The F-35 Thread

It's now 2017 and the latest report puts it at 406.5 billion... The total cost for the F35 is now 1.5 trillion USD... For a plane...

Total program costs don't really matter. From a per-fuselage perspective, it's already more cost effective than several competing airframes, while being more capable in a number of ways.

This is @#!$ing (not sure yet if I'm allowed to swear here) insane. Is America preparing to take on the world or something? Most of the countries under attack by America don't even have an airforce.

True, but the US has been the world's de-facto police force since WW2 (which attitude was arguably started based on the Monroe Doctrine in 1823). In theory, the military has to plan for all possible future wars, they can't just plan based on who they happened to fight the last time.

--gos

It also represents development cost for the replacement of three aircraft not one. Which is unprecedented in aircraft procurement. Their are three significantly different aircraft all under the term "F-35" so measuring total program cost is quite miss leading when you think about it. Since never to my knowledge has there been a single program for the replacement of three separate aircraft. (other then the F-111 maybe).

Also trying to estimate costs during 2012 when the aircraft is still not even fully out of development is kind of ridiculous. Almost like ETAs from Devs here, the reason we don't have them is because so much can happen during development, which changes things. Not saying manufactures should not be held to deadlines and budgets but never has there been a program like this in the history of weapons development. So I would take figures like that from reuters with a grain of salt.

As far as warfare goes, you should be building weapons, not to fight wars, but to win wars. Sorry for the cheese but its true.

http://thehill.com/policy/defense/341312-pentagon-predicts-f-35-program-costs-to-jump-by-27-billion-report

 

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lockheed-fighter-idUSBRE82S03L20120329

 

So the Reuters article is from 2012, and they reported the acquisition cost to be 332 billion. It's now 2017 and the latest report puts it at 406.5 billion... The total cost for the F35 is now 1.5 trillion USD... For a plane...

This is @#!$ing (not sure yet if I'm allowed to swear here) insane. Is America preparing to take on the world or something? Most of the countries under attack by America don't even have an airforce.

1.5 trillion USD over 55 years. Acquisition costs are not the same as acquisition + maintenance + training + etc.

A little context helps sometimes, FYI. It's literally right there in your quote. :)

The total cost for the F35 is now 1.5 trillion USD... For a plane...

1.5 Trillion minus 1.11 trillion for maintenance, spare parts, equipment, fuel, etc. That should give us 340 billion (please check my math) divided by 2457 aircraft should be around 139 million per aircraft. And if we only get 8k flying hours of each airframe (I bet we will get more) and if we fly an average of 3 hours a day for the next 7 years we should get around 19k per flying hour, that seems average for many combat aircraft. If we also consider that we won't fly that many hours a year, we probably spend a lot less money per flying hour cost.

Remember, flying hours is one of the main factors when you look for the age of an aircraft.

Finally, we should think about the fact that this is just an estimated, it could be half that or 5 times more once it all actually happens.

Here are a lot more details on that matter

this is a direct PDF link

F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER - Government Accountability Office

I don't know the answer to to this, but it seems like most of the risk is being passed on to the customer, ie. Lockmart stuff up something and it needs to be redesigned and refitted to the fleet and that cost is worn by the procuring governments even though it is the manufacturer that over promised and failed. I think the aircraft will be great once finished, but it does seem Lockmart are taking us for a ride and there is a negative incentive for them to make it right the first time. I have no knowledge wether this is true, it just seems like it from the uneducated outside.

Yes. Preparing to take on the world is how you maintain the best combat force for all circumstances. You don't plan to fight the current or past wars, that is always a losing proposition.

This is @#!$ing (not sure yet if I'm allowed to swear here) insane. Is America preparing to take on the world or something? Most of the countries under attack by America don't even have an airforce.

http://thehill.com/policy/defense/341312-pentagon-predicts-f-35-program-costs-to-jump-by-27-billion-report

 

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lockheed-fighter-idUSBRE82S03L20120329

 

So the Reuters article is from 2012, and they reported the acquisition cost to be 332 billion. It's now 2017 and the latest report puts it at 406.5 billion... The total cost for the F35 is now 1.5 trillion USD... For a plane...

This is @#!$ing (not sure yet if I'm allowed to swear here) insane. Is America preparing to take on the world or something? Most of the countries under attack by America don't even have an airforce.

Okay, present your solution to this problem:

You have to replace every F-16 ever made with an aircraft that'll be capable of doing everything it does now, and more, as well as being capable and adaptable for the next 30 years and face both opponents you have now but also be able to adapt to new threats across every threat spectrum.

Go.

I don't know the answer to to this, but it seems like most of the risk is being passed on to the customer, ie. Lockmart stuff up something and it needs to be redesigned and refitted to the fleet and that cost is worn by the procuring governments even though it is the manufacturer that over promised and failed. I think the aircraft will be great once finished, but it does seem Lockmart are taking us for a ride and there is a negative incentive for them to make it right the first time. I have no knowledge wether this is true, it just seems like it from the uneducated outside.

The risk is somewhat shared.

Each year our government has to re-approve the continued spending of money for N additional airframes. We can "save" a huge amount of that 1.x trillion by walking away, but then we're left with another short-run plane like the F-22 and we get to start looking at alternatives from scratch.

Ultimately, the project is too large and complicated to expect Lockmart to take on all the risk of a missed schedule, since a single slip would essentially put them out of business and leave us with either no airplanes or being forced to nationalize their assets, which isn't very popular.

IMO, it's just the state of the game these days. Those old days of 6-8 companies submitting bids and prototypes to build a 15% chunk of our forces are long over.

--gos

Thanks for the insight gos, let's hope they can keep a lid on those costs for all of us who are paying for it.

sorry to turn things away from politics but...

here are articles re: the engine fire incident.

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/f-35a-engine-fire-at-mountain-home-afb-sparked-by-strong-tailwinds

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-pins-f-35a-engine-fire-on-strong-tailwinds-439269/

tl;dr: fire was caused by a compounding chain of events instigated by ~30kt gusts blowing hot exhaust back into the apu. this was a known possibility prior to the incident but pilots were effectively lulled into a false sense of security by the ease afforded by automation.

sorry to turn things away from politics but...

 

here are articles re: the engine fire incident.

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/f-35a-engine-fire-at-mountain-home-afb-sparked-by-strong-tailwinds

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-pins-f-35a-engine-fire-on-strong-tailwinds-439269/

tl;dr: fire was caused by a compounding chain of events instigated by ~30kt gusts blowing hot exhaust back into the apu. this was a known possibility prior to the incident but pilots were effectively lulled into a false sense of security by the ease afforded by automation.

USAF Aircraft Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) Report

What I see in the report; The wind, improper engine start logic (this one is my opinion), improperly written check list, pilot not being trained on some items, not paying attention to the start (think it is all automated), egressing aircraft and not shutting down engine switch. It all happened in around 60 to 70 seconds.

The engine failed to develop RPM while it was receiving fuel, since there was a very strong tail wind, going into the exhaust, i.e the engine was receiving air from a place that it shouldn't, this is not supposed to happen, so the strong wind fed the flame with oxygen, and it ended up having fire/flame which the engine doesn't have control. The engine was under a perfect condition for that, it had fuel, low RPM, heat and oxygen, perfect condition for a fire. This sounds like a hot start with a wind trying to mess up the engine even more, the pilot was probably not paying attention to the temperature and RPM gauges, this led the engine to have an incontrollable flame.

Weird is the part that the engine was receiving fuel, the pilot did not shut off the fuel valve... This kind of thing happened in the past, it wasn't engine's fault, was because of the pilot and weather.

Please do not take this as absolute truth, that was just my two cents.

The engine failed to develop RPM while it was receiving fuel, since there was a very strong tail wind, going into the exhaust, i.e the engine was receiving air from a place that it shouldn't, this is not supposed to happen, so the strong wind fed the flame with oxygen, and it ended up having fire/flame which the engine doesn't have control. The engine was under a perfect condition for that, it had fuel, low RPM, heat and oxygen, perfect condition for a fire. This sounds like a hot start with a wind trying to mess up the engine even more, the pilot was probably not paying attention to the temperature and RPM gauges, this led the engine to have an incontrollable flame.

 

Weird is the part that the engine was receiving fuel, the pilot did not shut off the fuel valve... This kind of thing happened in the past, it wasn't engine's fault, was because of the pilot and weather.

 

Please do not take this as absolute truth, that was just my two cents.

The wind going into the back of the main engine did not have the effect you see. The USAF AAIB Report break it all down very well. Look at page 10 to 13

The wind going into the back of the main engine did not have the effect you see. The USAF AAIB Report break it all down very well. Look at page 10 to 13

That was my understanding from an article that I have received from a friend. Can you please quote that? I cant read it right now

I understand that the air went back to the APU or GTS, not sure which one the F-35 uses, and that caused to engine to not develop its necessary RPM.

First the check list:

The pilot checklist in use at the time of the accident contained a NOTE on the ENG START ABNORM page, indicating engine start with a tailwind may cause IPP FAIL, requiring movement

of the engine switch to the OFF position (Tab BB-24). This NOTE was not included as part of the ENG START checklist.

Pilots training:

Pilots were not trained on tailwind engine start procedures and were not aware of any specific concerns related to tailwinds. Additionally, they did not have knowledge of specific limits or engine parameters to monitor during engine start, other than simply identifying that the aircraft displays were green/yellow/red.

Inattention to start:

The F-35A engine start process is heavily automated, which drove a perception among pilots the aircraft handled virtually all of the starting procedures and so long as the dials were “green” there were no problems

Engine switch:

Upon recognition of the aircraft fire, MP initiated egress procedures per the F-35A pilot

checklist . The MP stated he lifted the cover for the engine switch with

the intent to turn it off, but could not recall whether he had actually moved the switch to the OFF position .

 

The aircraft memory indicated the engine switch was never moved to the OFF position . Further, examination of the switch immediately following the incident found it in the RUN

position (Tabs S-6 and HH-9). Based on this objective evidence, the MP failed to move the engine switch to OFF, as directed by the checklist.

 

The MP was under duress and distracted immediately upon recognition of the fire. The burn injuries sustained to his head, neck, face, and ears are further supportive of the urgency surrounding his circumstances and the necessity to prioritize egress from the aircraft above all else

Improper Integrated Power Pack (IPP, combine APU and EPU) and engine logic or programing (this one is my opinion). In both the engine or the IPP, the computer will increase fuel flow to correct the problems encounter in this situation, this I think aggravated the situation.

In response to the increased IPP inlet temperature, the PTMS began taking actions IAW the hot-gas ingestion logic. Power to the ICCs and ES/G was reduced. Increased fuel was added to the IPP motor which contributed to increasing EGT

Section 6, para b, item 1, page 11

Approximately 24 seconds after start initiation, acceleration of the MA engine began to slow because power to the ES/G decreased due to increased IPP inlet

temperature. Approximately nine seconds later (33 seconds after start initiation),increased fuel was added to the engine because of the slowed acceleration. At approximately 39 seconds after start initiation, the ICCs stopped providing power to the ES/G. At this time, the aircraft engine rotation was powered by combustion alone, which was insufficient to support engine acceleration, resulting in engine speed deceleration. Increasing fuel flow to the aircraft engine continued until approximately 62 seconds after engine start initiation.

Section 6, para b, item 1, page 13

Thats much worse than I expected, thanks for posting it. Initially I thought it was some sort of hot start combined with air in the exhaust, so the engine ended up having no control over the fire.

Pilots were not trained on tailwind engine start procedures and were not aware of any specific concerns related to tailwinds. Additionally, they did not have knowledge of specific limits or engine parameters to monitor during engine start, other than simply identifying that the aircraft displays were green/yellow/red.

this one in particular is really awful.

fc3 pilots irl

Thats much worse than I expected, thanks for posting it.

Hope I was able to explain it.

I'm always intrigued about aircraft accidents reports. They are obviously unfortunate, many time even tragic, but they regularly show that it is never one things, but a multitude of small things compounding into the accident. Pilot training, more clear or better written check list, looking at the engine parameters, different computer programing, etc. Any of those things could have prevented this or at least minimize the damage.

this one in particular is really awful.

 

fc3 pilots irl

Sadly, this is very common (at least in my experience) Many pilots and mechanics have just basic knowledge of many of the systems. Hell, most of the things I know about the aircraft I worked on I learned after I got out of the military, while working on them, rarely did I take the time to learn how it all work and why...I was a terrible mechanic. I great example of how little some USAF pilots know IRL about the aircraft systems, listed to the potcast posted by Knock-Knock here:https://forums.eagle.ru/showthread.php?t=189542

Indeed, the lack of knowledge, training in some situations is impressive. I have seen that myself, the person being a pilot and couldn't understand and explain a few systems of the aircraft, related to the engine.

But this behavior is fairly common in all the latest technology applied to mechanic: for example actually it’s hard to find a pilot of a Formula 1 able to explain to their mechanics what’s wrong with his setup, and what can be done to fix it...all the works are automated, mostly under the hood.

This is the progress ( or the regress?): less buttons, less things to break, more automation and so on...

But this behavior is fairly common in all the latest technology applied to mechanic: for example actually it’s hard to find a pilot of a Formula 1 able to explain to their mechanics what’s wrong with his setup, and what can be done to fix it...all the works are automated, mostly under the hood.

This is the progress ( or the regress?): less buttons, less things to break, more automation and so on...

I'd say this is just the result of technological evolution. There's so much shit you'd have to be a maniac to understand all of it. A pretty gifted one at that.

First-ever Public F-35 Helmet Cam Footage

The footage in this video (aside from at the end) is night vision camera footage from the ISIE-11 sensors, located in the pilot's helmet (HCAM) and on the dashboard (FCAM) of the jet (as shown at the start).

I think this is the first time I have seen the lights at night.

click on image to enlarge

70713-N-LG762-046 ATLANTIC OCEAN (July 13, 2017) An F-35B Lightning II joint strike fighter prepares to take off from the flight deck aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1). Wasp is underway acquiring certifications in preparation for their upcoming homeport shift to Sasebo, Japan where they are slated to relieve the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) in the 7th Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Zhiwei Tan/Released)

click on image to enlarge

170713-N-LG762-062 ATLANTIC OCEAN (July 13, 2017) Sailors refuel an F-35B Lightning II joint strike fighter aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1). Wasp is underway acquiring certifications in preparation for their upcoming homeport shift to Sasebo, Japan where they are slated to relieve the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) in the 7th Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Zhiwei Tan/Released)