

 

Thanks for your service (and to be clear I'm not being sarcastic)

[OutOnTheOP]

I've worked multiple airframes in my career. As to the topic of the thread, well I guess we'll just agree to disagree.

 

Thanks for your service (and to be clear I'm not being sarcastic)

 

Likewise. I may believe the A-10 is beyond it's prime, but that doesn't diminish the dedication and bravery of the crews that operate and service them. If anything, it makes it all the more impressive.

[mvsgas]

...Please, tell me, what roles can A-10 adequately fill, aside from CAS?...

 

I only have information on Desert Storm, still looking at for other conflicts. This is what I have

- Offensive counter air (OCA)= 175 sorties

- NBC targets =2 sorties

- CCC =130

- POL sites= 20

- Communications= 2

- Ground Order of Battle (GOB) Targets including Military Troop Installations, Ground Force Material and Storage Depots and Fortifications and Defense Systems= 3367

- SCUDS= 135

- SAM= 49

- Industry= 2

[AlphaOneSix]

I love the A-10. That said, when on a mission, I prefer the support of (#1) AH-64s and (#2) AC-130s.

[OutOnTheOP]

I only have information on Desert Storm, still looking at for other conflicts. This is what I have

- Offensive counter air (OCA)= 175 sorties

- NBC targets =2 sorties

- CCC =130

- POL sites= 20

- Communications= 2

- Ground Order of Battle (GOB) Targets including Military Troop Installations, Ground Force Material and Storage Depots and Fortifications and Defense Systems= 3367

- SCUDS= 135

- SAM= 49

- Industry= 2

 

I'm curious what they counted in the OCA strikes. Did that include attacks on GCI and EW radar? FARPS? Anything else? I don't recall A-10 ever being used to attack an actual airfield, but I'd love to hear if it happened.

 

I would also like to know what they counted as CCC targets. Are we talking hardened, prepared corps and above CPs, or brigade-division field CPs that might be no more than a sandbag bunker a couple KM behind the MLR?

 

The SCUD hunts can safely be considered BAI... but the A-10 wasn't a stellar success with them (though, to be fair, neither was any other platform)

 

POL sites may have been CAS/ BAI as well. Are we talking permanent fuel farms, or field refueling sites/ fuel truck parks?

 

That said, even without doubting the nature of any of the stats, it's still 87% CAS targets; I stand by what I said, that everything else is a tiny percentage.

[Dudikoff]

Where did I ever say "The F-111 did low-altitude CAS better than the A-10"? I said, *explicitly*, that the F-111 killed more tanks, that it was capable of dropping ordnance on targets in proximity of friendlies, and *implicitly* that it provided more valuable service to the overall success of the air campaign.

 

"As to the argument that "well, the F-111 were at higher altitude, so of course they took less losses", THANK YOU FOR PROVING MY POINT. They flew a higher altitude profile, did the mission as or more effectively, and took less losses."

"Again, the F-111 performed the same role against the same targets, with a high PGM delivery profile, and did not take losses."

 

Perhaps you were referring to BAI strikes then (perhaps not given the statements on CAS targets), but since BAI was never the A-10's intended role, I don't see the logic behind holding it against them that the F-111's can perform it better.

 

I never said ANYTHING about the F-16 doing CAS better, or even about F-16 killing tanks in the BAI role. The ONLY time I mentioned F-16 was in saying that it took less losses per sortie than A-10, despite operating more deeply behind lines, confronted by higher-capability ADA systems. That was in direct reply to an outright wrong assertion made earlier that the "A-10 is more survivable against SAMS and AAA than the plastic F-35"

 

Yes, you're right, I stand corrected, sorry. I guess the sleep deprivation got to me. But, as said, some A-10 sorties went very deep, too.

 

Yes, sortie rate for the A-10 was only high after the IADS was disrupted. Considering that was the very first thing the coalition did, this should be no surprise. And the area in which the A-10 primarily operated (the border areas, in the middle of the desert and along the infamous "highway of death"), did not have significant high-performance ADA to start with. No SA-2, no SA-3, no SA-6. Just MANPADS and the occasional SA-9/13.

 

What data are you basing these limited sortie rates on? They initially operated in depth, but after the first two planes were shot down (which happened after 15+ days of these operations), they were withdrawn to border areas exclusively.

 

The fact that A-10 was used for strikes on some EW/ GCI radar sites means the A-10 is capable of SEAD about as much as the fact that Apache conducted the first "SEAD" strike against EW radar sites. Think we should be using Apache for SEAD, too? I mean, it did it once in ODS, so that proves it's the right tool for the job, right? Perhaps YOU need to work on your reading comprehension.

 

I never even hinted at such a thing so I have no idea where are you going with this. When attacking these sites they were naturally under SEAD escort cover otherwise it could have been suicidal (if the Iraqis dared to turn on their radars in those early days).

 

That said, even without doubting the nature of any of the stats, it's still 87% CAS targets; I stand by what I said, that everything else is a tiny percentage.

 

I'm curious how you distinguish between CAS targets and e.g. BAI targets? It's not a CAS target if it is not performed in a CAS context and this couldn't have been done till those last 4 days of ground operations.

Edited April 25, 2015 by Dudikoff

[mvsgas]

I'm curious what they counted in the OCA strikes. Did that include attacks on GCI and EW radar? FARPS? Anything else? I don't recall A-10 ever being used to attack an actual airfield, but I'd love to hear if it happened.

 

I would also like to know what they counted as CCC targets. Are we talking hardened, prepared corps and above CPs, or brigade-division field CPs that might be no more than a sandbag bunker a couple KM behind the MLR?

 

The SCUD hunts can safely be considered BAI... but the A-10 wasn't a stellar success with them (though, to be fair, neither was any other platform)

 

POL sites may have been CAS/ BAI as well. Are we talking permanent fuel farms, or field refueling sites/ fuel truck parks?

 

That said, even without doubting the nature of any of the stats, it's still 87% CAS targets; I stand by what I said, that everything else is a tiny percentage.

 

The source is the document I posted earlier, you can look at it your self if you prefer and make your own opinion. I do not know any details beyond the information I find on line.

In relation to the document, it considers OCA as;

Offensive Counter Air (OCA)

Airfields

* Airbases

* Reserve Fields

* Helicopter Bases

Non Communications Electronic Installations

* Radar Installations

* Radars collocated with SAM sites

* ATCY Nav aids

* Meteorological radars

Air Logistics, general

* Air Depots

Air Ammo Depots

* Maintenance and repair bases

* Aircraft and Components Production and Assembly

 

You can find the answer to other question on the PDF.

How effective was the A-10? How accurate? etc, etc. I do not know.

 

Besides this document, the bit and pieces I find online and the book I mention before, I have no other references.

 

Now, many of us have mention accomplishments of several aircraft. Can anyone else post references? Document, etc.

 

I would like to read these, I am not questioning anyone opinion nor knowledge. Many people, including myself, get into meaningless argument over opinion without saying:"here read this, or look at this" to try to explain their point of view.

Edited April 25, 2015 by mvsgas

[rcjonessnp175]

And I've been in the Army for 12; been actively engaged in combat for the better part of 9 months of that (I mean "in firefights", not "occupying a base in Iraq"), deployed three times. I think I know what we need in support of our operations. 9 times of 10, it ain't A-10. I would trade every A-10 in the world for a better stock of Excalibur, and a modern CLGP replacement for Copperhead.

 

Two can play that game.

 

*edit* oh, and seriously, if you're going to play the "but I have access to secret squirrel info that I'm not gonna share, because classified, but trust me, it proves my point" bit, that doesn't prove a damned thing. I have access to plenty of interesting stuff I can't share, either, but I'm not going to try to predicate my argument around assertions that I don't back with... well, *anything*. So far you've asserted that the A-10 does "way more than CAS", but failed to even delineate which other missions it does, and you've claimed that you've talked to pilots, but not even cited a sample of what they've said. I'm going to assume that the pilots thought they had the greatest airplane in the world, and that it was nigh perfect... but historically, every pilot has said that about pretty much every plane, even those that were clearly outclasses against their contemporary opponents. As a contrast, consider that the scouts in the Cavalry troop I went on my most combat-heavy deployment with were very firmly of the opinion that they could take on anything in the world with their M4s; to the point that it was like pulling teeth to get them to dedicate time training how to direct mortar and artillery fire (in fact, the CO at one point suggested that we pull the mortar turrets from my M1129s; luckily I won that fight, because those mortars did more damage to the enemy than any other weapon system we worked with, with the possible exception of Apache). Just because they strongly believed something about the capabilities of their weapon system, doesn't make it instantly true.

 

I think your pride in your airframe is clouding your view of the topic

 

 

Sorry bud but your regular army inside the box mindset has shown your inexperience. I can speak for the community I'm in and we regularly use the a10 and is the most effective fix wing for our operations. It's not blind faith in a airframe, it's called combat experience that has proven its worth for many Oda's in my neck of the woods.

Your still very young in the army and sorry what your type of unit does is nothing in contrast to what mine would and has done there for requirements are much different. Just because a10s rock for us and our mission set doesn't mean it will for your type of unit. Battlefield is broad spectrum and that's something the regular army can't grasp.

 

Pride of an airframe.......

[OutOnTheOP]

"As to the argument that "well, the F-111 were at higher altitude, so of course they took less losses", THANK YOU FOR PROVING MY POINT. They flew a higher altitude profile, did the mission as or more effectively, and took less losses."

"Again, the F-111 performed the same role against the same targets, with a high PGM delivery profile, and did not take losses."

 

Getting a bit caught up in semantics, aren't you? They both did the same role in ODS: BAI. As you pointed out, neither had much opportunity for CAS. But as I have shown, even B-52s at 40,000 feet have, in recent years, shown themselves quite capable of providing excellent anti-armor CAS on targets as close as a mile from friendlies. If you want to argue that the A-10 is better for use against dismounts "hugging" friendly positions, then yes, A-10 is inherently better. But a good turboprop COIN aircraft with lower rate of fire cannon would be equally good, or better. And at that point, you're hinging the entire valuation of the A-10 on a very specific role in a very specific circumstance; not really enough to make the aircraft worth retaining for just that specific purpose. Particularly when that situation is one in which 60mm mortar, AGLs, and artillery fires are every bit as useful as an A-10 (I've practiced "desperation close final protective fires with live 105mm M119 howitzer before; we brought the rounds in to about 30 meters from our position. They're a lot more consistent than people give credit; all rounds landed in a nice even row)

 

I'm curious how you distinguish between CAS targets and e.g. BAI targets? It's not a CAS target if it is not performed in a CAS context and this couldn't have been done till those last 4 days of ground operations.

 

Well, first, "the job" I was referring to was preventing enemy armour and other ground forces from being effective against friendly ground forces. I may have misremembered, and the post I was thinking I had earlier made was in the F-35 thread instead of this one, but, yes, my point largely hinged on the belief that BAI is inherently a more effective use of air power than CAS.

 

Another source for our confusion may be that there's not much to distinguish between CAS and BAI, except that in CAS, the targets are in contact with friendlies and the aircraft is controlled by a FAC, and in BAI they... might be controlled by a FAC. Some CAS targets are farther from the FLOT than some BAI targets (for example, if an MLR battery is firing on friendly positions from 40km away and the ground commander asks for aircraft to hit the MLRs, that's technically a CAS mission... but if an aircraft spotted a tank column in the march just on the other side of a ridgeline, it's BAI. Now, realistically, BAI birds would never be allowed to engage anything that close, because the fire support coordination line is never that close to the FLOT.

 

Point is, a lot of the same tactics, ordnance, and techniques are applicable to both. If you can kill a tank with a precision guided munition while the target is 200km from friendlys, you can do it when the target is 200m from friendlies... just so long as you can positively ID the target, and the PI risk estimates on the ordnance allows it. There's simply no reason the F-111 could NOT have conducted CAS sorties very effectively. Even for the "enemy infantry hugging friendly position" type CAS, the M61 is going to get the job done (funny enough, the magazine for the M61 in the F-111 in particular was ludicrously large... something like 2,400 rounds if I remember correctly). You don't *need* 30mm against troops. Yes, it's got a larger bursting charge, but you can't kill them MORE dead; the GAU-8 is overkill on soft targets. If enemy dismounts are SO close to friendlies that the slightly greater dispersion of the M61 is a concern, the GAU-8 would cause fratricide, too. You're talking almost hand grenade distance at that point.

Edited April 25, 2015 by OutOnTheOP

[OutOnTheOP]

Sorry bud but your regular army inside the box mindset has shown your inexperience. I can speak for the community I'm in and we regularly use the a10 and is the most effective fix wing for our operations. It's not blind faith in a airframe, it's called combat experience that has proven its worth for many Oda's in my neck of the woods.

Your still very young in the army and sorry what your type of unit does is nothing in contrast to what mine would and has done there for requirements are much different. Just because a10s rock for us and our mission set doesn't mean it will for your type of unit. Battlefield is broad spectrum and that's something the regular army can't grasp.

 

Pride of an airframe.......

 

I'll bite; please explain exactly what the A-10 brought to the battlefield that would not have been provided just as effectively by another platform, either air or surface fired?

 

*edit: also, [...]. I understand the spectrum of the battlefield just fine, thank you very much. In fact, I have explicitly referenced COIN operations and insurgent tactics (in particular, "hugging" friendly positions) that create the special circumstances in which the A-10 has some notable advantages. However, I cannot think of *any* situation in which I could not solve that problem with an AH-64, other fix-wing platform, mortar fires, artillery (either conventional or guided), or other systems with equal efficiency... and without relying on an aircraft that is suicide to operate in any kind of near-peer engagement.

 

As I said many posts ago, there is a need for a COIN aircraft. There is *not* inherent need for the A-10 in particular.

 

*edit 2: also, you are committing a TERRIBLE logical fallacy; you are predicating your argument on some alleged expertise on your part (or that of people you know), but not presenting anything to back up your position. It's called "appeal to authority", and happens when, instead of backing your argument with something measurable, you, essentially say "yeah, but this person is more expert than you, so what they think is the truth; even in the absence of evidence". ...and yes, I have done that a couple times here, myself... though I have tried to limit that to direct responses of people themselves making an appeal to authority fallacy claim against me, trying to argue that "yeah, well, you don't know anything".

Edited April 25, 2015 by sobek
profanity

[rcjonessnp175]

I'll bite; please explain exactly what the A-10 brought to the battlefield that would not have been provided just as effectively by another platform, either air or surface fired?

 

If you have to ask their is no point in talking about our operations. Your mind is set. Take the time to read the thread and I'm sure you'll get an idea. 12 years in the army you say? Must be stuck in the box for all 12 if you think arty is more of an Effective platform for our need in cas operations then the A10. Hey I have allot of pride myself with the type of career ive had so far and the type of units I've been part of. Biggest and most effective thing to do is check pride at the door and realize everybody's operational needs and requirements are much different across the Army. Again what you fellas experience in the sand box is totally different than what we do. Leave it at that.

 

Thanks for your service, in the 18 years I've been in, so far we've gone through allot of different platforms for our needs. Biggest thing I have learned is be prepared for anything and be thankful to have pilots with balls over head. I'll list like somebody else in this thread our most preferred cas platforms for our operations is as following.

Ac-130

Ah64

A10

Beginning of the whole sandbox vacation ya arty was very useful when applied correctly. Thing is nowadays our operations have changed slightly for us anyways and we use mainly what was listed above currently.

[rcjonessnp175]

I'll bite; please explain exactly what the A-10 brought to the battlefield that would not have been provided just as effectively by another platform, either air or surface fired?

 

*edit: also, bullsh*t. I understand the spectrum of the battlefield just fine, thank you very much. In fact, I have explicitly referenced COIN operations and insurgent tactics (in particular, "hugging" friendly positions) that create the special circumstances in which the A-10 has some notable advantages. However, I cannot think of *any* situation in which I could not solve that problem with an AH-64, other fix-wing platform, mortar fires, artillery (either conventional or guided), or other systems with equal efficiency... and without relying on an aircraft that is suicide to operate in any kind of near-peer engagement.

 

As I said many posts ago, there is a need for a COIN aircraft. There is *not* inherent need for the A-10 in particular.

 

*edit 2: also, you are committing a TERRIBLE logical fallacy; you are predicating your argument on some alleged expertise on your part (or that of people you know), but not presenting anything to back up your position. It's called "appeal to authority", and happens when, instead of backing your argument with something measurable, you, essentially say "yeah, but this person is more expert than you, so what they think is the truth; even in the absence of evidence". ...and yes, I have done that a couple times here, myself... though I have tried to limit that to direct responses of people themselves making an appeal to authority fallacy claim against me, trying to argue that "yeah, well, you don't know anything".

 

 

Every time I post anything I post from my experiences, not others. I would not say what I say if I have not experienced it first hand.

[Basher54321]

Just reading some comments between some ex F-16 /A-10 pilots on here re subject (last 2 pages) - love all the different view points

 

http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=22&t=24483&start=1335

[NineLine]

http://theaviationist.com/2015/04/26/a-10-hit-over-iraq-emergency-landing/

[Snoopy]

http://theaviationist.com/2015/04/26/a-10-hit-over-iraq-emergency-landing/

 

A lot of assumptions in that article.