Two Su-27 fighters collides over Zhukovsky

The most detailed report I've seen so far but there are mistakes in this material, like Vitaly Melnik wasn't riding shotgun in #18 but was flying the #14.

Su-27UB, #18, - front: Igor Tkachenko, rear: Igor Kurilenko

Su-27, #14 - Vitaly Melnik

Video:

http://www.vesti.ru/videos?vid=240026

Tkachenko's last flight, 10 min footage of the Knights/Swifts joint training that ends in tragedy...just click and save:

http://www.aviapedia.com/videos/aerobatic/RussianKnights/Tkachenko_last_flight.mp4

New video found where the actual tragedy is visible.

Watch till the end......

Could someone translate the radio communication from about 7:00 minutes?

What's the two digit number they often call?! (82,85) What does it represent?!

Seems that it all happens when a third guy joins the last 2 and hits one of them... :(

What's the two digit number they often call?! (82,85) What does it represent?!

Power settings

Seems that it all happens when a third guy joins the last 2 and hits one of them... :(

After hearing multiple speculations of how this accident happened we can be 95% sure the following was the case.

 

After the final split, the leading aircraft (nr.18 ) together with slot (nr.01) flew east for rejoin and head back to Kubinka, Russian Knights home base. The left wing, Vitaly V. Melnik (nr.14, also flying east after split) was the first jet to rejoin the formation.

 

This rejoin is what went wrong. Left wing, sliding in from a higher altitude, miscalculated the leaders airspeed and overshot the formation. During overshooting, Vitaly V. Melnik probably lost visual and hit the leading aircraft with the engines. The nose of the leading aircraft was severely damaged.

 

The leading aircraft was a double seater. In the front seat flew Commander Igor Tkachenko and in the backseat, navigator Igor Antonovich Kurilenko. Kurilenko immediately ejected after the collision initiating both front and back seat ejection sequence.

 

Horrifying is that Tkachenko's parachute cought fire during the eject. Though, looking closely at the pictures we can assume that Igor Tkachenko was already dead from the impact.

 

The engines of left wing, nr.14 cought fire and Vitaly V. Melnik ejected a few moments later.

Trying to find out whether the collision was coused by a hydraulic failure or not. I will ask my team mates the exact translation.

7.00: "Visual"

7.02: "when spread-figure "Fontain"

7.04: "Starting"

7.10: "go right in form "rhombus"

7.12: "one,twooo" (Flares)

7.15: "inaudible when spread" (telling him that he have interference in the communication channel)

7.20: "In "rhombus" formation"

7.23: "reduce engine thrust"

7.27: "Go smoothly to the right"

7.32: "pitch a little" (increase turn speed)

7.40: "Visual"

7.42: "increase engine trust"

....

7.52: "41?" (i think he was asking alt or final clearense 1 of his group MiG`s(or 2`nd group of Su)

7.53: "Clear"

7.55: "Visual"

7.56: "Visual"

....

8.00: "prepares figure "loop"

8.02: "Visual"

8.05: "do it smoothly, turn right"

8.09: "Starting "loop"

........

8.12: "241, visual on my right"

8.17: "Smoothly on 3rd, have 1200m"

8.20: "Cpy,cpy, i c u(visual)"

........

8.24: " Vityazi", going on 5" (Changing radio channel for teamworking)

........

8.25: background: "1800m"

........

8.27: "3"

8.28: "4"

8.30: "5" (changing radio channel confirmation by each pilot in group)

.................................

8.36: "5, hydraulic failure"

8.39: background: "going left"

8.41: "1-jump,1-jump, collision!"

8.44: background: "800m"

8.45: "u burn"

8.47: "tailnumber 14 u burn"

8.50: "Rgr-ejecting"

.......

8.51: background: "prepares figure "oblique loop"

.......

8.54: "turn off engines"

.......

8.55: background: " starting "oblique loop"

.......

8.57: "Gordiy,244"

.......

9.01: "I see hes couple"

9.04: "Tagging mark, i see hes parachute"

9.09: "Fix mark"

.......

9.15: "244,900m, over crash-point"

9.21: "Cpy, sending helicopters"

9.25: "He crashed in clear field"

.......

9.40: "U fix coordinates?"

9.43: "Visual"

9.45: "Gordiy, visual crash-point"

9.48: "Cpy 243,climb and maintain 4800m standart proceed Pravdiviy (wp or homebase i think)"

Sry for bad eng.

Thanks for translation!

I guess the radio channel switch a few seconds before collision could have coused a short distraction from rejoining. On the other hand, his rejoin speed is far too high and it looks like he didn't have visual at the end.

What I don't understand is why nr5 rejoined from a higher altitude, the chance of an overshoot and loosing visual contact is much higher in this situation........

2 low video resolution 2 be sure 100%.But rejoin maneuver was very strange and agressive...it was boxing kick...

By the way I saw it #18 and #01 were turning away from the cloud to allow element rejoin to happen in the clear parts of the sky. Melnik's #14 came in too fast and too high and last few seconds before the impact seem like he lost visual with #18 and #01 'cause he was in the cloud at that point. We can see in the video taht he dissapears in the cloud then reapers to crash into #18 second later...

What I'm not sure is the Hydro failure call on the radio...Was it Melnik's voice? Is the audio slightly delaying in this vid? Cause it seems he called it after the collision, perhaps he wasn't even aware of crashing into #18 'til #01 warned him of fire and when he realized he cannot control the aircraft. IIRC #14 rolled inverted after collision!

cause he was in the cloud at that point. We can see in the video taht he dissapears in the cloud then reapers to crash into #18 second later...

Maby u right, but we need better video with hi-resolution 2 clarify this situation...

What I'm not sure is the Hydro failure call on the radio...Was it Melnik's voice? Is the audio slightly delaying in this vid? Cause it seems he called it after the collision

Yes. It was status (failure) report for GC after touch.

 

Yes. It was status (failure) report for GC after touch.

Which is a hard proof that #14 wasn't aware of the collision even after it happened! Guess he didn't have any visual on leading #18 at all!

By the way I saw it #18 and #01 were turning away from the cloud to allow element rejoin to happen in the clear parts of the sky. Melnik's #14 came in too fast and too high and last few seconds before the impact seem like he lost visual with #18 and #01 'cause he was in the cloud at that point. We can see in the video taht he dissapears in the cloud then reapers to crash into #18 second later...

 

What I'm not sure is the Hydro failure call on the radio...Was it Melnik's voice? Is the audio slightly delaying in this vid? Cause it seems he called it after the collision, perhaps he wasn't even aware of crashing into #18 'til #01 warned him of fire and when he realized he cannot control the aircraft. IIRC #14 rolled inverted after collision!

All very well possible scenarios.

He had enough time to abort the rejoin if he had visual after exiting the cloud. In other words, he was probably scanning another part of the sky and not low on his canopy.

Anyway, I do not know about the allowed rejoin procedures of the Russians, but in general aviation the rule is to rejoin from a lower altitude relative to the leader. Firstly, you can better see a jet with the sky in the background instead of the ground, secondly you have far less risk to overshoot.

Guess he didn't have any visual on leading #18 at all!

Maybe, but we dont know what exactly happened first: collision-hydro-report or hydro-collision-report coz trajectory was realy strange and time 2 realise that something going wrong was about 2-1 sec...Any way i think we never know what realy happened in air.:(

Maybe, but we dont know what exactly happened first: collision-hydro-report or hydro-collision-report coz trajectory was realy strange and time 2 realise that something going wrong was about 2-1 sec...Any way i think we never know what realy happened in air.:(

Maybe I will speak with the pilots this summer or at MAKS 2011, though I can imagine they rather don't like to talk about it.

Power settings

With power setting like that Su-27 in FC seems underpowered for aerobatic flights :music_whistling:

Knights must have been looooow on fuel during the practice.

With power setting like that Su-27 in FC seems underpowered for aerobatic flights :music_whistling:

 

Knights must have been looooow on fuel during the practice.

Nah exactly the same, around 92 for going up on loops and around 82 for going down. About 85/88 percent for quick formation turns. Knights fly with about 40% of fuel on board.

Aren't they stating altitude with that calls (92(0) etc.)? We can hear 1000 and 1200 also...

Aren't they stating altitude with that calls (92(0) etc.)? We can hear 1000 and 1200 also...

Neg, altitude is called in hundreds (800/1000/1800 and so on), power settings (if called, often simply power up or power back is enough) is in tens (everything between 80 and 95). And then we have pull up, roll left and so on. Split stages (split, pull, flare and such) are called in 1 (raz) 2 (dwa) 3 (tri) and so on.