Basher54321

Info on a Russian website I saw suggested the government had announced there would be 12 prototypes in service by 2020 for whatever that's worth - think they still need to get some new engines don't they? Would have thought J-20 & J-31 stealth fighters were bigger threats - considering China's growing financial power!

If LockMart built it then Sprey would still be appearing on the Fifth Estate to declare it a Turkey regardless, and this discussion wouldn't have changed one bit. ;) He would have had a lot of material to use from his attempts to stop the first F-14 in the 70s.! Can you specify where you think Berke in the video is misleading the general public audience?

Conclusions “The gun” has a long and storied history within the annuals of military aviation and, in one form or another, has been present since military pilots first took to the air. From simply using their own handguns to shoot at enemy aircraft, to today’s modern Gatlin gun systems, the gun has proven to be an effective, efficient, and dependable airto-air and air-to-ground weapons system. Within an air-to-air environment, the F-35 may find itself within a myriad of situations. Although the USAF has spent a significant amount of money ensuring the F-35 will have a signature which provides it with the “first look, first launch” opportunity, there are undoubtedly situations in which the aircraft will find itself fighting within the visual arena. Within the visual arena, the aircrafts low RCS is largely mitigated and the aircraft will find itself on much more even footing with older or less technologically advanced aircraft. Although the AMRAAM and Aim-9X have significant WVR capabilities, the number of missiles the aircraft can carry and their inability to ensure success within the extremely close quarters expected to be present during future dog fights, makes an permanent, internal gun system more of a necessity than an option. Furthermore, a F-35 gun system will be even more important within the air-to-ground arena. Although the development of laser guided bombs and GPS aided munitions have significantly increased the accuracy of air-to-ground munitions, there is still a significant limit on the number of weapons a stealthy aircraft can carry. Additionally, there will always be situations in which the F-35 needs a fast acting, precise and low collateral damage weapon that only a gun system offers. Furthermore, in both the BVR and WVR environments, a gun system offers an offensive weapon that will be available regardless of the status of other aircraft systems. In short, the gun offers the F-35 an extremely reliable and simple to use “point and shoot weapon” that is always available to the fighter pilots of the future. Recommendations Historically, the USAF concentrates on the development of advanced or future weaponry when it develops advanced/next generation aircraft. However, some legacy weapons, such as an internal gun system, continue to prove they are still viable and are absolutely necessary if we want our future aircraft to have the flexibility necessary for the wide range of missions we expect them to perform. When writing the F-35’s Operational Requirements Document (ORD), the USAF went to great pains to specify all the capabilities the aircraft would require in order to perform in the future battle space. As of this writing, the Joint Program Office acknowledges it faces significant challenges in order to meet the requirements specified by the Service’s in the ORD. Although many argue these challenges will be too costly or difficult to overcome, most within the Air Force’s requirements community understand the importance of preserving the internal gun system on the F-35. In order for this to happen the USAF should take the following steps: 1) “Hold the line” on the gun requirements currently outlined in the F-35 ORD. Regardless of the opinions of the USMC, USN or Joint Program Office, the USAF must not become dismayed or discouraged by the difficulties in achieving the capabilities it has determined it requires. Within the air-to-air and air-to-ground environments, the gun has proven to be a reliable and irreplaceable weapon. Even if Lockheed officially declares it will not be able to fully meet the requirements and specifications the USAF desires, disallowing requirement relief sends a strong message that the capabilities offered by the gun are not negotiable. 2) Direct the Joint Program Office to invest in the development of a 25mm FRAP round. Although the USAF will most likely have to accept a conventional round when the F-35 achieves Initial Operating Capability (IOC), the advantages offered by the FRAP round can not be overlooked. Additionally, the FRAP round enables Lockheed to come much closer to achieving the requirements defined by the USAF and will make the gun system a much more capable weapon. The bottom line is that FRAP ammunition is a proven technology, is currently available, and should be utilized for the F-35. 3) Continue to fund Research and Development (R & D) for new forms of ammunition. Even when utilizing the FRAP round, the limited number of rounds the F-35 will be able to carry is undoubtedly a major weakness for the gun system. Although many of the advanced avionics capabilities the F-35 will possess will help mitigate the problems associated with carrying such a limited amount of ammunition, there are still other options available to the Air Force. For example, there is little doubt that future technologies, such as telescopic ammunition, will offer the F-35 the ability to carry many more rounds within the limited space it can currently attribute to ammunition storage. Improvements such as these will only make the F-35 an even more formable threat and must be investigated. Finally, the USAF must not be timid or reluctant to continue to make its case for including an internal gun system on the F-35. Historical precedent, as well as careful analysis of the F-35’s CONOPS, makes it abundantly clear that a gun system is not only required weapon, but also an absolutely necessary if the aircraft is reign supreme on the battlefield of the future. Without a doubt, any and all of the negative attributes discussed is this paper are overcome by the tactical flexibility and indemnity that a permanent internal gun system offers. Furthermore, there is no uncertainty that an internal gun offers a reliable, low cost, difficult to defeat, fast acting, small logistical footprint system that provides tactical effects that are unachievable by other weapons. It would be completely imprudent for the USAF to pass up the opportunity to field such a weapon on the aircraft that will ultimately represent the backbone of the United States’ combat Air Force. from Case for a gun on JSF - (Colonel Charles Moore 2007)

God help us!

That just about sums up a lot of your posts nicely - especially the F-35/Su-35 video that you are now trying to save face on :megalol:

Two can play these childish games my friend.

Its designation is now Su-57 apparently - looks like another easy target for an F-35C :thumbup:

:music_whistling: Not an uninformed opinion at all - you have been told why - the fact you choose to ignore it is telling. Sprey makes the claim - not much more maneuverable than an F-104 - obviously Berke pretty much has to restrain himself in the reply at something so retarded. The only authority on the F-104 is the pilots that flew them - that doesn't include you and doesn't include Sprey. Their testaments are backed up with reams of flight test data and Technical Orders. On the other hand to suggest Sprey has access to any useful data on the F-35A is still irrelevant because his entire claim is blown out of the water at the PAS without any argument what so ever. Can you ensure you also drop the attitude where you know everything and the rest of the world are total idiots - you are really showing yourself up - and yes it was there before you jumped onto this thread as you put it!

100% well said :thumbup: A similar problem occurs with the Sprey V Berke video - even though as neofightr suggests Sprey might be making some good points in places - what is the point of him doing this if it is surrounded by a layer of Horse**** that is 100% false. People get to the horse**** layer think its the same old Sprey and discard everything else he has to say!

Okay - and would you perhaps agree that Sprey is proud of the F-15 :) I say this because I am astounded you could be so oblivious to the messages that have been spreyed (pun intended ) out publically all these years - not just in articles and videos but even books like "Boyd" by Coram that Sprey contributed to.

Peer conflicts without Nukes? most sensible empires only bully the weak. :thumbup:

They were afraid of getting themselves in close because they had not been trained properly for A-A - it wouldn't have mattered if they were in F-15s if they didn't know how to use the thing in close. Programs like Top Gun gave the Navy these close in skills to utilise the F-4 and it was fairly good in the right hands. You are welcome to make your assumptions that seem to suggest that every air force around the world stuck with F-35 is totally clueless of course. :thumbup:

You have already been told why - this video is not the reason.

Which Typical adversary is that?

The F-35 program office is looking at adding capacity for another AIM-120 AMRAAM radar-guided air-to-air missile in each of the jet’s two weapons bays, increasing internal—and thus stealthy—missile loadout by 50 percent, program director Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan said March 22. Speaking with reporters after his speech at a McAleese/Credit Suisse conference in Washington, D.C., Bogdan said, “There is potential … to add a third missile on each side.” The upgrade would likely be part of the Block IV program of F-35 enhancements, but “that’s something I know the services and all the partners” are interested in. Bogdan said this would not require some special version of AMRAAM, but “the same AMRAAM missiles that we carry today, just an extra one; probably on the weapons bay door.” The F-35 can carry two AMRAAMs in each bay now, or a mix of AMRAAMs and Joint Direct Attack Munitions internally. “There’s a lot of engineering work to go with that,” Bogdan cautioned, and he did not speculate on when such a change could be made. http://www.airforcemag.com/DRArchive/Pages/2017/March%202017/March%2028%202017/Let%E2%80%99s-Do-More-Shots.aspx

Fairly certain it is fuel in the C and either fuel or just literally the lift fan in the B - trouble is you got me searching for the diagrams that you can never find when you need them! Searching for some history on the B/C guns - GarryA not far off :thumbup: Initially, the F-35 ORD had a specific “objective” requiring the Carrier Variant (CV) to have an internal or missionized gun and the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant to have an internal gun that is easily removed/installed and doesn’t impact aircraft handling qualities/vertical landing performance when removed and doesn’t impact internal/external weapons employment when installed. ------ Although the USAF lists an internal gun system as a threshold requirement, the US Navy and USMC listed their gun system as an objective requirement. From the beginning, the US Navy and Marine Corps seem to have attributed significantly less significance to an internal gun system that the USAF had listed as an objective requirement. In any case, issues that appeared during System Development and Demonstration (SDD) led the Navy and Marine Corps to change their requirements. SDD for the STOVL variant were plagued with issues surrounding the weight of the aircraft. For any STOVL type of aircraft weight is a driving factor in the aircraft’s ability to perform the short takeoff and vertical landing maneuvers that give it its name. In fact, in 2004 weight issues with the STOVL became so severe that there was a real threat that the variant might be cancelled.2 During several extensive weight reduction efforts the USMC agreed to modify its objective requirement and instead settle for a podded system that could be carried externally and removed or added depending upon mission requirements. Simply put, the USMC had to make significant capability trade offs in order to save the STOVL variant of the F-35. -------- The US Navy, on the other hand, has mostly given up on the F-35 gun system for the CV. Although the gun system was originally only an objective requirement, issues with weight and space have largely caused the gun system to be abandoned. The US Navy’s current plan is to utilize the gun system the USMC will use on the STOVL variant. The Need for a Permanent Gun System On the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter April 2007 (Colonel Charles Moore)

It is great to hear your insight and opinions - but up till the last post I thought you were someone who had been out of the loop for 20 years trying to feed me information from a site I wouldn't go to for the weather. Anyway the technical issues I cannot comment on - the guns have been there from the start but not going to get into a debate over the history of aircraft development problems - done to death. Guns on F-4s - to see where other forum members might be coming from is the fact that putting a gun on the F-4E didn't just magically change the Vietnam air war - it was just not black and white. A lot of the USAF pilots didn't want a gun because they knew it would put them in situations they were not trained for (which is another issue entirely). It was totally right to put guns on the 4 gen fighters and is clearly still important to have a gun as the USAF have put on the A and the F-22. If you feel the Gun pods on the B/C are not adequate then that is an argument you have against those in the Navy that feel they are. As I said in my first post here - we know that Sprey knows what he is talking about - he gets attacked because of the blatent lies and misinformation he feeds to the public - this isn't the first Sprey video - we have had years and years of this ****.

I am not going to Drone on about Drones (bit OT) - afraid you will have to wait and see like the rest of us. Fred Clifton is also long retired and he was using his experience in his judgment - but he decided to speak to those in the know about it which gave him a different impression. Worryingly you on the other hand seem to be basing your opinions on a few clickbait tabloid news articles - Dave Majumdar has been around for while but the man has to earn his living. We can clearly see with our own eyes the F-35 is anything but a rock!! Lockheed officially have released statements down playing its turn performance and as you can see its original requirements were literally F-16 & FA-18 like performance - the thing was built primarily with more priority on A-G - but it looks like they hit the requirements. JSF Case Study 2008 There are several USN F-4 pilot comments even back in the late 60s and 70s (Red Baron) that clearly state they did not need a gun because the missiles were adequate - right or wrong they were actual combat veterans and not everyone in the know shares your view points. https://fightersweep.com/2698/f-35-worst-fighter-ever/ https://fightersweep.com/2548/f-35-v-f-16-article-garbage/ https://theaviationist.com/2016/03/01/heres-what-ive-learned-so-far-dogfighting-in-the-f-35-a-jsf-pilot-first-hand-account/ https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/update-norwegian-pilot-counters-leaked-f-35-dogfi-422552/

Funny that because the F-35 looks far superior to the FA-18EF in the slow speed high Alpha regime - hate to think you were eyeballing Aerodynamics! ;) Which pilots are these exactly? (better be unclassified ones ) thus far you are one of only a few pilots to publically start slagging it off - and the last one had to backtrack on pretty much everything when he became more informed. I hope all the bad vibes you bring here are not to do with you being turned down for F-35C. And these drones that you are making massive assumptions about - does this please you that you can finally leave the pit for good and fly a desk? You do realise that your drones will still be experiencing X software issues many years into their service with their pioneering systems - it is not some unique case to the F-35 alone that only Boeing can fix with their magical unicorns.

Sounds like you want a fully autonomous thinking AI robot - not sure Drone is the best term considering they have already been used in conflicts for decades. Problem is that it still needs similar sensors a manned jet has (optical/radar) to be of the same level of autonomy - unless it can dogfight totally blind - cant be totally reliant on off board information. Conveniently some of these systems like EODAS have been developed for the F-35 and anything like that going into your robots would almost certainly be derived from that. Your radar sensor might be a bit small after you have crammed in everything with the fuel for range to meet requirements. You also need a stealth tanker if your drones need a lot of refueling to go anywhere. The structural weight will also be relatively high if you want a 6000 hr 30G airframe for example - which outside of a gunfight still wouldn't be enough Vs a laser or a redesigned missile (which have 0 hour requirements ) The F-35 is just another stepping stone in technology development and hopefully a lot of that can be used as a basis for future systems - if not however the cost of even higher technology will be even higher - guaranteed. I certainly await the future debate where Sprey is vehemently opposed to these new high cost /high technology blights on humanity. :thumbup:

I am not overly impressed that Michel writes it in a way that makes out Boyd was somehow responsible for the USAF failings over Vietnam - when in "Clashes" he aims the blame exactly where it really began and ended with total incompetent leadership. Nothing of that nature is "set in Stone" and if they were not "corrected" until the mid 70s it only only confirms how inept the USAF were at the time. Would need to check but the tactics manuals were written off mostly F-100 experience no? The F-15 thing is an interesting one and see it is straight from Suters book - maybe hamstrung was the right word because Boyd seemed to know what he was doing. (e.g. using Sprey as a convenient pawn). Where he was detached from reality seemed to be technology progress - the radars he had seen and used were next to useless - he didn't seem to grasp how things were already changing - will say though some pilots from that era certainly seemed to have a lot of respect for the guy.

Sprey has no credibility and not seeing to many valid points there. The guy is no idiot but he specializes in taking everyone else for one - since leaving the Pentagon he has been aligned with various groups opposed to military spending - so for better or worse he basically wants to influence certain people to redirect those funds to where his buddies need them - he certainly has no interest in providing the US with the best tactical fighter jet. He has written various papers since the late 80s - some are on the net and most can be found at a place called POGO. Read any of the papers they are mostly full of total and utter BS. This is from THE REVOLT OF THE MAJORS: HOW THE AIR FORCE CHANGED AFTER VIETNAM by erx USAF bod Michel III. While working on the F-X, Boyd met Pierre Sprey, a weapons system analyst on the OASD/SA staff, whose background was similar to Enthovenís but much less distinguished. By his own account, Sprey was a dilettante with an engineering degree but no military experience. After graduation from Yale, Sprey became a research analyst at the Grumman Aircraft Corporation for space and commercial transportation projects. He came to OSD/SA in 1966, where he declared himself an expert on military fighter aircraft, despite his lack of experience. Sprey admitted being a gadfly, a nuisance, and an automatic opponent of any program he was not a part of.45 He was opposed to many Navy and Air Force tactical air systems, especially the Navyís Grumman F-14, because of its size and complexity. ------------ In mid-1969, Sprey mounted a formal challenge to the F-14/F-X. In the name of the OSD/SA staff, he drafted a ìDraft Presidential Memorandum [DPM] on Tactical Air,î suggesting both the Air Force and the Navy adopt the VF-XX/F-XX concept, claiming it would allow the services to double the size of their future fighter force.24 The DPM circulated around the Pentagon for coordination and, coming after Laird had seemingly gutted OSD/SA, dismayed both the Air Force and the Navy because it threatened both the F-14 and F-X programs. The Navy was especially unhappy because Lairdís reduction in the number of F-14s left the Navy short of the number of new fighters required for its carriers, but it wanted more F-14s, not a less capable lightweight fighter. The Navy took the lead in the counterattack, and in an informal but devastating response circulated around the Pentagon, George Spangenberg, the Director of the Naval Air Systems Command's (NAVAIRSYSCOM) Evaluation Division, and Fred Gloeckler of the Systems Evaluation Division, wrote a scathing analysis of Sprey's work. The Navy engineers said the lightweight claimed for the VF-XX was unachievable and the proposed thrust-to-weight ratio and wing loading could only be achieved by a larger airplane. They added it was ìobviousî that Sprey was not an aeronautical engineer and that: [sprey's] basic concepts have been considered in detail by the Services during the formative stages of the F-14 and F-15, have been reviewed by DDR&E [Deputy Director of Research and Evaluation], and rejected in all decisions to date...the reconsideration of the concept [VF-XX/F-XX] as a viable alternative should have been turned down before submission to the services... In common with past papers by the same author, this study contains many fallacious assumptions, half-truths, distortions, and erroneous extrapolations. Unsubstantiated opinions are presented as facts. Any rebuttals give the appearance of arguments against the rudimentary virtues of simplicity, high performance, and low cost. 25 This response, while delivered with feeling, was factual and analytical and effectively blunted Sprey's attempt to forward the DPM. It also showed that Sprey was out of his class when confronted with knowledgeable aeronautical engineers, but it was a valuable lesson for Sprey, Boyd, Riccioni, and other Critics do not make arguments in front of experts. Their arguments would only achieve traction when they could present them to non-engineers unaware of the complexity and trade-offs of aircraft design. This meant they would have to move out of the Pentagon and fight on a different field. So as an example lets take Wing loading - by itself it is no measure of how an aircraft turns especially when you get to 4 Gen designs like F-16. it is considered an old fashioned metric because it does not consider things like LEF/TEF, Tail or vortex lift - but mentioning Wing Loading makes him sound like an expert to the majority of his audience so all good! We have just witnessed an F-35 apparently performing a fully controlled helicopter - something thought possible only on jets with TV. On the other hand Sprey in the video has upgraded F-35 maneuverability to F-104 instead of F-105 - of course an F-104 was limited to under around 15 degrees AoA due to its T Tail - again a ludicrous & retarded comparison! - he certainly has no access or any clue to actual performance.

Pretty much spot on - the Bis was heavier and handled significantly differently from pilot comments. IIRC the Red Eagles started flying F-7s (Chinese MiG-21) and noted they were also less maneuverable than the F-13s which had lighter noses.

F-35 & the Air to Air role by Morten Hanche In February, I was allowed to talk about the F-35 during the annual air power seminar at the Air Force Academy in Trondheim. The order was F-35 air-to-air role. I've written a lot about the F-35 and dogfight in other blog posts. This post is an adapted version of the speech I held in Trondheim, and it has a slightly different angle. Initially I summarize unexpected performance perspective, before I go into the main part of the article: How should the Armed Forces use the F-35 air-to-air role? I think this is an important question that we need to have good and clear answers. Seen in a wider perspective seems not think it's smart to try to disentangle the role of air-to-air from the air-to-ground. The point must be that the military must have a plan for how to use the F-35. I will return to this in a later post. http://nettsteder.regjeringen.no/kampfly/2017/06/02/f-35-og-luft-til-luft-rollen/

To add to what was stated re the PF - I have yet to see anything regarding the VPAF ever acquiring or using the GP-9 gun pod on their PFMs before 1973.