AGM-65 Maverick

конвертация guidance control sections AGM-65A/B в AGM-65E2

Raytheon Missile Systems получила контакт ВМС США на конвертацию 500 секций наведения ракет AGM-65A/B в AGM-65E2, стоимость работ составляет 49,5 млн. $, срок окончания январь 2017 года

http://www.defense.gov/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=5366

нашивки

USAF Weapon System Evaluation Program. Maverick missile launch analysis, 1999

a361645.pdf

ВВС США (USAF) и ВМС США (USN) приобрели 490 комплектов переоборудования ранних моделей Maverick в вариант ракет с лазерным наведением AGM-65L/E2 Maverick Laser в рамках контракта стоимостью 49.9 млн $ с Raytheon, объявленного 28 сентября.

USAF и USN пополняют свои запасы ракет Maverick Laser (обозначение AGM-65L принято в ВВС, AGM-65E2 в ВМС) в связи с повышенным темпом расхода, учитывая их широкое применение против Исламского Государства в Ираке и Сирии.

http://www.janes.com/article/64141/dod-awards-laser-maverick-guidance-kit-contract

США разрешили продажу Южной Корее 89 шт. AGM-65G-2 на сумму около 70 млн. $, такие ракеты уже состоят на вооружении ВС ЮК

http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/republic-korea-agm-65g-2-maverick-missiles

AGM-65G это усовершенствованный "IIR Maverick" для ВВС США. Он основан на AGM-65D, но использует тяжелую боеголовку и предохранительно-исполнительный механизм от AGM-65E/F поскольку разработан специально для поражения укрепленных тактических целей. AGM-65G также имеет новый цифровой автопилот для улучшения сопровождения цели и выбора вариантов траектории. Новый автопилот позволяет оператору выбрать более низкую траекторию полета, чтобы предотвратить срыв захвата ГСН в облаках. AGM-65G поступили на вооружение ВВС США в 1989 году.

AGM-65G-2 представляет собой AGM-65G с модифицированным программным обеспечением от флотской ракеты AGM-65F. Как и версия AGM-65D-2, G-2 имеет ГСН с увеличенной точностью и угловой скоростью сопровождения движущихся целей.

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-65.html

Нифига се дорогая ракета получается, 800 тыщ баксов за штуку!

Нифига се дорогая ракета получается, 800 тыщ баксов за штуку!

Около 100 тыс за штуку.

Остальное доставка, да))

Остальное доставка, да))

Остальное части, гарантия и обслуживание, тренинг.

$110,000 самая дорогая модель.

http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104577/agm-65-maverick.aspx

Нифига се дорогая ракета получается, 800 тыщ баксов за штуку!

это же FMS контракт там наценки в разы

в 90-х Hughes прорабатывала проект Маверика с увеличенной до 70-км дальностью, в основанной на удлиненном и переработанном планере версии AGM-65F размещался турбореактивный двигатель

варианты систем наведения включали тепловое/радиолокационное самонаведение и инерциальную/спутниковую навигацию

http://en.valka.cz/topic/view/62490/USA-Longhorn

Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona, has been awarded a $47,917,924 for 469 Laser Maverick units. This contract provides for the manufacture and delivery of 469 each Laser Maverick units. Work will be performed in Tucson, Arizona. The work is expected to be complete by Sept. 30, 2021.

https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/1936972/

Raytheon получила контракт ВВС США ценой 47,786,995 $ на производство и поставку 95 инфракрасных ГСН иностранному государству

https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2044738/

фантом через IR Maverick

IR Maverick захват нагретого участка почвы

TV Maverick пикирует

абзац из перевода китайской статьи сделанного Отделом иностранных технологий ВВС США в 1990 году, в тексте телевизионное наведение, в заголовке абзаца инфракрасная версия

Двухдиапазонная противорадиолокационная управляемая ракета AGM-65D Maverick

 

Корпорация Hughes Aircraft Corporation построила три единицы противорадиолокационной ракеты Maverick, оснащенной двухдиапазонной головкой наведения использующей пассивное наведение на излучение радара и оптико-электронное наведение. Версия была специально разработана для удара по стационарным радиолокационным станциям на вышках. Особенностью этой управляемой ракеты является то, что даже после того, как радар противника прекратил работу на излучение, она все еще может наводиться телевизионной головкой самонаведения.

 

В первой части полета будучи запущенной с F-4 Phantom пассивный радиолокационный сенсор измерял курс на излучающей цель, на втором этапе ракета автоматически переключалась на телевизорный сенсор.

Интересно, а современный КАЗ способен нейтрализовать разрушительное действие этой болванки?

нет

более поздняя 140 кг проникающая WDU-24/B создана пробивать бетонные перекрытия, ей будет все равно

кумулятивная WDU-20/B весит 57 кг из них 39 кг взрывчатки Composition B и диаметр ее воронки под 300 мм, даже при нештатном подрыве выведет танк из строя

проект создания Maverik с MMW ГСН, начало 1990-х годов

Цель этих усилий - продемонстрировать применение технологии ГСН миллиметрового диапазона для защиты от систем оружия класса "земля-воздух". Этот проект потенциально предоставит ВВС всепогодно и всесуточное оружие с автономном захватом и сопровождением после пуска для противодействия стационарным и мобильным подразделениям ПВО, движущейся среди массы бронетехники и другим мобильным целям поля боя второго эшелона. В рамках этого проекта MMW ГСН будут интегрированы на планер ракеты AGM-65 Maverick для летных испытаний в рамках конкурсной демонстрационной программы.

 

Технический подход к демонстрации MMW технологии

 

Технические цели, которые должны быть достигнуты в этом проекте:

Продемонстрировать зрелость MMW ГСН и готовность к полномасштабной инженерной разработке

Продемонстрировать способность MMW ГСН обнаруживать цели в реалистичных затрудненных условиях и классифицировать цели по типу

Оценить восприимчивость сенсора к помехам

Интеграция MMW ГСН с центральной и кормовой секциями Maverick

Достижение несколько запусков и убийств за один проход самолета

Себестоимость единицы продукции должна быть менее 110,000 долларов.

 

При этом необходимо решить несколько ключевых технических задач. В том числе разработку и демонстрацию алгоритмов, позволяющих сенсору отличать машины ПВО от других целей, уменьшать количество ложных срабатываний, действовать в условиях противодействия, а также отслеживать и поражать цели.

 

Интеграция ГСН MMW с планером Maverick таким образом, чтобы допускать удар на скорости ниже нормальной, также является технической проблемой. Прогресс MMW на сегодняшний день - оба подрядчика протестировали ГСН на полетах "в неволе". Оба сенсора хорошо показали себя в летных испытаниях на подвеске летающей лаборатории против массивов реалистичных целей, включая симулятор системы ПВО Куб, а также различные танки и другую бронетехнику. Тесты проводились как в среде с низким, так и с высоким уровнем помех. Эти ГСН особенно хорошо работают против движущихся транспортных средств и вращающихся антенн.

 

ГСН MMW легко обнаруживали и сопровождали цели типа машин ПВО. Движущиеся цели легко обнаруживаются благодаря селекции. Также продемонстрирована работа против массивов стационарных целей, но с ними у них меньше возможностей борьбы. Производство оборудования и доработка программного обеспечения продолжались для запланированных испытаний ракеты в свободном полете. Аппаратное тестирование продолжалось. Были изготовлены специальные мишени для испытаний "в неволе" и запланированных пусков ракет.

 

Испытания MMW на высокоскоростные полеты и свободный полет будут проведены в 1991 финансовом году. Демонстрация программы испытаний MMW в свободном полете Maverick должна быть завершена в начале 1992 финансового года с расходом запланированных в 1991 финансовому году средств. TAC будет рассматривать, сможет ли MMW Maverick удовлетворить потребность в улучшенном атакующем оружии в соответствии с условиями в Statementof Need 317-87.

To my knowledge the Maverick was always an option but I don't recall exactly if that was true in early 80s. In Europe we didn't do Maverick at TJ nor did we teach it in FTU when I was there 86-89, but I did lots of Maverick at Homestead in Blk 15 jets from 1991 on. We trained with A, B, D, and G models and I shot a live B and D from the Blk 15s and a G-model from a Blk 32. The A-model was useless and dangerous as you needed to get closer to get a lock on and shoot than you did dropping dumb bombs and often you had to reattack to get lock on. Sometimes you couldn't (go all that way, face all those threats, and come away empty handed?). The B-model was only slightly better. The D and G were great and wish I had seen the H. Never flew with the Laser Mavs but I know they have been used in Afghanistan.

I don't remember if we had a SMS code for GBU-10/12 but if we ever had a reason to buddy lase I am sure we could have loaded them as Mk-84/82 as they had close enough ballistics. But buddy lase was not a big option prior to TGPs and not required much after. Ground Lase is not very good unless they are on a significantly elevated position. Otherwise the Laser skips causing laser "dashes" across the ground and you never know which one the bomb is going to like. Sometimes it likes the designator. This was very apparent when we flew with NVGs for the first time and saw ground FACs using IR Laser pointers that looked like dashed lines when they were at a low graze angle.

http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=18&t=52915

I flew with the AGM-65A and B on both the F-4D and the F-16A. (Later flew with AGM-65D on the F-16C.) I actually launched the AGM-65A and B off the F-16A.

A common misconception is that the Maverick is a "stand off weapon" to avoid flying into threat environments. While that may possibly be true today, it was not back in the Cold War, low altitude, Fulda Gap era.

During Southeast Asia the USAF discovered the near impossibility of killing a moving MBT with conventional unguided bombs. The answer was the AGM-65A, which was essentially a precision guided bomb with a shaped charge to kill tanks. The idea was for a two-seat F-4D/E loaded with six Mavericks on two LAU-88s to fly at medium altitude to visually locate tanks. The pilot would then roll in and place his fixed red reticle on the desired target. The WSO would blow the seeker head cover, look in his scope to try to figure out what the heck the front seater was looking at, eventually find a dark smudge that looked about right, squeal "I GOT IT! I GOT IT!" and attempt to lock on, both would wait for the lock-on to take, the WSO would launch the missile, and once the missile lumbered past the cockpit, the pilot could pull up to avoid ground impact.

In the F-16A we had to do all the above by ourselves. There was no slewing of the seeker to a radar or targeting pod. You pointed the HUD at a tiny little black dot which was a tank several miles away. Blow the dome cover, look down between your knees at the small monochrome REO, squint hard while trying to match what you saw outside with what the Maverick was showing you through the REO, slew the seeker onto what you hoped was the target, designate, wait for the flashing cross to go steady (indicating that the lock would survive the launch transients), maneuver to ensure that the cross was within "the keyhole" (seeker gimbal limits), and finally launch the missile, hopefully before hitting min range or the ground.

The F-16A + AGM-65A/B combination was doable in a fairly permissive environment. Whether it would have been workable in the Fulda Gap in winter at 300AGL and 500KIAS is problematic. Trying to avoid the rocks, avoid the threats, avoid the weather, avoid your wingman, pick out tanks from amid thousands of moving vehicles enveloped in clouds of dust and smoke, focusing on the REO between your knees while acquiring a lock-on, and then getting the missile off the rail while still in the launch envelope, would have been difficult at best.

Other thoughts: The AGM-65A/B was electro-optical (visual), not IR. The resolution on the REO was less than human 20/20 vision, so while you might be able to visually see a target outside, you might not have sufficient discrimination to see it on the REO.

The electro-optical seeker only saw dark vs light contrast. If there were long shadows (low sun angle) the seeker would lock onto the target tank AND the long dark shadow. As the missile approached impact, it would stay centered on the combined dark target and shadow, usually resulting in the missile impacting the longer shadow.

Having reviewed hundreds of Maverick HUD tapes, I found that the average launch slant range was usually 5000'-7000".

http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=18&t=57332

WSOs: Agree with JB. I was fortunate to get to fly with Vietnam vet WSOs with several hundred combat missions "up north". Some of them were outstanding. I basically made sure that we didn't hit the ground. The WSO worked the (ancient) radar, the ALQ-119, the ALE-40, the radios, checked six, did the time-distance-heading on our low levels, and alternated between launching AIM-7s and the AGM-65. They were VERY good. On the other hand, there were some that (as JB says) were weight and ballast for the CG.

F-16A (Block 15) and AGM-65: I looked in my logbooks and don't find any Maverick missions in the F-16A at TJ before I left. I don't recall why TJ would have given up that tasking. However, we did employ the AGM-65A/B at Kunsan AB in 1985, and I launched a live AGM-65B at Nellis AFB in 1986.

"Standoff": A little history on the Maverick missile; The F-4 and F-105 were the primary USAF air-to-ground fighters in Vietnam. They were "red reticle" or "iron sight" or manual bombers. We were terribly inaccurate, especially in combat conditions. I don't recall the exact numbers (and they were classified anyway) but to kill a Soviet tank, you had to physically hit the topside with a MK82 to kill it, and you had to get within something like 8 feet with a MK84. I worked with JMEMs a lot, and recall that an F-4D dropping 12xMK82 on a single pass had something like a 10% PK on a Soviet main battle tank. The main concern for USAFE was trying to stop waves of thousands of Warsaw Pact tanks rolling through the Fulda Gap. The MK20 Rockeye was one attempt to solve the problem. While better than MK82 GP bombs, it still had a pretty low PK. Another solution was the AGM-65. As I recall the AGM-65 PK was around 50% once launched. Therefore, an F-4 carrying 6xAGM-65 had a good chance of taking out three tanks, whereas an F-4 armed with 12xMK82 had a 10% chance of taking out one tank. Clearly, the Maverick was a much better tank killer than a GP bomb. Note that there was no mention of "standoff" with the AGM-65. It was not a "standoff" weapon, but a precision guided anti-tank munition.

A little reality check on the "standoff" concept: When attacking a runway, the enemy defenses (ZSU-23-4, SA-6, etc) are not parked on the center of your target runway. They surround the airfield within a radius of 3-5 miles. Similarly, if you attack a bridge, the defenses are not located on the middle span of the bridge, they're on the hilltops surrounding the bridge. When you attack a tank on a battlefield, it is surrounded by 30,000 troops within 10 miles carrying SA-7s and six bazillion guns. When you say that you are employing a "standoff" weapon against a target, that does not "stand you off" from all the defenses that you have to fly over to reach said target. As JB said, in USAFE in the early 1980s, you had to get right in amongst them to deliver your weapons. There was no "standoff" as it is envisioned today.

http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=18&t=52915

For both of you, how close would you have to get with the AGM-65 A and B models for a good kill probability. All the sources online for these older models say ~12 miles for range, but I'm pretty sure that's just how far the missile can actually go, it's much more limited by the EO lock and guidance. Would a few miles be more accurate (at least for the B, I know you had to get absurdly close with the A model).

Absolutely correct on the max range. Remember, the AGM-65A/B was an anti-tank weapon. It was useless against bridge abutments or ships or aircraft shelters. Its sole advantage over a MK-82 was the greater likelihood of actually hitting a tank. Now think about what the prevailing weather would have been in Central Europe or Korea during a major tank invasion. The ceiling would have probably been around 2000' AGL, and the vis would have been less than 5 miles. Add in dense forests, tall buildings, dense urban areas, smoke, dust, haze, and rain. Now imagine trying to pick out a camouflaged tank operating in that environment. At 5 miles a tank is less than one mil size to the naked eye. The AGM-65A/B centroid tracker could not see a target that size, much less keep a lock during launch transients. You didn't want to waste your precious Maverick on a Red Army food truck serving borscht to Ivan, and you could not distinguish the many trucks from the few tanks at 5 miles. Realistically, the max range that you could acquire and lock up a tank was probably about 18,000' slant range, and min range was probably around 5,000' slant range.

When I shot my AGM-65B at Nellis in 1986, we were very familiar with the area, we had INS coordinates for the target tank column, the tanks were dark green against a bright yellow desert background, and the weather was CAVU, there was no smoke, and nobody was shooting at us. As I recall, I started trying to lock up my target (last tank in the column) at about 12,000' slant range, and drove in to almost minimum range before getting a solid lock at around 5,000' range. (The missile hit the tank.)