DCS: MiG-23MLA by RAZBAM

But this more/less sensitive in the end does not matter. What matters is the end result, that being range. Where they are more or less equal, with slight advantage when it comes to the ML.

 

But here's the catch - electronic warfare exists. And more powerful radar is always an advantage. Until you get down low, where the radar power becomes a hindrance - because you need to filter out all the noise you get reflecting from the ground. Even then you can find the enemy on N003 with enough time before your missiles get in range.

[/Quote]

 

One of the advantages is as well counter-jamming. When the jammer can't send a signal that overpowers yours, you will get advantage. But as you say, there comes disadvantages as well.

 

As for GCI, it's a situational awareness thing. No, GCI will not be able to tell your enemy's energy state from the radar screen. Nor would the poor guy there be able to communicate to you quickly enough. This is the reason why even the "merge" exists. Did you know radars do not have infinite resolution? At some point, speaking about older radars, the "blips" of you and the target will merge on the screen, to the point where you cannot tell them apart. That is the "merge". More modern radars will still be able to recognize and display two separate targets, but the refresh rate and the spacing (or lack there of) will prevent the GCI from giving you any meaningful inputs.[/Quote]

 

And that is exactly the thing here, it is different to try to track something from 600 km than from a 100 km. You have a different resolutions and different capabilities with EW and tracking radars than airborne radars. EW radars resolutions can be in couple hundred meters, not enough for weapons grade targeting but enough for even a dog fight, and tracking radars gives even better idea. As dog fight is not that you swirl around each other's in 100-300 meters from each others, you really are 1-4 kilometers from each others, especially when you have no eyes to multiple threats. And you get to know target speed, altitude and vector so you will know your tracked target energy state if you follow the combat in your mind.

 

The idea that GCI can't see what is happening 2-3 km around you as you are "merged" is just....

None of that necessarily means the GCI is telling you the energy state of your opponent

Thought I'd share some beautiful shots (they're of MiG-23Ms though)

And that is exactly the thing here, it is different to try to track something from 600 km than from a 100 km. You have a different resolutions and different capabilities with EW and tracking radars than airborne radars. EW radars resolutions can be in couple hundred meters, not enough for weapons grade targeting but enough for even a dog fight, and tracking radars gives even better idea. As dog fight is not that you swirl around each other's in 100-300 meters from each others, you really are 1-4 kilometers from each others, especially when you have no eyes to multiple threats. And you get to know target speed, altitude and vector so you will know your tracked target energy state if you follow the combat in your mind.

 

The idea that GCI can't see what is happening 2-3 km around you as you are "merged" is just....

CGI is not a radar... its a system: a system of radars of distinct characteristics, computers, comand centers... etc etc etc, and i dont know the bands in wich operate an modern (or older) cgi radar systems... but i think they can se more than a couple of km in resolution (they have an really strategic role and i think they have betther radars than the counter baterys have... or the guidance radars in the long range anty air bateries) even the airports can measure the distances between aicrafts of very diferent sices (i think diferenc resolution at diferent disctances and targuets... so the theme is more complex)

I think you are thinking dogfigth as an bvr engagement... if you are pursing someone about 7km... and you got somemebody at your 3 chasing you.... you think your radar is going to show you this threat?? you can manage both thread at a time??? sure??? pulling 7g behind someone and loking the thread at your 3?... and if you can do this... how much longuer is that situation?1/4 of a second? the guy in your 3 are behind you with the wingnam of the guy you pursuit and your radar is showing this too????

and... wen you are pursuing the guy at 7km and 7g, in what radar mode you are using?

i tell you... if you can see in your radar the guy at your 3... and the guy you got rigth behind... is command and control who is showing you (cgi, awacs, or the name you want to give them)

Something interesting regarding the use of R-23R:

Because of interference of the aircraft radar with homing head of missile, it flew blind first 3sec in carrier avoidance path. After those 3sec missile will try to home to target. not sure if this was different on R24R.

 

Picture: Mig-23ML from one of the F-1 onboard camera in that combat, Taken from a Cuban Military magazine.

 

Real Story in Spanish about an unsuccessful ambush made by 3 F-1 against a single Mig-23ML. Angola war:

 

¡Cuidado, son tres!

 

Artículo de Maikel Mederos Fiallo.

 

El 25 de febrero de 1988, alrededor de las 17:35 horas, el piloto de tercera, capitán Orlando Carbó, cumple una misión de cobertura al sureste de Cuito en el MiG-23ML matrícula 476. Su navegante en tierra, el primer teniente Ricardo López Castillo, le informa de la presencia en la zona de un Mirage F1 sudafricano.

– 877, tome rumbo 90 grados. ¡Máxima velocidad!

– Enterado, rumbo 90 – respondió con rapidez Carbó.

– 77, el objetivo está delante de Ud., distancia 25 km, 30 grados a su izquierda y debajo.

La tensión del piloto aumentaba con la creciente velocidad de acercamiento, mientras sus ojos peinaban la pantalla de su radar.

– ¿Este radar estará ciego? – pensó el piloto. El velocímetro llegaba a 1 100 km/h. Su mano derecha, sin quejarse, aplicaba mayor fuerza sobre el bastón de mando.

– 877, objetivo 5 grados a su izquierda, distancia 12 km…

– ¿Qué altura más o menos? – preguntó el piloto.

Su voz sonó como un latigazo de decisión que daba confianza al navegante López Castillo quien oprimió de nuevo el micrófono de su equipo e indicó:

– 77, busque el objetivo por debajo, aumente la velocidad.

No hubo respuesta.

– Lo perdí, lo perdí, delante de usted. Búscalo a la izquierda 5 grados.

– 877 ¡En captura!... – apareció en su radar el objetivo aéreo.

Hasta ese momento habían transcurrido 2 minutos y 29 segundos.

– ¡Correcto!

– Completamente de frente – dijo el piloto.

– Distancia 8 km – indicó el navegante.

– ¡Se cayó la captura! – se lamentó el piloto.

Interferencias activas nublan la pantalla del radar.

– Distancia 7 – el piloto no oyó ni contestó nada.

– De frente completamente, 3 km. Búsquelo por debajo. Coge pa´ abajo trancando – se alteró el tono de voz de Castillo.

– ¿Pa´ qué rumbo? – preguntó Carbó con desconcierto.

– ¡Tranca por la izquierda pa´… curso 280!

– 280 grados por la izquierda.

Carbó se apresta para entablar combate.

– Delante de usted, distancia 9… Distancia 7, es una pareja, delante de usted, ahí abajo – se acercaba con rapidez – De frente completamente. ¡Cuidado que están trancando! ¡Cuidado!, de frente dos… – le pasó por debajo.

– ¿Dime?... ¿dime?... ¿dónde?... ¡a la vista, voy pa´ bajo!

– ¿Lo tienes? – preguntó Castillo.

– Correcto, son dos – respondió Carbó.

– Correcto, mete caña, no te dejes coger.

Momentáneamente los perdió y Castillo le informó que los tenía detrás. Lanzó el tanque auxiliar de combustible y descendió con brusquedad su altura girando en espiral. El combate se desarrollaba a alturas entre 200 – 1 000 metros.

Efectivamente, por encima y por detrás se acercan a alta velocidad dos cazas Mirages F1: el MiG-23 ha caído en una emboscada. El primer avión solitario era un señuelo para atraer a Carbó.

Al instante escucha la voz de su navegante que le informa sobresaltado:

– ¡Cuidado, son tres, son tres!

Un macabro carrusel aéreo se entabla en el cielo: de un lado el MiG-23 secundado desde tierra por López Castillo y del otro las tres máquinas sudafricanas empeñadas en coger la cola del solitario MiG. En pocos instantes se entremezclan la emoción con el aplomo, la valentía con la sagacidad y entre giros y banqueos, trepadas y picadas se oye la voz de Castillo que más que hablar grita:

– ¡Dale tú, coño! – Resuena en el intercomunicador del piloto – ¡Métele caña, tienes que tumbarlo! ¡No te dejes coger la cola!...

El avión líder enemigo lanzó un cohete desde el ala de su F1. Con un brusco tirón del bastón de mando Carbó evadió el cohete cuando este se encontraba próximo al impacto. El segundo disparo de “Kukri” se efectuó teniendo una diferencia de 30 grados desde la semiesfera frontal, este se desvió de su trayectoria de vuelo e impactó contra tierra. El tercer y último disparo lo recibió desde la semiesfera trasera y sintió sobre la cola de su avión una fuerte sacudida, provocada por la onda expansiva.

En tierra de detectarían se detectaron tres pequeñas partículas metálicas que agujerearon los timones con diámetro del tamaño de un centavo.

Los minutos pasan a velocidad supersónica y el capitán Carbó amenaza con derribar a uno de sus atacantes. Cambió la posición de sus alas para el ángulo de 72 grados y emprendió la salida del “carrusel de la muerte”. El combate había durado 6 minutos y 15 segundos con el régimen de trabajo del motor al máximo y postcombustión conectada.

El piloto Orlando Carbó todavía tiene motivos para seguir preocupado, su avión ha consumido demasiado combustible en el lance aéreo, tiene dudas de que alcance para llegar a la base de Menongue, pero con la misma seguridad con que le indicara en el combate, el navegante López Castillo, tras determinar cálculos para altura y velocidad le dice que se puede llegar a la base y que el aterrizaje será allí.

En Menongue todos están a la espera, los ojos buscan un punto que no aparece en el cielo. Ya en las cercanías del aeropuerto, Ricardo López cede la conducción a sus colegas y espera, también con ansiedad la llegada del MiG.

– ¡Allí está! – son varias las voces de quienes ven la diminuta figura del avión que se aproxima bajito, arrebatando al tiempo cada metro de un combustible que se acaba y con este la vida del motor. Las ruedas se posan en la dura rampa, el paracaídas de frenado se extiende y ya al final de la carrera, cuando el avión va a girar en 180 grados para dirigirse a su nicho, el motor se apaga en medio del asombro general.

Carbó retira su mano del bastón, se seca el sudor de la cara con la manga del overall. Entonces, una amplia sonrisa aparece en su rostro.

Un saludo para todos.

exelente!!!

Would be nice to see some historical paintjobs with this module.

Some cool nose art from Afghanistan war (MiG-23MLD not MLA tho):

No.55 that got hit by Pakistani F-16A on 12.09.1988 but had light damage and RTB.

No.58 that shot down 2 Pakistani helicopters on 26.09.1988.

No.57 that was used often for CAP and Escort missions.

No.64

I love these @Apok, thanks for posting them.

@OverStratos, @RAZBAM_ELMO, having seen the recent batch of Lightning pictures on your FB makes me think that its 3d model is further along than that of the MiG (though I'd like to be wrong). There's also talk of the F-15E supposedly coming next year, though I have a hard time believing these rumours. Is there any chance you could give us a rough roadmap of planned module releases? IMHO clarifying the situation would be beneficial for both devs and fans alike.

I love these @Apok, thanks for posting them.

 

@OverStratos, @RAZBAM_ELMO, having seen the recent batch of Lightning pictures on your FB makes me think that its 3d model is further along than that of the MiG (though I'd like to be wrong). There's also talk of the F-15E supposedly coming next year, though I have a hard time believing these rumours. Is there any chance you could give us a rough roadmap of planned module releases? IMHO clarifying the situation would be beneficial for both devs and fans alike.

That will be announced after the next OB update

Thank you Elmo, looking forward to it.

i am thinking where come the idea of "pilos in western aiforces fly alone" (almost like hippies in lollapetoza... searching for a beer or something else... hooo good times all my respects to those hippies) and dont recieve orders from cgi... this idea dont come from the usaf... they make documentaries showing they work, and its like i alwais thinck it is... so where the stupid idea comes?.... from top gun and hollowood movies like this? (at least top gun is an good enterteinment.... iron eagles are just crap, below z category movies), i know were the idea of "soviet pilot were robots stupids and soviet machines are made bla bla bla crap bla bla bla crap bla bla bla propaganda bla bla bla crap" this is just propaganda... but tho other idea its a nonsense spreaded all over internet... but where that come from????

In WW2 it was that when a Green aircraft was seen, Germans duct as it was British. When a Grey aircraft was seen, Brits duct because it was German aircraft. But when a Silver aircraft was seen, everyone duct because it was an American.

the Americans shot everything there was moving.

If you listen radio communications from Gulf War to this date in American fighters pilots in engagements, they are alone. They operate as standalone units and not as extension of air defense as missile trucks. If you listen their interviews from Korean and Vietnam wars that pilots has told, they were sent to hunt and not to follow some GCI telling what to do and where. What someone did in the homeland is different as defender has other strategies than invader that needs to attack to defended land.

They're not alone, but they're with other aircraft. US planes are guided by AWACS, supported by CAP and given targets by AFACs. In Vietnam, especially, they did everything from the air. MiGs? Send aircraft to shoot them down. SAMs? Send aircraft to suppress them. VCs hiding in the jungle? Send aircraft to spot them. Enemy infrastructure? Send aircraft to bomb it. Even in the age of joint operations, USAF can and does operate in a largely self-contained manner. That's also why multirole aircraft are such a hit with them, from F-4 to F-35 (and even the Sabrejet had decent ground attack capability).

Not so in the Soviet bloc, where air doctrine was largely defensive in nature, and, especially with PVO aircraft, focused on operating under strict GCI, mainly to prevent the enemy from obtaining air superiority. They were part of a system that included SAMs, SHORAD, EW radars and aircraft. Soviet offensive power was largely about ground forces, both helos and close support aircraft like Su-25 were meant to support the boots on the ground (or rather, treads, as tanks and IFVs would've been used heavily).

This mirrors the kind of experiences both had in WWII, BTW. Soviets were on defensive for a long time, and by the time they weren't, they were basically counterattacking against an enemy who had already broken their teeth on their defenses. US, on the other hand, was never actually under threat, and waged expeditionary warfare with focus on offensive operations, including major carrier and land-based air campaigns. There's a reason it's said that generals are always prepared for the last war. :) That said, F-106 also had a remote-controlled autopilot, similar to the likes of Su-15, and was meant to be used with the SAGE GCI system. F-104 was too small for that, so they used voice commands, but they were also operated under this system. USAF GCI wasn't quite as advanced as the Soviet solution, but it was well known to be an effective way of conducting defensive operations, so they used it.

 

If you listen radio communications from Gulf War to this date in American fighters pilots in engagements, they are alone. They operate as standalone units and not as extension of air defense as missile trucks. If you listen their interviews from Korean and Vietnam wars that pilots has told, they were sent to hunt and not to follow some GCI telling what to do and where. What someone did in the homeland is different as defender has other strategies than invader that needs to attack to defended land.

LOFL, sorry man, but you couldn't be more wrong. They are almost exclusively guided by AWACS when possible or other units. Mostly for ROE and force multiplier reasons. There is a great story from the gulf war about an E2 controller having to get on the horn to the E3 to tell that idiot his F15's were about kill some tomcats that the E3 guy thought were foxbats. Luckily he did in time. Yes, in theory western airforces were always given more leeway than for example the E. bloc. But they all talked to each other and the AWACS or GCI in previous decades.

 

LOFL, sorry man, but you couldn't be more wrong. They are almost exclusively guided by AWACS when possible or other units. Mostly for ROE and force multiplier reasons. There is a great story from the gulf war about an E2 controller having to get on the horn to the E3 to tell that idiot his F15's were about kill some tomcats that the E3 guy thought were foxbats. Luckily he did in time. Yes, in theory western airforces were always given more leeway than for example the E. bloc. But they all talked to each other and the AWACS or GCI in previous decades.

 

You only enforced my statement. Sorry.

GCI is about people (I don't talk it is a radar, but group of intelligence personnel and others that keeps tight track of every own flight what is going where as their orders are strictly followed), while on west they are cowboys where left hand doesn't know what right does, or who is where and when. Why blue on blue happens easily.

The rule was, if GCI doesn't see something then it is no go. As then GCI can't confirm is it a friend or not. In western style, shoot first and ask later. Lots of assumptions and very clear mistakes as not recognizing that UH-60 is not a Mi-24 while flying few hundred meters from them in clear day at slow speed.

The AWACS and other didn't have full picture, didn't know who were where and when.

And when fighters were sent to bombing missions, it was radios off as you revealed otherwise your approach very clearly. No talking in flight, no talking back. Only to use radios if your life dependent from it or it didn't anymore matter for mission success. Talking over radio is like carrying a beacon at night. Any radio emissions reveals to defenders your location constantly.

The intercoms are interesting to listen how much was completely based to assumptions as fog of war is serious problem.

 

 

The rule was, if GCI doesn't see something then it is no go. As then GCI can't confirm is it a friend or not. In western style, shoot first and ask later. Lots of assumptions and very clear mistakes as not recognizing that UH-60 is not a Mi-24 while flying few hundred meters from them in clear day at slow speed.

I mean if this is the hill you want to die on fine by me. But absolutely in that case in 1994, those F15's were talking to the AWACS, and were given clearance to shoot. There were many lessons "learned" and even a criminal trial. But ABSOLUTELY without any doubt, those F15's were talking to the AWACS.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_B...tdown_incident

"The pilots of two United States Air Force (USAF) F-15 fighter aircraft, operating under the control of a USAF airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, misidentified two United States Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters as Iraqi Mil Mi-24 "Hind" helicopters. "

 

I mean if this is the hill you want to die on fine by me. But absolutely in that case in 1994, those F15's were talking to the AWACS, and were given clearance to shoot. There were many lessons "learned" and even a criminal trial. But ABSOLUTELY without any doubt, those F15's were talking to the AWACS.

In vino veritas.

Edit:

The air tasking order (ATO) that was supposed to list all scheduled coalition aircraft missions for that day and which the two pilots reviewed before takeoff, mentioned that U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters would be operating in the TAOR but did not list takeoff times, routes, or flight durations for them.

At 10:15, Wickson radioed Martin on the AWACS and asked if he had any information to pass to them to which Martin replied in the negative.

Both F-15 pilots then electronically interrogated the radar target with their on-board IFF systems across two different modes (Mode I and Mode IV). Their IFF systems responded negatively to the attempt to identify the contact on Mode I. The Mode IV momentarily gave a positive response, but thereafter responded negatively and the F-15s moved to intercept the unidentified aircraft. Intermittent IFF Mode I and Mode II returns from the Black Hawks now began to show on Wilson's and other AWACS crew members' scopes and friendly helicopter symbols reappeared on Wang's scope. After closing to 20 miles (32 km) of the radar contacts, at 10:25 the F-15s again reported the contact to the AWACS and Wilson this time responded that he now had a radar contact at that reported location. Although the Black Hawk intermittent radar and now steady IFF returns on the AWACS scopes were in the same location as the unidentified contacts being tracked by the F-15s, none of the AWACS controllers advised Wickson or May that the contacts they were tracking might be friendly helicopters.

The two F-15s now initiated a visual identification (VID) pass of the contact. The VID pass entailed violating one of OPC's rules of engagement, which prohibited fighter aircraft from operating below 10,000 feet (3,050 m) above the ground. At this time the two Black Hawks had entered a deep valley and were cruising at a speed of 130 knots (150 mph; 240 km/h) about 200 feet (60 m) above the ground. Wickson's VID pass was conducted at a speed of about 450 knots (520 mph; 830 km/h), 500 feet (150 m) above and 1,000 feet (300 m) to the left of the helicopters. At 10:28 Wickson reported "Tally two Hinds" and then passed the two Black Hawks. "Hind" is the NATO designation for the Mil Mi-24 helicopter, a helicopter that the Iraqi and Syrian militaries operated and was usually configured with armament on small, side-mounted wings. Wilson responded with "Copy, Hinds" and asked Wang, "Sir, are you listening to this?" Wang responded, "Affirmative" but offered no further guidance or comments.

]May then conducted his own VID pass about 1,500 feet (500 m) above the helicopters and reported, "Tally 2."[/b]

May later stated to a USAF accident investigation board that his "Tally 2" call meant that he saw two helicopters but did not mean that he was confirming Wickson's identification of them as Hinds.

Neither F-15 pilot had been informed that U.S. Army Black Hawks participating in OPC often carried auxiliary fuel tanks mounted on wings nor had either been instructed in the paint scheme that Iraqi Hind helicopters used, light brown and desert tan, which was different from the dark green color used by the Black Hawks.

Wickson later said, "I had no doubt when I looked at him that he was a Hind ... The Black Hawk did not even cross my mind."

 

Following their VID passes, Wickson and May circled back behind the helicopters approximately 10 miles (16 km). Because aircraft from various nations sometimes operated unannounced in the northern Iraq area, the OPC rules of engagement required the F-15 pilots to attempt to verify the nationality of the helicopters.

Instead, at 10:28, Wickson notified the AWACS that he and May were "engaged" and instructed May to "arm hot."

Serious problems in communications, in rules of engagements, in pilot actions to take actions without clarification from anyone else, especially when they had this time AWACS with positive ID to them be friendlies.

Does nothing more than remind the stupidity between co-pilot and ATC:

Too many hands, left doesn't know what right does, no one really cared about all information and hints there were, all just to "go cowboy".

Regardless IFF malfunction (amazing time to happen) and AWACS being incompetent, the pilots were totally incompetent as well to visually ID two totally differently looking helicopters and to even think that there could really be friendlies on the area.

It would be more interesting to read more about the soviet GCI accidents for similar cases....

It would be more interesting to read more about the soviet GCI accidents for similar cases....

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean...nes_Flight_007

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean...nes_Flight_902

Here you go. Both of those were cases of GCI mistaking an airliner for an US spy plane, or a cruise missile carrier (with a Su-15 being dispatched to intercept a broken piece of wing). While they could see much, GCI was not omniscient, and most crucially, they didn't have visual information that the pilots did.

Do note there were two phases of Soviet GCI doctrine. One was close to what you describe, and eventually resulted in the Flight 007 disaster. This resulted in major changes to the way GCI operated. Most notably, more focus was put on the pilots, and they were both better trained and much less strictly controlled. MiG-23, which is under discussion here, came much later than Su-15, and operated under the latter concept. GCI was still in overall control, and they continued to assign targets to the interceptors, but they were not holding their hands all the way through the intercept. That goes especially for VVS aircraft (and the MiG we're getting is a VVS bird), which were less reliant on GCI as PVO ones (most of them didn't have Lazur, for one). They still could and did work under it, but they could fly and fight independently of it, too.

Here you go. Both of those were cases of GCI mistaking an airliner for an US spy plane, or a cruise missile carrier (with a Su-15 being dispatched to intercept a broken piece of wing). While they could see much, GCI was not omniscient, and most crucially, they didn't have visual information that the pilots did.

Thanks, but already knew those.

but due to a navigational mistake made by the KAL crew the airliner deviated from its original planned route and flew through Soviet prohibited airspace about the time of a U.S. aerial reconnaissance mission.

So not an accident, but clearly violation by the aircrew.

Soviet air defence radar spotted the plane at 20:54, when the plane was approximately 400 kilometres (250 mi) away from Soviet territorial waters.[8] At 21:19 the plane entered Soviet airspace. As the plane did not respond to multiple requests from the ground, a Su-15 interceptor, piloted by Alexander Bosov, was dispatched to intercept the airliner. Having approached KAL902, Bosov waggled the Su-15's wings multiple times, using the international signal for the airliner to follow the interceptor. Instead KAL902 made a 90 degree turn towards the Soviet-Finnish border. Bosov reported the attempted escape from Soviet airspace to the Air Defence Command Officer Vladimir Tsarkov, and the latter, based on internal instructions, commanded Bosov to shoot down KAL902.

Blue is the flightplan, red is the flight route.

Again not an accident, but clear violation and commanded to be shot down.

Deviation from the flightplan was very severe.

But those are not the same thing, or related to it. As example the other was clearly the higher level politics. Unless you want to say that the UH-60 case the AWACS operator commanded the shoot by order, and not just ignore all the information there was that it was friendlies, and not even reacting to require pilots to recheck their visual ID?

Bosov tried to convince his superiors that the plane was not a military threat, but after receiving orders to shoot it down.

So pilot clearly stated that not a threat, only to receive orders to shoot it down.

Similar situation as officer commanding a soldier to shoot an civilian even when everyone see that it is a civilian.

And that is something what makes it horronious how some police officers can shoot civilians clearly seeing there is no threat, because they have been trained to kill people from tiniest reasons that might threaten them.

Do note there were two phases of Soviet GCI doctrine. One was close to what you describe, and eventually resulted in the Flight 007 disaster. This resulted in major changes to the way GCI operated. Most notably, more focus was put on the pilots, and they were both better trained and much less strictly controlled.

Exactly, the Soviet GCI doctrine was that GCI was in full control. If the GCI told to turn, the pilot was required to follow and turn. If the GCI told to launch a missile, the pilot was expected to follow commands. The fighters were extension of the missile defense just by getting the weapons closer and have capability to move as require. But the major change how GCI worked came only after Su-27 and MiG-29, while MiG-23 were still under strict control of GCI.

While western were from the start more of a "go there and do whatever you want to do following the ROE". Communications to AWACS or anything else were not mandatory and were not even possible many times. The pilots were sent to mission and expected to use their highly expensive training and skills to work together as standalone units to respond a sudden opportunities to destroy enemy.

MiG-23, which is under discussion here, came much later than Su-15, and operated under the latter concept. GCI was still in overall control, and they continued to assign targets to the interceptors, but they were not holding their hands all the way through the intercept. That goes especially for VVS aircraft (and the MiG we're getting is a VVS bird), which were less reliant on GCI as PVO ones (most of them didn't have Lazur, for one). They still could and did work under it, but they could fly and fight independently of it, too.

Anyone can eventually fly and operate independently. Just like the MiG-25 defection happened. There was no hardwired GCI control of the aircrafts, all the remote commands to turn radars, set their parameters and even set adjust aircraft autopilots were optional, that pilot could at any given time override or disable.

It doesn't mean that Soviet pilots were idiots, it was just far more effective to be guided by a GCI as you could stay silent all the way in, you didn't need to talk over radio when automated to reveal your existence or your actions. But in a combat the GCI talked over radio with very accurate information about the close combat. We are not talking about combat at 1000 km from the radars here, nor a < 500 meter circle fight. Just like the Americans were surprised about the details and performance capabilities that soviets GCI were able to work with the pilots, it is even today amazing feat. Lots has changed since those days, were Russians are nothing like the Soviet era styles as aircrafts capabilities to provide situational awareness to pilots has gone a lot better since MiG-19/21 days.

There is a difference when you are commanded to do something, and when you are not even capable to even recognize a own helicopter regardless you know it is to be sometime in that day there and you have excellent visual ID for it and yet you go to guns blazing when you should have freedom to question your actions.

This is the similar problem as with nuclear missiles. In the last hand it is up to the two persons inside a missile control room the make the decision to launch the missile, or not.

These things are not easy, they become very difficult when you are given the change to do something based your moral and your decision. And when you put kids (<30yr) in the aircrafts to make dead-live decisions, it has more troubles than when you have them trained just to follow commands where GCI is suppose to work internally by confirming everything before giving such commands, that there are more people involved to make the decisions in more stress-free environment than the pilot in tight cockpit with almost zero situational awareness is capable to do.

(side note, APKWS II..... how much a such weapon in such a scenario would have changed decision making?)

When ever you give someone weapon at their control, mistakes and clear violations will happen. When you mix it with the politics and war mongering that is fed with money and fear, doubts and uncertainty, you move to very high risk scenarios where you can't really train for.

Everyone likely knows the risky situations that happens, that many tries to present in the movies as well:

Based to the real incident of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet...te_Storozhevoy

The MiG-23 was just a part of a larger "machine", pilots training, weapons and all. That was different from what at the time political views and situations were.

On 7/27/2020 at 12:05 AM, TLTeo said:

Yeah the Western equivalent would be something like SAGE (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semi-Automatic_Ground_Environment,

), not e.g Link 4 or Link 16.

No 1 Sweden here think we was the pioneers in data link from West last time I checked. 

The Russian data link system looks like a bad copy of ur Swedish STRIL50 that was designed in the late 40's Finnish in mid 50's J35 Draken was the first one fitted with a data link. Could Voice transmission and tactical help from bas station and for unknown reasons they added digital data. Around 1956 they fast release digital was the future and and the limitations of the STRIL50 was pretty clear.

1961 J35 Draken got a mechanical computer and in service with STRIL60. Now it was pretty much just testing the hel out of the system and connect everything that hade a transmitter. Now it was tweak it to perfection and prepare untill JA37 Viggen is finish it hade been designed on central computer it was named calkylator37. Viggen is the first known aircraft with a central computer. 

 Guess the Russian spy miss that impotent part digital... The Russian data link posted here dated 1975 is pretty much where STRIL50 reach its end and the system was scrapt for STRIL60. I guess all that time waiting for computer to be power enuffe to run STRIL60 for full capacity all J35 and JA37 built had data link from mid 60's and got updated frequently. I guess all the waiting and tweaking pays of. The Swedish Data link had 1sec response in ~1981 it's what's needed for real time data so I can use your wing men or bas radar on your screen an go silent and lock on fire your missile and it flow wing mans lockon. With out this system Sweden would not have a chans to lockon the SR-71 and kept the look even under havey jamming and got a simulated kill. So hav do whe know the Russians data link didn't succeed? They never lockon or shoot down the SR-71.

I rest my case.

The EF2000 is build from grownd up with data link in minde, just like the Viggen and Gripen. It's the one that that have the capacity to run closer to our avagees Swedish for now.

2009 EF2000 for its first time use the wingman's radar to fire a missile.

As JA37 did 70-80's

Stealth planes data link used by F-22 och F-35 is not stable so looks like they taking a brake and are pleased with Link16 for now. 

I have a feeling the EF2000 link will be unstable and end up with Link16. For some time. 

Czech Gripen got the version 3 update 2006

History about the data link and SIRI50 well put together ups and down for the different known system system in use.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/swedish-air-force-datalink-history-and-gripen-link-16-integration-described-by-czech-air-force-article.33880/

On 7/30/2020 at 4:04 AM, Harlikwin said:

 

So what, I'm not measuring sausage sizes. I merely pointed out that it isnt what the average DCS'er thinks when they think of "datalink" like link4 or 16.

No the copy Sweden the spy just missed that STRIL50 after 1956 when J35 Drakeb got the data link it had voice msg and digital data. A light went on that digita data is the future and STRIL60 prio 1.

The expected capacity of STRIL50 is where Russia was 1975. And with out the data link Sweden wouldn't have got a singel lockon SR-71 and no change in hell keeped the lock with SR-71 heavy jamminig. That Russia never lockon on the SR-71 or shoot it down. Its a hard confirm they didn't have any advance data link probably copy our STRIL50 and had to star all over from the beginning in the 70's but adopted computer and digital data.

Best Russian data link I seen today update ever 2 sec at best still to slow for real time data. 

EF2000 have come closest to the Swedish system when radar off an lockon and fire a missile using wing mans radar 2009.

Swedish system with same performance was in service 1981  say it again in service... 

On 3/13/2021 at 1:52 PM, DrPepper.se said:

So hav do whe know the Russians data link didn't succeed? They never lockon or shoot down the SR-71.

I rest my case.

SR-71 was locked almost in every flight according to the interceptor pilots' latest interviews. Moreover, intercepting the one doing the Norway/Murmansk route was a routine flight that was happening trice a week (tuesday, thursday, friday) perfectly timed. Soviet IR systems like OLS tend to lock this high-alt hot target at enormous ranges of some 200-300km away.

Also, shooting down an aircraft above international waters would have a lot of negative consequences.

That, and SR-71 was fast. Sweden was in position to perform good interceptions, the Russians were not. Locking onto something is different from having a missile shot, as anyone who tried fighting with Fox 1s in DCS will know. When this changed, and new SAMs were developed that could catch the SR-71, the overflights were stopped for precisely this reason.

After the U-2 incident, the US became much more careful with their recon flights. A lot of work went into planning those routes so that something like that won't happen again.

13.03.2021 в 12:52, DrPepper.se сказал:

No 1 Sweden here think we was the pioneers in data link from West last time I checked. 

The Russian data link system looks like a bad copy of ur Swedish STRIL50 that was designed in the late 40's Finnish in mid 50's J35 Draken was the first one fitted with a data link. Could Voice transmission and tactical help from bas station and for unknown reasons they added digital data. Around 1956 they fast release digital was the future and and the limitations of the STRIL50 was pretty clear.

1961 J35 Draken got a mechanical computer and in service with STRIL60. Now it was pretty much just testing the hel out of the system and connect everything that hade a transmitter. Now it was tweak it to perfection and prepare untill JA37 Viggen is finish it hade been designed on central computer it was named calkylator37. Viggen is the first known aircraft with a central computer. 

 Guess the Russian spy miss that impotent part digital... The Russian data link posted here dated 1975 is pretty much where STRIL50 reach its end and the system was scrapt for STRIL60. I guess all that time waiting for computer to be power enuffe to run STRIL60 for full capacity all J35 and JA37 built had data link from mid 60's and got updated frequently. I guess all the waiting and tweaking pays of. The Swedish Data link had 1sec response in ~1981 it's what's needed for real time data so I can use your wing men or bas radar on your screen an go silent and lock on fire your missile and it flow wing mans lockon. With out this system Sweden would not have a chans to lockon the SR-71 and kept the look even under havey jamming and got a simulated kill. So hav do whe know the Russians data link didn't succeed? They never lockon or shoot down the SR-71.

I rest my case.

 

The EF2000 is build from grownd up with data link in minde, just like the Viggen and Gripen. It's the one that that have the capacity to run closer to our avagees Swedish for now.

 

2009 EF2000 for its first time use the wingman's radar to fire a missile.

As JA37 did 70-80's

 

Stealth planes data link used by F-22 och F-35 is not stable so looks like they taking a brake and are pleased with Link16 for now. 

I have a feeling the EF2000 link will be unstable and end up with Link16. For some time. 

Czech Gripen got the version 3 update 2006

 

History about the data link and SIRI50 well put together ups and down for the different known system system in use.

 

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/swedish-air-force-datalink-history-and-gripen-link-16-integration-described-by-czech-air-force-article.33880/

 

Which Soviet system precisely do you claim to be a copy of STRIL50? Do you have any technical comparison showing this? Now your post looks like some wishful thinking based on some racist sentiment.

That's some real next-level Swedeposting right there. Impressive.

I am not sure where the "Viggen was the only plane capable of locking SR-71" thing came from, presumably SAAB's marketing department, but it is patently false. Soviet interceptors routinely locked it, but did not fire, because it did not violate the border and nobody wanted an international incident that could lead to open conflict. Czech MiG-23s also routinely achieved lock on it and in at least one attested case, the pilot requested permission to fire (the 71 was still on the other side of the border) probably just for the bragging rights.

Ability to guide a wingman's missile was also achieved by the Soviets in the same timeframe. It's not an exclusively Swedish technology and nor was it 'copied'.

I do wonder how come the Swedes used US-made air-to-air missiles, if their tech was so amazing. Perhaps next we'll hear they were the first to land on the moon.

5 часов назад, rossmum сказал:

I do wonder how come the Swedes used US-made air-to-air missiles

Hey that's too hard on him)))) Even Soviets used US AAMs))))))))))))