Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Mi-24 vs. AH-1 (1970s era)

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

    #21
    Originally posted by Avimimus View Post

    Some accounts can be found here: http://www.airvectors.net/avhind_2.html

    It might have been something I read over at ACIG.

    You might also try: Yakubovich, Nikolay. Boevye vertolety Rossii. Ot "Omegi" do "Alligatora"
    oo thx im excited to read this

    Comment


      #22
      Originally posted by Avimimus View Post

      Some accounts can be found here: http://www.airvectors.net/avhind_2.html

      It might have been something I read over at ACIG.

      You might also try: Yakubovich, Nikolay. Boevye vertolety Rossii. Ot "Omegi" do "Alligatora"
      reading this I cant help but wonder how this would play out slightly more modern - as in like with the E Germany modified hinds that had R60s for small aircraft etc, and I think by the 80s the US was putting sidewinders on apaches at least..
      reading your link though thanks! I wonder if the germany border incident cobra pilot was a Nam vet.
      very interesting the soviets concluded the helo that could turn tighter would win - considering that meant in their estimation the cobra was superior for helo on helo fighting. i really dont know how the hind flies irl, but one would think their fast speed would be a huge ace up their sleeve, and im surprised the sov test didnt state the obvious - that seeing the enemy helos first seems far more important than all the other factors

      Comment


        #23
        Hind vs Cobra in the Iran-Iraq war:
        Attached Files

        Comment


          #24
          Originally posted by sublime View Post
          [...]and im surprised the sov test didnt state the obvious - that seeing the enemy helos first seems far more important than all the other factors
          Yes... that was the impression I got too - spotting the enemy first and engaging it with ATGMs seems to be the biggest factor (beyond the aircraft themselves)!

          Comment


            #25
            The deployment of the Hind was a completely different tactic to that of the Cobra. Russian tactics back then was to overwhelm the enemy with sheer numbers of equipment, regardless of losses. Manufacturing was about quantity rather than quality.
            When the Hind fist appeared, NATO in Europe crapped itself, they had nothing to combat such an aircraft on a modern day 1970-1980’s battlefield. The Hinds tactic was to fly at speed firing mass amount of rockets while Russian tanks and infantry armour raced below. While patrolling the East German border, by air, we would be on occasions shadowed by a Hind. Our official defence at the time was to hide if you weren’t spotted, or, to fire all of our TOW missiles in the general direction if he had seen us( immediately wire cutting each one) and hopefully this on coming barrage would give us time to escape.
            The two main things we feared most at the time of the Cold War apart from the sheer number of tanks, was the Hind and Russia’s battlefield air defence regiments.

            Comment


              #26
              Originally posted by Rabies View Post
              The deployment of the Hind was a completely different tactic to that of the Cobra. Russian tactics back then was to overwhelm the enemy with sheer numbers of equipment, regardless of losses. Manufacturing was about quantity rather than quality.
              The Soviets weren't that loss-aware, and they often had to make do with less electronic (etc.) but - are you sure the opinion you gave isn't actually coming from a post-war account by Wehrmacht officers trying to rationalise their defeat by people they considered subhuman? A lot of American analysis of what a war would look like with the Soviet Union was based on interviewing Germans (as they had experience)... but they were hardly reliable sources - something that has become increasingly true as more data has been analysed after the end of the Cold War.

              Comment


                #27
                Avimimus is correct. Plus, you don't have to look that far - if the Soviet Union wanted numbers over quality and didn't care about losses, they wouldn't have adopted the Mi-24 or its original project in the first place. The entire design philosophy around the Mi-24 was to provide an assault helicopter that was survivable, because it was felt that American helicopter losses over Vietnam were unacceptable and aircraft protection was inadequate.

                Comment


                  #28
                  Originally posted by Avimimus View Post

                  The Soviets weren't that loss-aware, and they often had to make do with less electronic (etc.) but - are you sure the opinion you gave isn't actually coming from a post-war account by Wehrmacht officers trying to rationalise their defeat by people they considered subhuman? A lot of American analysis of what a war would look like with the Soviet Union was based on interviewing Germans (as they had experience)... but they were hardly reliable sources - something that has become increasingly true as more data has been analysed after the end of the Cold War.
                  Yeah, alot of NATO doctrine grew up around these myths mainly spouted by former Nazi generals. And there was Definately alot of "Echo Chamber" effect as the Americans pretty much just wanted hear such things to reinforce their own ideas of superiority. There is good read about Gen. Balk, and Mellenthin and the commentary they had on NATO wargames in the 70's/80's where this is exemplified in the extreme.

                  IMO, the Soviet doctrines were largely just refinements/extensions of their WW2 doctrines that worked well enough. They were also very pragmatic about the cost/benefit analysis of fancy weapons. Though as the cold war went on, you can see the shift to more western style ideas/doctrines in various areas. The other main difference in design philosphy is that the west pushed decentralization, and therefore "tech" out to every level (which was expensive), while the soviets tended to centralize tech resources moreso. I.e. one example is that each US fighter had fancy radars and SA tools, while the soviet fighters relied more on GCI for this, and their radar was mainly meant for the endgame engagement rather than as a SA tool.
                  New hotness: I7 9700k 4.8ghz, 32gb ddr4, 2080ti, TM Warthog. TrackIR, HP Reverb (formermly CV1)
                  Old-N-busted: i7 4720HQ ~3.5GHZ, +32GB DDR3 + Nvidia GTX980m (4GB VRAM) TM Warthog. TrackIR, Rift CV1 (yes really).

                  Comment


                    #29
                    Yeah... it is really interesting. I agree with your point about using expensive technology primarily where it would have the biggest impact... given how small Russia's GDP was it is amazing what they were able to accomplish.

                    In the 1930s and 1960s there seems to have been a real emphasis on radical new technologies in an attempt to compensate for the lack of industrialisation (i.e. having elite forces with innovative solutions defeat an enemy that can better equip large numbers of troops... by countering it with remote controlled tanks using recoilless rifles etc.)

                    During the Second World War we see a shift towards concentrating artillery and armour... and came to have a lot more heavy equipment than the Germans did (and in some cases technologically competitive or superior equipment too).

                    Soviet units in Germany also tended to have more heavy equipment than NATO units did throughout most of the Cold War (although this was partly because they were to advance on large static NATO defenses - By the way, I always wondered if that might be because they figured NATO would be less indiscriminate in its use of tactical nuclear weapons once the battlefield had moved into West Germany??? I have no evidence of this though!)

                    Anyway, it is certainly a lot more complex than the stereotypes!

                    Comment


                      #30
                      The shift towards the Western tactics in the final years of Cold War, and immediately after, was actually a result of the "oh, look, they won the Cold War, their way must be better than ours!" complex that some figures at the top subscribed to, and usually didn't work too well. For most of the Cold War, Soviet doctrine was based on what worked well in their strategic situation, which was completely different from the US. In fact, if you look at the European aircraft design philosophy, they are often closer to Soviet ones than to US. This is because for European NATO members, like for the USSR, WW3, would've been first and foremost a land war, with short reaction times and likely fought with tactical nukes, as well. This called for simpler aircraft, able to operate from highway bases or even dirt strips, with very quick reaction times.

                      In fact, both sides based themselves on what happened in WWII. Soviets had equipment that was not only quite advanced technologically, it was also easy to make, something which they tried to keep going forward, because they knew that during a war, quality can take a hit, especially if your factories find themselves on the front lines. So, the equipment should be able to tolerate a decrease in manufacturing quality. The US, OTOH, never had that particular problem, but required big, long-ranged aircraft, based on WWII-era assumption that US itself was more or less secure from a land invasion, but would have to fight overseas a lot. It's been said that generals tend to make plans for the last war, and this is no exception.

                      Comment

                      Working...
                      X