The Air Battle over Normandy

Here is an article I came across while doing a little research into the air war over Normandy from 6th June 1944:

Without doubt, air superiority was a key to the Allied victory at Normandy in June - August 1944. This air superiority was based on both a qualitative superiority and a numerical superiority.

The qualitative superiority manifested itself both regarding the technical field and pilot training. The Allied fighters generally were superior to the German Bf 109 G and Fw 190 A in service in 1944. Moreover, at this stage, the quality of the Luftwaffe pilot standard was being worn down to a mere shadow of what it had once been, and this was the result of a terrible attrition in a long fight against numerically superior US formations over Germany.

In March 1944, the German Luftflotte Reich had performed 3,672 combat sorties and lost 349 fighters. That equals a loss ratio of 9.4 %. (Prien, "JG 1/11", p. 821)

These 3,672 combat sorties were flown against approximately 18,000 sorties by US 8th Air Force (including 8,773 heavy bomber missions; I don't have totals for fighter escort missions, but usually by this time there were more escort fighters than heavy bombers on each mission), plus several thousand sorties over Germany and the Netherlands by the 15th AF and the RAF.

Even if the Americans lost more aircraft than the number of Luftwaffe aircraft they were able to shoot down, the sheer numbers made the US losses have a less serious impact. Because of the large numbers of aircraft deployed on each mission by the Americans, the loss ratio in 8th AF heavy bombers was 3.3 % in March 1944, and in the US fighter units it was even lower. Such a loss ratio can be sustained by any air force without having any negative effect on the quality of the crews.

Luftwaffe fighter pilot losses in March 1944 alone reached nearly 22 % of pilots present on 29 February 1944. In February 1944, nearly 18 % of the pilots present on 31 January 1944 had been lost. The losses surpassed the replacements, so rookies had to leave their pilot training schools before their training was completed and were sent into action - against numerically superior Allied air forces.

Thus, pilot training quality inevitably suffered. It started with the calling of many instructors to first-line service. This first step lowered the quality of the trainers themselves. Next, the pilot training schemes were shortened. Already in early 1944, the Luftwaffe fighter pilot training was shortened to an average of 160 flight hours. A few weeks later, it was further shortened to only 112 hours. Finally, in the spring of 1944, the B flight schools were disbanded, and the pilots were sent into first-line service directly after A schools. The condition for the A2 flight certificate included a basic training of sixty training flights with a total of 15 flight hours. Meanwhile, the average USAAF or RAF fighter pilot's training consisted of 225 flight hours.

In his 380-page study on the air war over Normandy 1944, David Clark writes: "We noted how many German super-aces appeared in the air battle. The skill level of the pool of German pilots was not homonogenous but rather, presented a dramatic contrast. The killing of so many good pilots in the first six months of 1944 left most Gruppen with a smattering of super-aces, a small number of experienced but not yet expert pilots, and the vast majority with but a few hours flying experience. These latter had been desperately pressed into service without sufficient training." ("Angels Eight: Normandy Air War", p. 59)

However, a study of the air war shows that the factor which was most decisive to the Allied air superiority over Normandy in the summer of 1944, was their huge numerical superiority.

On 6 June 1944, the Allies had a total of 13,000 aircraft ready to support the Normandy invasion. The Luftwaffe had 1,300 aircraft at its peak (reached on 10 June) in France.

The effect of this is described by one of the German veterans who flew over Normandy, Major Hans-Ekkehard Bob, commanding JG 3:

"I often found myself alone pursued by eight or ten Mustangs, and was able to survive only by mobilising all my flight skills, twisting and turning around small woods and church towers in low-level flight. I was aided by the lacking skills on behalf of the American pilots, since each one of them wanted to shoot me down, and thus they blocked each other."

III./JG 3's War Diary, 13 June 1944:

"Die zahlenmässige Überlegenheit des Gegners, abgesehen von der technischen, ist derart gross, dass Starts in Schwarm- oder Staffelstärke zu untragbaren Verlusten führen. . . . Eigene Verbände werden in kürzester Zeit in Luftkämpfe mit überlegenen Feindkräfte, die laufend Verstärkung erhalten." (Prien, "III./JG 3", German edition, p. 364.)

As a consequence, the Luftwaffe was instructed to operate in "Gefechtsverbände" - intended to consist 40 or more fighters, but in reality, due to circumstances often composed of rather only half that number. These became subject to repeated Allied fighter attacks from several units.

One mission - several combats

As a consequence of Allied numerical superiority in the air over Normandy in 1944, the Luftwaffe was instructed to operate in "Gefechtsverbände" - intended to consist 40 or more fighters, but in reality, due to circumstances often composed of rather only half that number. These became subject to repeated Allied fighter attacks from several units.

Author Nick Beale wrote: "Ultras from the Jagdkorps II in Normandy campaign give the impression that Allied superiority manifested itself as a near-constant presence - i.e. the Luftwaffe was often lucky to get to its target (or off the ground) without running into opposition. The refrain seems to have been 'task not carried out owing to …' "

What was even worse - from the German POV - was that already the first combat during a mission caused the German formation to get dispersed into twos or threes - hence a US 8th AF observation: "enemy aircraft were sighted . . . mostly Me 109s and Fw 190s in twos and threes". These twos and threes then often were left on their own, with tired pilots and aircraft running low on both ammunition and fuel - against "fresh" Allied formations of 20, 30, 40 or more fighters which bounced them from above. (An air combat often has the tendency to drift downward in altitude, so that fighters which have come out of one combat often are flying lower than newly arriving fighters.)

One example of the fate of such a Gefechtsverband is given on 27 June 1944. The largest single mission performed by the Luftwaffe over France on 27 June 1944 probably was that which involved I. and II./JG 27 in the evening, with approximately 20 Bf 109s. These were attacked by the Thunderbolts of 353 FG, and then Thunderbolts of 56 FG joined in, followed by the Mustangs of 352 FG and 355 FG. It is possible that the Mustangs of 339 FG also participated in the onslaught on I. and II./JG 27's formation, since this fighter group claimed a victory against a German fighter in the same area and at the same time, while there are no records of other German fighter units in the vicinity by the same time. The Germans lost nine Bf 109s (the Americans claimed 14 victories) while they only managed to shoot down two US fighters. (See Clark, "Angels Eight", p. 94, and CD for 27 June 1944.)

In total, there were 134 Fw 190 and 196 Bf 109 sorties over France during 27 June 1944, in thirty-five ordered missions. "It is probable that a 'mission' in this context represented an effort by one Gruppe; a Gruppe mission thus contained an average of fewer than ten aircraft." (Don Caldwell, "JG 26 War Diary", Vol. II, p. 292)

Some interesting examples of the vast Allied numerical superiority over France during the invasion of France is given by the combat reports which are published in 20th FG's chronicle, "King's Cliffe: The 20th Ftr. Grp Association":

On 25 June 1944 in the evening, a formation of 49 Lightnings from US 20 FG attacked 15 Bf 109s near Chartres. ("King's Cliffe: The 20th Ftr. Grp Association", p. 161.)

The US report from the mission against targets north of Paris on 28 June 1944, shows a total of 25 German fighters intercepting 684 heavy bombers escorted by fourteen Fighter groups with a total of 569 fighters. US 20th FG, with 46 Lightnings, was attacked by eight Fw 190s and Bf 109s. ("King's Cliffe: The 20th Ftr. Grp Association", p. 162.)

The report for 14 July 1944 reads: "This morning 524 P-51s and P-47s were dispatched to support a special heavy bomber operation in the Chartres area. Enemy opposition was characteristically meagre and 4 of 10 Me 109s and Fw 190s encountered were shot down by our fighters."

Of course the Allies weren't always able to make use of their numerical superiority. To quote Don Caldwell again, this time concerning 18 June 1944: "Addi Glunz took Uffz. Lissack, a young 7th Staffel pilot on a two-airplane evening sweep. They encountered a pair of tactical reconnaissance Mustangs from No. 414 Sqd. (RCAF) and shot them both down. The more experienced of the Geschwader's pilots could best most Allied pilots in single combat, but such opportunities came rarely." (Caldwell, "JG 26 War Diary", Vol. II, pp. 281 - 282.)

In other cases, the numerical superiority would not save the Allies from sustaining bitter losses - like on US 4th FG's last mission on 6 June 1944. David Clark writes that "P-51s of 334th FS, 335th FS and 336th FS of the US 8th AF 4th FG tangled with 10 Fw 190s. . ." ("Angels Eight", p. 42.) I don't know why Clark states that 10 P-51s were lost - due to "mechanical failure, a collision and heavy flak". 4th FG's report clearly states that there were "only" seven losses, and that most - if not all - were shot down by German fighters:

"Fifteen 109s and 190s bounced them out of the cloud cover. The entire section, consisting of Bernard McGratten, Harold Ross, Walter Smith, and Cecil Garbey, was shot down and all four pilots were killed. Later, at 2035 hours, Edward Stepp was heard over the radio to say to Mike Sobanski "Watch those behind you White Leader!" after Sobanski had requested a visual check of his aircraft after hitting some wires. Both were killed. As if that were not enough, Mike McPharlin, who was visiting his old squad, the 334th, on loan from the 339th Fighter Group in his 6N-Z, was lost after reporting his left magneto was out and he was aborting. He wanted to fly "the big one" with his old buddies. He was never heard from again. The totals for D-Day, 4 destroyed, 9 lost. Seven of the losses were on the final mission of the day."

Obviously, Clark made a mistake when he placed this disastrous combat at "just after noon", since the 4th FG report clearly states that it was "The last mission of the day [which also] was the worst for the 4th since its inception when 12 Spitfire MkIXs were lost near Morlaix, France"- i.e. at between 2030 and 2100 hours.

The "fifteen 109s and 190s" which bounced 4th FG clearly were a composite formation from JG 2 and 2./JG 26, led by Hptm. Herbert Huppertz. These German pilots claimed six Mustangs, one Thunderbolts and three Typhoons during this mission (of which Huppertz contributed a Mustang and a Thunderbolt). In all, these German pilots were engaged by at least the Mustangs of 4th and 352nd FG, the Thunderbolts of 56 FG, and Typhoons of 2nd TAF. Probably they were engaged by even further Allied units on this day - when the Luftwaffe fighters in France performed a total of 172 sorties throughout the day (divided between at least 13 separate missions from 0800 hrs to midnight ), versus 14,674 Allied sorties (including 2,185 by US 8th AF fighters) over the landing region.

In an analysis on the air war during the Winter War in particular and numerical superiority in general, Cdr (USN Ret) Robert L. Shaw (Author of "Fighter Combat") writes: "Quantity is typically much better correlated with the final outcome of a conflict than with aircraft exchange ratios. If the side with superior numbers is willing and able to make good on its losses, it can accomplish its goals in support of the overall effort and eventually achieve victory. The price, however, may be great." See the Fighter Tactics Academy website: http://www.sci.fi/~fta/winter-w.htm

This was precisely the case during the air war over Normandy in the summer of 1944, which cost the Allies many more aircraft than the Luftwaffe lost, but being "the side with superior numbers", and willing and - above all! - able to make good on its losses, the Western Allies could "accomplish their goals in support of the overall effort and eventually achieve victory."

Here are the aircraft loss figures for the air war over France during the period 6 June 1944 - 30 June 1944:

2nd TAF: 322 aircraft (Clark, "Angels Eight", p. 170)

9th AF: 302 aircraft (Rust, "The 9th Air Force in World War II", p. 90)

8th AF: 359 aircraft (137 bombers, 222 fighters) (Freeman, "The Mighty Eighth War Diary", pp. 259 - 283 - only losses in France included)

Total losses by 2nd TAF, 9th AF and 8th AF in France 6 June 1944 - 30 June 1944: 983.

Since losses sustained by ADGB, RAF Bomber Command (which alone lost over 300 bombers in June 1944, many of them over France), and other commands must be added to the figures above, the total number of Allied aircraft lost over France during the period 6 June 1944 - 30 June 1944 definitely exceeds one thousand, I would say approximately 1,200 Allied aircraft were lost over France during this period.

During the same period, the Luftwaffe lost 646 fighters, fighter-bombers and medium bombers in France. (Clark, "Angels Eight", p. 170)

Thus, while almost two Allied aircraft were lost for every German aircraft loss, these losses should be compared with each side's numerical strength. During this period, the Allied air forces performed 99,000 sorties over France (Clark, p. 98 ), while the Luftwaffe only flew 13,315 sorties over France (Prien, "JG 1/11", p. 1051). Thus, the Allied loss rate was only around 1 % while the German loss rate was almost 5 %.

Out of a total of 13,000 Allied aircraft on 6 June 1944, less than 10 % were lost over France between 6 and 30 June 1944. Out of 1,300 Luftwaffe aircraft in France (the peak number, reached on 10 June), around 50 % were lost between 6 and 30 June 1944.

Part 4, the last part of this article, examines the cases when a number of German aces were killed in action during the Battle of France in 1944

If we go through the cases of a number of Luftwaffe "super aces" (to borrow David Clark's term) who were killed in action in Normandy, the effect of an almost ever-present Allied numerical superiority becomes clear:

Major Herbert Huppertz, a veteran who was in first-line service from 1939, attaining 70 victories, and served as III./JG 2's Gruppenkommandeur: On 6 June 1944, Huppertz testified to the value of the German "super veterans" over Normandy - particularly in exceptional cases when Allied airmen due to a combination of bad luck and poor planning were caught without the numerical superiority which they usually enjoyed. At noon on 6 June 1944, Obstlt. Kurt Bühlingen (who scored his 100th victory on 7 June 1944) and Huppertz participated when 29 Fw 190 attacked at least 24 Thunderbolts (of US 365 FG) and Typhoons (of RAF 183 Sqn). The Germans claimed to have shot down six Allied fighters - including two Typhoons in less than two minutes by Huppertz - against a single own loss. Actual Allied losses in this engagement were five (two P-47s, three Typhoons). (Clark, "Angels Eight", p. 42.) That same evening, Huppertz caught eight Typhoons of 164 Sqn and shot one down, with F/O Roberts KIA. (David Clark, CD "Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary", 6 June 1944.) During another mission late on 6 June, Huppertz engaged the numerically superior formations of Allied aircraft which by that time swarmed the whole sky in the area (on 6 June 1944, the USAAF and RAF conducted 14,674 sorties over the Normandy area - against only 319 Luftwaffe sorties). During this single mission, Huppertz was entangled in combat with several Allied fighter units, involving both Mustangs and Thunderbolts, but in spite of all odds he claimed a Mustang and a Thunderbolt. David Clark has identified the former as one of US 352 FG's losses, while the Thunderbolt was one of a total of 2,302 Thunderbolts despatched by US 8th and 9th AF (Freeman, "The Mighty Eighth War Diary", p. 259; Rust, "The 9th Air Force", p. 84.) Thus, Huppertz had scored five victories in a single day.

At around 0945 on 8 June 1944, a formation of Fw 190s of III./JG 2 were engaged by both Mustangs and Thunderbolts: Mustangs from 361 FG's Mustang (whereby Hptm. Wurmheller claimed one Mustang, while 361 FG failed to shoot down any of III./JG 2's Fw 190s), and Thunderbolts from possibly both 56 FG and 353 FG. Four Fw 190s were claimed by 353 FG during the morning mission, and 56 FG simultaneously claimed one or more Fw 190s. 56 FG made its claims when it attacked a group of German fighters which were taking off from an airfield. Only two Fw 190s were lost by the Germans in that very uneven combat, and one of them was flown by Huppertz - who was killed. (David Clark, CD "Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary", 8 June 1944.)

Hptm. Karl-Heinz Weber, a veteran with over 500 combat missions from the autumn of 1940, and 136 victories, Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 1: At around 1000 hrs on 7 June 1944, about 10 Bf 109s of III./JG 1, commanded by Hptm. Weber, were en route to the frontlines. (Clark, "Angels Eight", p. 56.) But already northeast of Paris they were attacked from above by 30 Allied fighters (Prien, "JG 1/11", pp. 1008 - 1009), and Weber crashed to his death at Pontoise, north of Paris. Apart from Weber, one more III./JG 1 Bf 109 was shot down in that combat. It is possible that Weber was killed in combat with 24 Mustangs from 306 and 315 squadrons of 133 (Polish) Wing, which claimed to have shot down four Bf 109s in the Dreux area. (David Clark, CD "Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary", 7 June 1944.) Due to a Polish aviation enthusiast, Weber was shot down in a combat with only four Polish Mustangs, but I have in vain asked to see the source to that claim.

Hptm. Josef Wurmheller, a veteran with over 300 combat missions from 1939 and 102 victories, commanded 9./JG 2 at Normandy: On 22 June 1944, Wurmheller was killed when he collided with his own wingman near Alencon. (Obermaier, "Die Ritterkreuzträger der Luftwaffe", Vol. 1, ed. 2, p. 38.)

Hptm. Siegfried Simsch, a veteran with around 400 combat missions from the autumn of 1940, and 54 victories: Simsch was killed in action early on 8 June 1944, when I./JG 11 despatched around 20 Fw 190s in a fighter-bomber mission against the Allied landing fleet. Having endured the hellish fire from hundreds of AAA guns from the landing fleet, the dispersed remnants of I./JG 11 were attacked by numerically superior Allied fighters. (Prien, "JG 1/11", pp. 1019 - 1020.) The Allies conducted 1096 fighter sorties for beach patrol (David Clark, CD "Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary", 8 June 1944), and it is possible that many of these fighters engaged Simsch - but according to David Clark's "Angels Eight", he was killed in combat with Mustangs of 339 FG, which formed part of 869 Mustangs and Thunderbolts of US 8th Air Force which simultaneously were out on search-and-destroy missions against lines of communications. (Freeman, "The Mighty Eighth War Diary", p. 262.) David Clark writes: "Simsch spotted a small formation of P-51s from 339th FG of the US 8thAF and immediately attacked not realizing that the whole FG was in the vicinity - the others hidden by clouds. Attacking from above, the 503rd FS and 505th FS swept down." (Clark, "Angels Eight", p. 62)

Oblt. Eugen-Ludwig Zweigart, a veteran in first-line service since the fall of 1940, with 69 victories, with III./JG 54: All I know is that on 8 June 1944 his Fw 190 A-8 (WNr 170736, "Black 3") was shot down in aerial combat near Le Cambaux. Zweigart baled out but was gunned to death has he hung in his parachute. Based on US 8th AF's reports, Roger A. Freeman wrote: "On the 8th [of June 1944], 130 enemy aircraft were sighted during the day, mostly Me 109s and Fw 190s in twos and threes." ("The Mighty Eighth", p. 166.) US 8th AF alone performed 2077 sorties over Normandy on 8 June 1944, and these 2077 pilots sighted a total of 130 German aircraft - mostly flying in twos and threes. On 8 June 1944, the Allied fighter pilots claimed to have shot down 60 German fighters (David Clark, CD "Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary", 8 June 1944), and Luftflotte 3 claimed 21 victories. (Prien, "JG 1/11", p. 1021.) Actual Luftwaffe losses were either 30 aircraft (Clark, "Angels Eight", p. 63) or 36 aircraft (Prien, "JG 1/11", p. 1051) while the Allies lost 42 aircraft. (Freeman, "Mighty Eighth War Diary", p. 261 - 262, 2nd TAC Losses, and http://www.geocities.com/AF9th/new_page_13.htm )

Hptm. Emil Lang (403 combat missions, 173 victories): On 3 September 1944, three (or maybe six) Fw 190s led by Lang were bounced by 338 Sqn/55 FG (8th AF) and RAF ADGB 41 Squadron - altogether maybe something like 25 Allied fighters, resulting in two German and one Allied fighter getting shot down.

The Mustangs of 338 Sqn/55 FG (8th AF) - i.e. probably 15 to 18 Mustangs - attacked the formation of three Fw 190s led by Lang, and after Lang's undercarriage and fallen down he was shot down and killed. This matches with the claims made by 338 Sqn/55 FG. But then one of Lang's wingmen shot down a Spitfire, whose pilot was buried at the same place. Researching that particular combat, that led Don Caldwell to find another Allied unit participating in the attack against Lang's formation: RAF ADGB 41 Squadron, which reported eight Spitfire XIIs attacking three Fw 190s in the same area. Caldwell speculates that there may have been an additional Kette of three Fw 190s, which is not mentioned in the German report. (Caldwell, "JG 26 War Diary", Vol. II, p. 343.)

I have posted this extract not to start a debate about it, but merely to give some insight into one author's research and conclusions. No doubt, there are a number among us who would take delight in ripping it apart, and declaring what he says here as garbage, but if so, please take it up with the author directly, and don't use my posting as another excuse to brow beat, debase, or demean the events of 1944 to your own ends.

Short version: by the time the Allies invaded Occupied France, the Luftwaffe was a) short on planes, and b) short on trained pilots. Yup?

Thanks for the collation of the information, and I wasn't aware that either of those points were ever under dispute. Certainly every source I've read, including the accounts of both Allied and Luftwaffe pilots, support this.

As stated, the article has been posted for information only, and not to start, continue, or enter into any kind of debate.

I wasn't suggesting anything, just providing a little background information for the Normandy theatre in 1944.

Some more info, 2ndTAF and the Normandy Campaign

For some reason will not connect

Thanks Neil.

I have compiled an extensive list of all squadrons flying mostly Mk. IXs, which subtype and the corresponding time period of operation. However, I am missing some information regarding RCAF squadrons.The RAF documents are not very yielding in regards to RCAF squadrons. And I have no acces to possible RCAF documentation.

Does anybody have reliable information on dates concerning the following Squadrons?

411 Squadron IXb (10/43 - 09/44); IXe (09/44 - ?/45) to Europe 19/06/44

412 Squadron IXb (11/43 - ?/45) to Europe 18/06/44

416 Squadron IX (3/43 - ???) to Europe 16/06/44

421 Squadron IXb (5/43 - ???) to Europe 16/06/44

402 Squadron (8/44 - ???) to Europe 30/09/44 (XIVe)

Recce

430 Squadron (between 6 to 12 ?/44 - 8/45) (partly converted/ F converted into FR)

PS: I am sorry, I didnt want to hijack your thread! Good read, thank you!

411 Spitfire XVIs in 1945

421 converted to Spitfire XIVs in Dec 1944

402 Spitfire Mk.IXc (July 1944 – August 1944) Spitfire Mk.XIVe (August 1944 – June 1945)

Ok I just missed it, here is what I have found so far. Looking much better than before! :) Thank you for the response.

401 Squadron IXB (8/42 - 12/42); IXB (10/43 - 4/45) to Europe 18/06/44

402 Squadron IX (8/42 - 3/43); IXc (7/44 - 8/44)

403 Squadron IXb (1/43 - 12/44) to Europe 16/06/44

411 Squadron IXb (10/43 - 09/44); IXe (9/44 - 5/45) to Europe 19/06/44

412 Squadron IXb (11/43 - 9/44); IXe (9/44 - 5/45) to Europe 18/06/44

414 Squadron IX (08/44 - 4/45)

416 Squadron IX (3/43 - 6/43); IXB (6/44 - 12/44) to Europe 16/06/44

417 Squadron IX (3/44 - 5/44); IX (4/45 - 7/45) MTO

421 Squadron IX (5/43 - 2/44); IXB (2/44 - 12/44) to Europe 16/06/44

441 Squadron IXB (3/44 - 1/45); IX (1/45 - 5/45) to Europe 15/06/44

442 Squadron IXB (3/44 - 9/44); IXe (9/44 - 4/45) to Europe 15/06/44

443 Squadron IXB (4/44 - 2/45) to Europe 15/06/44

451 Squadron IX (12/43 - 1/45)

453 Squadron IXB (3/43 - 6/43); IXB/IXe (1/44 - 11/44) to Europe 25/06/44

485 Squadron IXB (7/43 - 11/43); IXB (2/44 - 7/44); IXB (4/45 - 8/45); IXe (7/44 - 2/45) to Europe 31/08/44

402 Squadron XIVe (8/44 - 1/45) to Europe 30/09/44

414 Squadron XIV (4/45 - 7/8/45)

430 Squadron XIV (11/44 - 8/45) (full conversion 1/45/ F converted into FR)

And most of this realities can't translated for a "computer game" in MP. :)

451, 453 and 485 are not RCAF squadrons.

Til Nov '44 451 was in the MTO. converted to Spitfire XVIs

453 converted to Spitfire XVIs Nov '44.

True, I just have all "400s" in one sheet. I was missing mainly info on the RCAFs though. :) I also havent done the XVIs yet.

Normandy Based December 1944

XIV Squadrons:

Squadrons 402, 130, 350, 610, 41,

XIV Fighter Recce Squadrons:

Squadrons 2 and 430

UK Based December 1944

Long Range Escort Squadrons:

Squadrons 91, 322

Corresponds pretty much with what I have on the Mk XIV so far.

Mk XIV

41 Squadron (9/44 - 9/45) to Europe 05/12/44 (5/11/44 2nd TAF, armed recon)

91 Squadron (3/44 - 8/44) not in Europe

130 Squadron (8/44 - 5/45) to Europe ?

322 Squadron (3/44 - 8/44) not in Europe

350 Squadron (8/44 - 11/45) to Europe 03/12/44

402 Squadron (8/44 - 1/45) to Europe 30/09/44 (XIVe)

610 Squadron (1/44 - 3/3/45) to Europe 04/12/44

Recce Mk XIV FR

2 Squadron (11/44 - 09/45) to Europe 29/06/44 (Mustang sorties until 17/1/45)

268 Squadron XIVB (4/45 - 9/45) to Europe 8/44

414 Squadron XIV (4/45 - 7/8/45)

430 Squadron XIV (11/44 - 8/45) (full conversion 1/45/ F converted into FR)

322 went to B.79 1-3-45

Not with MK XIVs. ;) It is only mentioned if they were stationed in Europe with that specific Mk.

PS:

UK Based December 1944

 

Long Range Escort Squadrons:

 

Squadrons 91, 322

Not with MK XIVs. ;) It is only mentioned if they were stationed in Europe with that specific Mk.

 

PS: Both Squadrons are equipped with Mk IXBs in Dec 44. The Mk IX list is a monster and took me ages.. :(

Interesting it looks like they reverted back to IX from XIV, the XIV must have been shipped off to the anti diver squadrons.

They are not cheap ($$$) books but one should read:

2nd Tactical Air Force, Vol. 1: Spartan to Normandy, June 1943 to June 1944

2nd Tactical Air Force Vol. 2: Breakout to Bodenplatte July 1944 to January 1945

2nd Tactical Air Force: Volume 3 From the Rhine to Victory

2nd Tactical Air Force: Volume 4: Squadrons, Camouflage Markings, Weapons and Tactics 1943-45

Yes, these are good books indeed MoloMorai! :thumbup: I personally only have the last one, but probably all of them are well worth acquiring.

Second Tactical Air Force Order of Battle -- June 1944

http://www3.sympatico.ca/angels_eight/2tac.html

U.S.Ninth Tactical Air Force Order of Battle -- June 1944

http://www3.sympatico.ca/angels_eight/9tac.html

Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs) in Normandy

http://www3.sympatico.ca/angels_eight/alg.html

Luftwaffe Order of Battle May 31 1944

http://www.oocities.org/sturmvogel_66/LWOB.html#Jagdwaffe

As it is not allowed to make correction to bombastic statements in certain threads........

JGs that used the K-4

Unit - date introduced to unit (1944) - number of K-4s + other 109s at month end - (end of Dec) - Losses

III./JG4 - Oct - 15 + 38 - (26 + 2) - 24

I./JG27 - Oct - 57 + 1 - (14 + 1) - 19

II./JG27 - Oct - 2 + 57 - (0 + 21) - 2

III./JG27 - Oct - 55 + 2 - (26 + 0) - 47

IV./JG27 - Oct - 4 + 58 - (0 + 32) - 2

III./JG77 - Oct - 67 - (27) - 26

II./JG2 - Nov - 2 + 56 - (9 + 20) - 7

III./JG3 - Nov - 9 + 58 - (8 + 16) - 8

II./JG26 - Nov - 35 + 36 - (29 + 15) - 41

I./JG4 - Dec - 2 + 26 - 0

II./JG11 - Dec - 11 + 58 - 1

II./JG53 - Dec - 5 + 37 - 0

I./JG77 - Dec - 1 + 37 - 0

IV./JG4 – (7 + 25)

S./JG53 – (2 + 4)

III./JG1 - Nil 1944

III./JG51 - Nil 1944

II./JG52 - Nil 1944

III./JG52 - Nil 1944

III./JG53 - Nil 1944

II./JG77 - Nil 1944

Now Kurfurst can go on and on about the 854 K-4s built til end of 1944 but the truth is there was only 168 actually with front line units and even less operational serviceable. Also notice that more K-4s had been lost than were 'onhand' at the end of Dec '44.

Does the dating - October onwards - reflect the fact that there were none around before October 1944?

It would seem you have made some typos/errors while complying that list Milo, for example JG 77 had 75 K-4 at the start of October 1944, and 67 on the last day of the month (8 seems to have been damaged/destroyed in accidents).

I am sure these are just honest mistakes, as always.

Anyways its funny to see a single K-4 Wing, III/JG 77 could muster more aircraft for operations than all the Mark XIV the RAF had. And yet we have people here on the board like Krupi and Solty who keep on with the mantra how 'rare' that bird was!

It looks like to me that ED has made the wise choice by disregarding these isolated hysterics for aircraft that only saw service in insignificant, penny packet numbers and carried on with the commonplace Mark IXc at its historical +18 lbs and the K-4 and D-9.

Thank you Kurfurst, I will correct to 67.

No III./JG77 did not have 75 K-4s at the beginning of Oct as they didn't begin arriving at the unit til mid Oct. If they were there at the beginning of Oct they would have been counted at the end of Sept, which they are not. I am sure this is an honest mistake on your part Kurfurst.

Yes Neil.

It still doesn't relate to how many were available for the D-Day campaign, which really ended with the Falaise gap being closed on 21st August 1944. That single event distinctly marks the end of the Battle for Normandy, and resulted in catastrophic losses to the German army.

Knowing what was available in October is hardly relevant to the Normandy theatre of operations, as by then fighting was all but over in that phase of the conquest of Europe.

Even the Battle of Arnhem was over before October, so knowing how many K4s were around in October has absolutely no impact during the air battle over Normandy.

How many were available to the Luftwaffe from say January 1944 until the beginning of September?

Don't get me wrong, I am not trying to get anything excluded, I'm just, as previously stated, interested in the history of the campaign. We have the modules we have, and we're getting the ones we're getting, so they're what we'll be flying.

It would seem you have made some typos/errors while complying that list Milo, for example JG 77 had 75 K-4 at the start of October 1944, and 67 on the last day of the month (8 seems to have been damaged/destroyed in accidents).

 

I am sure these are just honest mistakes, as always.

 

Anyways its funny to see a single K-4 Wing, III/JG 77 could muster more aircraft for operations than all the Mark XIV the RAF had. And yet we have people here on the board like Krupi and Solty who keep on with the mantra how 'rare' that bird was!

 

It looks like to me that ED has made the wise choice by disregarding these isolated hysterics for aircraft that only saw service in insignificant, penny packet numbers and carried on with the commonplace Mark IXc at its historical +18 lbs and the K-4 and D-9.

Please don't spread lies Kurfurst, I have said that the Tempest, XIV, Kurfurst and Dora were all rare aircraft, which is a fact.